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ABSTRACT 
Oblique Optics contends that studies of visual culture must account for the 
queerness of images. This argument posits images as queer residents within visual 
culture by asking how and where the queerness of images becomes visible. These 
questions are interrogated by utilizing queer theories and methods to refigure how the 
image is conceptualized within traditional approaches to visual culture studies and 
media studies. Each chapter offers different approaches to see the queerness of 
images by torquing our vision to see "obliquely," whereby images are located beyond 
visible surfaces (like pictures or photographs) through ec-static movements within 
thresholds between bodies and beings. 
Chapter One rethinks how images are conceptualized through metaphorical 
language by exploring how images emerge from fantasies about will-be-born bodies in 
fetal photographs. This chapter turns to figures of queer children for insight about 
oblique approaches to visual culture and foregrounds later engagements with 
aesthetics of failure. Chapter Two considers how aesthetics of failure extend to the 
visible forms of lacking bodies. The visibility of lack is explored by considering how 
pixelated vision provides alternative ways to image mastectomy scars in the film The 
Body Beautiful (1991) and the advertising campaign "Obsessed with Breasts." Chapter 
Three addresses the visible form and function of cutting within images about Michael 
Jackson and these images are shown cutting the body toward non-human forms of 
visibility. Chapter Four expands on this discussion about the non-human by 
contemplating how the film Air Doll (2009) reveals a visual culture of things, where we 
not only see things but also see how things see. Finally, Chapter Five turns to digital 
glitches as a visible form to explore how non-human bodies like the computer produce 
images beyond human-centric concerns and reveals how the digital is shown to image 
itself. 
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 1 
PREFACE 
What pictures want from us, what we have 
failed to give them, is an idea of visuality 
adequate to their ontology. —W.J.T. Mitchell1 
I have studied and written about theories of queerness through most of my time 
in academia and this project began while I was exploring how queer theory (or the 
broader interdisciplinary field of queer studies) would be useful when applied to the 
field of visual culture studies. In this process, I began to see the use of the term 
"queer" in its gerund form as strikingly similar to descriptions about the movements of 
images.2 This initial perception resulted in a rather simplistic question: "Are images 
queer?" My response was an emphatic affirmation—"Of course images are queer!"—
because it seemed little could not be (or had not been) considered queer in 
contemporary academic scholarship.3 And, yet, this answer did not seem satisfactory. 
                                            
1 W. J. T. Mitchell, "What Do Pictures "Really" Want?," October 77(1996): 82. 
2 I describe how I use the term "queer" in the first chapter, with additional references in 
footnotes 29 and 30.  
3 There are countless examples I could offer, so I provide the following list to illustrate a range 
of queer(ed) topics beyond the scope of what I address in my dissertation. Beyond more 
familiar topics like bodies, gender, sex, and sexuality, consider: animation (Halberstam); 
biotechnologies (Parisi); companionship (Haraway); disability through crip theory (McRuer); 
loneliness and singleness (Cobb); and, post-humans and necrosexuality (MacCormack). See 
Michael L. Cobb, Single: Arguments for the Uncoupled (New York: New York University Press, 
2012); Judith Halberstam, "Animating Revolt/Revolting Animation: Penguin Love, Doll Sex and 
the Spectacle of the Queer Nonhuman," in Queering the Non/Human, ed. Noreen Giffney and 
Myra J. Hird (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008); Donna J. Haraway, "Companion Species, Mis-
Recognition, and Queer Worlding," in Queering the Non/Human, ed. Noreen Giffney and Myra 
J. Hird (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008); Patricia MacCormack, "Necrosexuality," in Queering the 
Non/Human, ed. Noreen Giffney and Myra J. Hird (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008); ——, 
Posthuman Ethics: Embodiment and Cultural Theory (Farnham, Surrey, England; Burlington, 
VT: Ashgate, 2012); Robert McRuer, Crip Theory: Cultural Signs of Queerness and Disability, 
Cultural Front (New York: New York University Press, 2006); Luciana Parisi, "The 
Nanoengineering of Desire," in Queering the Non/Human, ed. Noreen Giffney and Myra J. Hird 
(Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008). 
 2 
My question about the queerness of images arose in response to specific ways the 
image is conceptualized in studies of visual culture and, to this end, I wanted to know 
why and how images are queer. 
My initial understanding about how I could define an image in a study about 
visual culture came from W.J.T. Mitchell's book, What Do Pictures Want?: The Lives 
and Loves of Images. For Mitchell, images facilitate the movements of pictures, they 
are the unseen support system that allows pictures to become meaningful residents 
within the realm of visual culture. If, as Mitchell argues, pictures are plagued by 
inadequate conceptualization, I became curious about what images "want," or if 
images suffer a similar plight to their pictorial companions. I never aimed to provide an 
adequate conceptualization of "visuality" because I did not want to direct my inquiries 
toward the pursuit of mastery over visual knowledge, as a means to master pictures or 
images.4  
Instead, my aim was to account for a range of relationships we might have with 
images. I recognized this as an objective with the potential to become a disappointing 
relationship were images to thwart my understanding by not being rendered into 
visibility. I find the uncertain and unknowable properties of images fascinating because 
                                            
4 Nicholas Mirzoeff addresses how "visuality" is understood as a majoritarian pursuit by tracing 
the emergence of this term in the work of Thomas Carlyle. See Mirzoeff's essays "On Visuality" 
and "The Right to Look," which were followed by his book The Right to Look: A Counterhistory 
of Visuality. Also see the edited collection by Hal Foster for a range of discussions about 
visuality. See Nicholas Mirzoeff, "On Visuality," Journal of Visual Culture 5, no. 1 (2006); ——, 
"The Right to Look," Critical Inquiry 37, no. 3 (2011); Thomas Carlyle, On Heroes, Hero-
Worship, and the Heroic in History, The Norman and Charlotte Strouse Edition of the Writings 
of Thomas Carlyle ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993 [1841]); Nicholas Mirzoeff, 
The Right to Look: A Counterhistory of Visuality (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011); Hal 
Foster, ed. Vision and Visuality, Discussions in Contemporary Culture (Seattle: Bay Press, 
1988). 
 3 
of my penchant for queer engagement with and analyses of objects. Thus, my aims to 
gain better understanding about images have always had the potential to fail; I 
remained open to this possibility and chose to embrace the shame of each experience 
with the failure to understand. 
With these things in mind, my dissertation sets out to answer several questions. 
First, are images queer and what reveals their queerness? I will argue that it is a 
palpable, uncertain and changing form that becomes the primary similarity between 
images and queerness. I determined this by considering two related questions: how 
can we see the queerness of images and where would we look? To answer these 
questions I needed to develop a method of looking. The choice to embrace my inability 
or failure to master images led me to experience visual culture as collections of optical 
perspectives.5 In this regard, I utilized queer theories to develop what I call "oplique 
optics," the sideways forms of sight that have the ability to torque typical or normative 
approaches to visual culture. This led me to wonder about the possibility to take some 
of Mitchell's metaphorical language literally, and if this would enable me to see or hear 
images and pictures speaking about what they want. To this end, I turned to 
descriptions of the body that are used to clarify our understanding about pictures and 
images; and, in the process, determined that the queerness of images becomes visible 
                                            
5 In different terms, this experience began to provide modes of engagement functioning similar 
to descriptions of archaeology, which Michel Foucault uses to describe a departure from the 
construction of historiographies centered on consciousness or the individual subject, and 
assemblages, which Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari use as a designation for heterogeneous 
entities (multiplicities) operating in unity. See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand 
Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987); 
Michel Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge, Routledge Classics (London; New York: 
Routledge, 2002). 
 4 
through movements within thresholds between bodies and things, detectable only if we 
turn our vision to see obliquely. 
●●● 
In what follows, I torque some of the tropological figurations that keep images 
hidden within thresholds between bodies and things. This process will provide 
palpable means of engagement with the queerness of images in visual culture. I will 
explore the queerness of images through various forms of embodiment beginning with 
the human body. In my first chapter, I engage with some of the metaphorical language 
that situates our understanding of images by discussing how images emerge from 
fantasies about will-be-born bodies projected onto fetal photographs. In Chapter Two, 
"Embracing the Shame of Visible Absence," I shift to address visible forms of living and 
"lacking" bodies. I do this by exploring how images of "imperfection" emerge from 
pictures of female bodies with mastectomy scars, how these pictures facilitate staring 
relations, and address why these staring relations inspire shame but also a sense of 
wonder. I foreground why wonder becomes valuable within staring relations by turning 
to digital pictures of imperfection, where pixels will be shown to embrace the shame of 
visible debasement. Pixelization will also provide us with a sense of wonder that 
orientates toward the possibility to embrace the failure of visual clarity by thwarting our 
dependence on visual mastery. 
Chapter Three, "Cutting Visual Aesthetics," continues to address how the 
human body operates within visual culture, but, shifting from staring relations and a 
sense of wonder, I address how Michael Jackson becomes a figure who disorientates 
 5 
our understanding of the relationship between images and bodies in visual culture.6 I 
will explain how this experience of disorientation emerges from an aesthetics of cutting 
and, more specifically, reveal how Jackson functions as a figure who has learned to 
image his body beyond the boundaries of the human, becoming an image for a being 
who need not remain confined by the pictorial form. This chapter also provides a 
transition to Chapters Four and Five, where I extend my discussion about cutting 
aesthetics and the post-human toward non-humans within visual culture.  
In Chapter Four, "Tracing the Visibility of Palpable Plastic Things," I shift to 
address a visual culture of things. This chapter proposes the possibility for things to 
become the center of a non-human visual culture, where things engage with visual 
cultures of their own by seeing and producing images independently from humans. 
More importantly, in this chapter I address the possibility for a mode of being and a 
form of aesthetics to emerge through the process of "becoming ec-static," where 
beings and images are set beside themselves. I will describe "becoming ec-static" as 
one form for a queer aesthetics of failure and, in this context, one that reveals the 
possibility for objects and things to operate beyond the confines of anthropocentric 
visual cultures. Thus, in Chapter Five, "Seeing Things," I shift to digital aesthetics of 
failure to detail the ways that non-humans become visible engaging with and 
producing their own images. I address how glitches uncover the digital imagining and 
imaging itself and, from this, extrapolate why glitches reiterate the queerness of images 
and the value of queer aesthetics of failure.
                                            
6 To see what I previously published on this topic, see Kristopher L. Cannon, "Cutting Race 
Otherwise: Imagining Michael Jackson," Spectator 30, no. 2 (2010). 
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1. SEEING OBLIQUELY: THE UN-SEEABLE SI(GH)TES BETWEEN PICTURES 
AND IMAGES 
 
Figure 1.1 "Future Athlete" fetal photograph 
Pimp My Ultrasound is a strange iPhone application for users who want to 
"announce an arrival of the[ir] newest family member."1 The ability to use this 
application to place text, signs and symbols over a sonogram does not imply that the 
program functions are intrinsically strange, but emerges as strangeness in relation to 
the utility of these "pimped" pictures (Figure 1.1).2 Pimped pictures do not illuminate 
meaning above or beyond the "original" fetal photograph because these additional 
layers of textual description function as superimposition rather than supra-imposition. 
Instead, Pimp My Ultrasound merely facilitates our ability to use textual information as 
                                            
1 Quoted by "Hazey22" on the application page in the Apple iTunes Application Store. See 2 
Wise Guys LLC, "Pimp My Ultrasound," Apple Inc., Retrieved November 05, 2010, 
https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/pimp-my-ultrasound-baby-picture/id331968861?mt=8. 
2 I use the word sonogram in reference to the visual object produced by an ultrasound 
examination. When I reference the ultrasound later, I am writing about the ultrasonic wave 
technology and machinery used to produce visual representations like the sonogram. 
 7 
a means to formalize and reinscribe the fantasies parents already project upon non-
"pimped" fetal photographs: imaginings about who their child will become. 
I begin with the application Pimp My Ultrasound as an introductory context for 
two topics I address in this chapter. I will discuss how ultrasound technologies function 
within visual culture and, more broadly, why studies of visual culture should continue to 
engage with W.J.T. Mitchell's now famous question, "What do pictures want?"3 I 
address why pictures produced by an application like Pimp My Ultrasound draw 
attention to a peculiar investment in the pictorial form by considering how the 
sonogram pictures the un-born child, by interrogating the meaning and meaningfulness 
of images emerging between fetal photographs and parental projections, and, most 
broadly, by explaining why sonograms demand that we address and reassess how 
images structure the forms and functions of pictures within the realm of visual culture. 
We can begin to explore these dynamics through the prenatal space where 
unborn children are pictured and how this space is accessed through sonography. 
Nathan Stormer's writings about the rhetorical and visual framing of prenatal spaces 
not only illuminate how cultures engage with the fecund body, or what he calls the 
"prenatal sublime," but also lend clarity to how cultural understanding of this 
environment frames the fetus or unborn child. Stormer's work engages with a long 
history of feminist scholarship about the position of female bodies in relation to 
prenatal space and, while I would affirm this as an "heterotopic commonplace for 
discourses on life's order," I shift my focus to the unborn child as the necessary 
                                            
3 This is the broad question W.J.T. Mitchell asks in his book with the same title: see W. J. T. 
Mitchell, What Do Pictures Want?: The Lives and Loves of Images (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2005). 
 8 
condition for the emergence of heterotopic qualities within this space.4 Foucault tells 
us that heterotopias are both real and "outside all places," both perfect, utopian 
mirrors and "disorganized, badly arranged and muddled," and create spatial and 
temporal discontinuities.5 The reflexive and reflective nature of these internal, in utero 
spaces extend mirror-like functionality to fetal photographs, lending depth to pictorial 
surface by collapsing foreground with background and inside with outside. 
Prenatal space also functions as a common and heterotopic space because our 
access to this space is limited. Our inability to picture prenatal spaces without 
ultrasound technologies facilitates a sense of wonder by providing access to what 
would otherwise remain unseeable space. This access simultaneously produces a 
paradoxical sense of amazement, which, Stormer explains, remains "dependent not on 
what we see but on how we see."6 Ultrasound technologies facilitate how we see the 
unborn child through sonography but, if Pimp My Ultrasound offers any indication, 
what we see indicates how fetal photographs are rarely—if ever—explored beyond 
their surface. Pimp my Ultrasound reveals how parents picture their desires about the 
yet-to-be-born child, which functions as an interface for normative fantasies about 
children. After importing a fetal photograph into the application, the unborn child is 
imagined by labeling her with a future, including phrases like "best grandbaby," "baby 
rockstar," and "future athlete." Parental desires and fantasies enable these labels to 
                                            
4 Nathan Stormer, "Looking in Wonder: Prenatal Sublimity and the Commonplace "Life," Signs 
33, no. 3 (2008): 648-649. 
5 Michel Foucault, "Different Spaces," in Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, ed. James D 
Faubion (New York: New Press, 1998), 178-184. 
6 Stormer, "Looking in Wonder," 668. 
 9 
function within a logic of difference, which is more precisely a differential logic.7 The 
unborn child can be the greatest and most successful because, as with any differential 
logic, parental fantasies and desires operate outside of measurable, quantifiable 
standards for differentiation. Within fantasies about the hope and futurity of children, 
these logics not only reveal, as Judith Halberstam suggests, how winning functions as 
a "multivalent event: in order for someone to win, someone else must fail to win," but 
also how the "act of losing has its own logic, its own complexity." The "best" grand-
baby only exists when other grand-babies take second or third place and a baby will 
only reach "rockstar" status by imagining a future where other children demonstrate 
incompetent musical abilities. Parental fantasies project success and greatness onto 
fetal photographs, which simultaneously constructs this "best" child by relegating all 
other children to "the pursuit of greatness."8  
These fantasies frame fetal photographs as a pictorial form for the will-be-born 
child but hold the unborn child in a space of optical arrest: she is arrested by pulsating 
pixels that are captured and then rendered in the form of a digital picture; she is 
arrested from in utero development to present the unborn child as a pixelated will-be-
born body; and, in this process, she becomes confined by parental fantasies within an 
isolated fetal figuration. The sonogram and the fetal photographs it produces become 
surfaces for parents to imagine and fantasize about who they mis-recognize as their 
                                            
7 This statement about difference and differential logics is based on what Saussure formulates 
as the structure of language, based on differences without "positive terms." See Ferdinand de 
Saussure, Course in General Linguistics (Peru: Open Court Publishing, 2006 [1972/1983]; repr., 
Sixteenth printing), 118. 
8 Judith Halberstam, The Queer Art of Failure (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), 93-94, my 
emphasis. 
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will-be-born child. Although parental desire brings an imagined child to the surface of 
fetal photographs, a logic of failure foregrounds why fantasies of the Child and "the 
future of children" create subjects who cannot match every connotation we conjure 
through fantasies beholden to futurities that may never effloresce. I expound upon this 
logic of failure while addressing these dynamics at an intersection between two, 
transitioning pre-subjects: the picture becoming an image and the fetus becoming a 
child. This intersection will reveal how sonograms operate in contrast to the desires 
that fuel and facilitate perceptions of sonograms as static, photographic surfaces. 
1.1 From Picture to Image through Si(gh)tes Unseen 
W.J.T. Mitchell explores the desires of pictures by turning to the lives of images 
and, in doing so, distinguishes between pictures as concrete, embodied objects and 
images as forces circulating between the materiality of pictures, humans, and other 
bodies. Images, as opposed to pictures, enable and enact desires to mediate their 
pictorial representations within the realm of visuality, where images function as a 
"mental thing"—a virtual process—made material through mediated representations.9 
Mitchell argues that pictures desire (and "want") because of their relationship to 
images, causing pictures to oscillate between desire (for fixed, reified or mortified 
form), drive (toward repetition or proliferation) and need (for a material form and space 
to occupy), and to simultaneously occupy the Symbolic (linguistically and semiotically), 
the Imaginary (figuratively intersecting between drive and desire), and the Real (as 
                                            
9 For more on the relationship between images and pictures, see Mitchell's chapter "The 
Surplus Value of Images," in What Do Pictures Want?: especially 80-85. 
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virtual images become material pictures).10 Mitchell provides these taxonomies to build 
upon historical engagements with visual culture and reformulate how pictures operate 
within and outside of classical forms of representation, which emerge within what 
Heidegger calls the "World Picture" by maintaining multiple relationships with images 
after the "pictorial turn."11 
This distinction between pictures and images is illustrated by pictures in a 
photographic form, which gesture beyond their boundaries to "point" toward multiple 
and oft un-seeable images. For example, Roland Barthes explores this distinction 
through the functions of photographs in Camera Lucida, when cultural perceptions of 
commonalities between photographs emerging from the studium give way to 
"uncommented" or un-contemplated meanings and affects. This is why the punctum, 
Barthes explains, gives the photograph "musical voice;" as if, Barthes says, the "image 
speaks when the eyes close" because the punctum is the always-already present, 
potential meaning within photographs, which escapes from the photographic object to 
pierce a viewer in undetermined or unexpected ways.12 The possibility to be pierced by 
photographs couples with the "intractable" essence of photography and forms what 
                                            
10 Ibid., 72-74. In these contexts, "materiality" is not meant to correlate with a particular body 
or medium, such as physical photographs or pictures but should be understood as a broad 
category for various visual media: ranging from photographs and paintings to digital pictures.  
11 For additional insight about the "World Picture, see Martin Heidegger, "Age of the World 
Picture," in Off the Beaten Track, ed. Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002 [1950]). For more in-depth exploration of the "pictorial turn," 
see W. J. T. Mitchell, "Showing Seeing: A Critique of Visual Culture," Journal of Visual Culture 
1, no. 2 (2002); ——, Picture Theory: Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1994); Martin Jay, "The Visual Turn," Journal of Visual Culture 1, 
no. 1 (2002). 
12 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, 1st American ed. (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 1981), 51-59. 
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Barthes calls the ontology of the photograph: photographic movements perpetually 
reach beyond their frame, as the "presence and life of the thing" reaches toward the 
materiality of the real.13 
Much like the fantasies and imaginings of parents, images become sources of 
value in relation to their pictorial representations because images often function as 
"quasi life-forms" and require host organisms to circulate; thus, as Mitchell explains, 
images become valuable because of the subjective desires they maintain through 
circulation and exchange.14 Pictures operate within the "seeable" because of their 
materially visible boundaries but perceptions of pictures (like fetal photographs) 
become valuable and meaningful through unseeable image movements. Pictures 
mobilize above and beyond the boundaries of their visibility, becoming rendered 
through images between but not as material things.15 Images move like other 
processes of perception, between the "seeable" and the "sayable" through imaging 
                                            
13 Ibid., 78-80, 85-89. 
14 Mitchell focuses on the subjective movements and exchange-values of images as his broad 
concerns in What Do Pictures Want? but addresses this most specifically in the chapter "The 
Surplus Value of Images." 
15 This argument maintains affinities with Mitchell's arguments, specifically in his discussions 
about the "material support" pictures lend to images. Mitchel expands upon this by 
summarizing Roland Barthes: "Photographs are things we look at, and yet, as Barthes also 
insists, "a photograph is always invisible: it is not what we see." By extension, we can locate 
additional arguments being made by Barthes in his discussion about the function of the 
punctum, which arises from the capacity of photographs to animate and affect a viewer. See 
——, Camera Lucida: 6, 16-20, 27; Mitchell, What Do Pictures Want?: xiii, 274. 
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processes.16 When we imagine or fantasize about the yet-to-be-born child through fetal 
photographs, our experiences of their pictorial form extends beyond visible surfaces to 
include multifarious imaging processes operating beyond the surface of visibility.  
We learn more about these forms of visibility, as Akira Lippit explains in Atomic 
Light, by turning to "Derrida's excess visualities," which 
"point to a category of complex visuality, a system of visuality that shows 
nothing, shows in the very place of the visible, something else: avisuality. 
Avisuality not as a form of invisibility, in the sense of an absent or 
negated visibility: not as the antithesis of the visible but as a specific 
mode of impossible, unimaginable visuality."17 
Avisuality emerges as a form of visibility we experience through encounters with visual 
forms for unseeable space, which includes but also surpasses visual forms for 
invisibility. Lippit explores avisuality in his analysis on the emergence of cinema, 
psychoanalysis, and the X-ray, which "haunt 1895" as "technologies" and 
"phenomenologies" of the inside.18 These technologies function as apparatuses of the 
invisible by lending visual form and representability beyond seeable surfaces to 
produce an "archive of the invisible" where secret archives of surfaces give way to 
                                            
16 Mark B.N. Hansen also provides terminology to distinguish between pictures (which he calls 
images) and images (which he defines as an imaging process by shifting images into verb 
tense). I prefer to use Hansen's notion of imaging as a semantic clarification for Mitchell's 
terminology because this term foregrounds how images operate as a process rather than as a 
static form within visual culture. Later, I will refer to imaging processes as "imag(in)ings"—a 
textual cut-in meant to emphasize how images mediate materiality and lend to virtual 
conceptualization at the same time. See the introduction in Mark B. N. Hansen, Bodies in 
Code: Interfaces with Digital Media (New York; London: Routledge, 2006). 
17 Akira Mizuta Lippit, Atomic Light (Shadow Optics) (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2005), 32, his emphasis. 
18 Ibid., 10, 58. 
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anarchives of the visible.19 Ultrasound technologies function like these technologies of 
the inside, and the X-ray in particular, in that they allow us to see through and beneath 
the sealed surface of flesh.20  
  
Figure 1.2 Fetal photograph, provided by the author 
Fetal photographs provide material representations for encounters with an 
otherwise inaccessible, un-seeable space (Figure 1.2). A fetus becomes visible when 
sonograms employ ultrasounds to vibrate through the fecund body, reverberating with 
traces of in utero prenatal space to turn this un-seeable interior out, which, 
simultaneously, produces a visible representation for (ultra)sound. Our experiences 
with sonograms become an "extreme" form of engagement with sound when it is 
                                            
19 Ibid., 29-30, 44-48. 
20 Obviously, this is an over-simplification. Ultrasounds provide access to bodily interiors 
without using the destructive radiated force necessary for XRay technologies. Ultrasound 
technology (and its differences from the XRay) will be addressed more precisely below. 
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brought into visibility. Sonograms can only attempt to muffle the noisiness21 of 
(ultra)sounds by extracting a snapshot from flickering pixels, which are rendered and 
reduced into a static, less-noisy photographic form. This is to say, an "impossible, 
unimaginable visibility" is extended to sound through a representable, visible form, 
which operates beyond what might otherwise be understood as the ocular-phobic 
properties of sound. 
Within this context, I argue that the sonogram functions like all images within 
visual culture while it also functions as a "metapicture" for imaging processes.22 The 
sonogram provides a visible form to illustrate how fetal photographs are pictured while 
it draws attention to picture-making processes by engaging with the pictorial form 
beyond surfaces of visibility. This is to say, the sonogram illustrates how pictures are 
not static but emerge from beyond their visible surfaces; it collects and projects 
(ultra)sounds to continually pulse between recognizability and unintelligibility; and, 
ultimately, it provides the possibility for us to experience and encounter ec-static forms 
of avisuality.23 Here, I use ec-stasis to foreground a precise experience or encounter 
with visual culture. Rather than "ultra-" sound, not only is this term meant to clarify how 
                                            
21 Although I am not explicitly engaging with the notion of noise in this chapter, I return to the 
concept of noise in several chapters that follow, including the relationship between visibility 
and pixilation in Chapter Two, surface orientations toward noise in Chapter Four, and the 
communicative, ethical, and ontological properties of noise in Chapter Five. 
22 Metapictures, we learn from W.J.T. Mitchell, are more than objects of evaluation because 
they provide a visual form that can be "pictured" while, simultaneously, drawing attention or 
"pointing" to the process of picture-making as a reflection of their genesis. See the chapter 
"Metapictures" in Mitchell, Picture Theory: 45-49. 
23 I base the notion of ec-static sight on Judith Butler's use of the phrase "becoming ec-static," 
which is a becoming outside, beyond, or beside oneself. I return to this concept in more depth 
various times throughout my dissertation. See Judith Butler, Undoing Gender (New York: 
Routledge, 2004), 20. 
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sound is set beside and beyond its sonic properties when being rendered into visibility 
through the sonogram, but it is also meant to clarify a particular form of visibility I 
interrogate throughout my dissertation. In everything that follows, I direct my attention 
to the ec-static forms of images, which operate beyond and beside surfaces of 
visibility—beyond, for example, what can be pictured on the surface of a photograph—
to render what we know as visual culture. 
●●● 
My dissertation takes a closer look at images and imaginings like these to 
illuminate the processes that mobilize and mediate visual culture at a threshold beyond 
and between the surfaces of pictures. I draw attention to emergent and dis/embodied 
forms for images, media, and beings as a means to understand how images and their 
desires move, mediate, and grow meanings within visual culture. My analysis provides 
critical accounts regarding these thresholds of visibility to reveal why normative 
understandings about visual culture—especially those reliant upon surfaces of 
visibility—should be reconsidered. To this end, I address how we engage with visible 
surfaces by elucidating various avisual and unseeable images within thresholds beyond 
the confines of pictorial forms, I explore how moments of optical arrest reveal 
confrontations between pictures and images, and I reveal why the desires of images 
become ec-static demands to be (re-)rendered within visual culture.  
This exploration reveals why images maintain a patina for strangeness and, 
more specifically, I contend that we should understand images we encounter and 
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experience as a species of strangeness.24 While careful, often curious and rigorous, 
examinations of visuality and visual culture are anything but new, studies about the 
strangeness of visual culture have received little scholarly attention. How, then, might 
this strangeness be understood before we can address it with appropriate attention 
and rigor?  
Most broadly, I want to complicate how studies of visual culture conceptualize 
images through metaphors (or metaphoric language). For example, W.J.T. Mitchell 
argues that "the concept of image-as-organism is, of course, 'only' a metaphor, an 
analogy that must have some limits." Given this position, I am curious about why 
Mitchell makes a semantic distinction—what he calls a verbal and visual trope—about 
lively images while, at the same time, he does not address how the different uses of 
metaphoric, metonymic, or catachretic devices change our understanding about the 
                                            
24 Note, at least provisionally here, how images function as a strange species in both broad and 
precise terms. A species, the Oxford English Dictionary tells us, is "a group of living organisms 
consisting of similar individuals capable of exchanging genes or interbreeding" but, broadly, 
can also be a "kind or sort." W.J.T. Mitchell also makes this connection and explains how "the 
origin of the word species itself in the figure of the 'specular' image" is motivated by and 
accounts for the "recurrent appeal to criteria of similarity, recognizability, and reproductive 
lineage in both images and species." These criteria can be seen, in Mitchell's account, through 
the lives of images: communicating information and pasts in "[co]evolutionary" forms as their 
mechanisms to record transform; maintaining affection for what they communicate; and 
offering affective qualities, especially for their "hosts" or reproductive "assistants," which are 
carried into unforeseen futures. This is a similar explanation Donna Haraway offers in her 
introduction to Queering the Non/Human. Mitchell, What Do Pictures Want?: 85-86; Haraway, 
"Companion Species."  
Mitchell also foregrounds the terminological similarities between ("specular") image and 
species in his discussion about (images of) cloning and Dolly the Sheep. Mitchell explains how 
"the clone signifies the potential for the creation of new images in our time—new images that 
fulfill the ancient dream of creating a 'living image,' a replica or copy that is not merely a 
mechanical duplicate but an organic, biologically viable simulacrum of a living organism." See 
"Chapter 1:Vital Signs | Cloning Terror," in Mitchell, What Do Pictures Want?: especially 12-13. 
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differences between (human) bodies and (non-human) images and pictures.25 Mitchell 
extends his argument about the liveliness of images when he interrogates this 
question: 
"Why does the link between images and living things seem so inevitable 
and necessary, at the same time that it almost invariably arouses a kind 
of disbelief: 'Do you really believe that images want things?' My answer 
is, no, I don't believe it. But we cannot ignore that human beings 
(including myself) insist on talking and behaving as if they did believe 
it..."26 
While Mitchell's book continues to interrogate or engage with questions pertaining to 
the desires of pictures and images, I question the value or usefulness of his references 
to these desires when his use of metaphorical language immediately undermines itself 
by suggesting that images do not "really" want things. 
In more precise terms, I aim to understand why these metaphors persist within 
critical studies of visual culture and, more specifically, remain intrigued by the insights 
and problematics that arise when these metaphors about the lives and desires of 
images mobilize beyond metaphor and are really taken literally. To this end, I address 
how the strangeness of visual culture arises from how we write about pictures and 
images, and how our use of metaphors for relations to or with visual objects have the 
potential to estrange our epistemological and ontological understanding of objects 
circulating within visual culture. While I do not provide an exhaustive account of 
                                            
25 ——, What Do Pictures Want?: 10. 
26 Ibid., 11.  
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metaphors circulating about objects in visual culture, I direct my efforts toward various 
metaphors about the human body that are used to frame our understanding of visual 
culture. I inquire about how and why bodies persistently linger in these writings about 
pictures and images within visual culture and, by extension, how the strangeness of 
images is made visible through the movements of images within thresholds between 
bodies and things.27 
In what could be described as dissected accounts of image anatomy, I move 
from the sonogram to other visual artifacts to flesh-out and trace the contours of 
images within thresholds where they reveal a penchant for strange, sideways forms of 
movement and growth. To accomplish this requires that we understand strangeness in 
more precise terms before examining the strangeness of visual culture. In this regard, I 
want to narrow my earlier claim about the lack of scholarly attention devoted to the 
strangeness of visual culture. I posit that our ability to fully understand what I call the 
strangeness of visual culture is better understood through precise examinations of and 
                                            
27 I use the term threshold to suggest a liminal or ethereal space of in-betweenness. There is a 
wide range of scholarship that uses this term in that context. As examples, see: Dudley 
Andrew, What Cinema Is!: Bazin's Quest and Its Charge, Blackwell Manifestos (Chichester, 
West Sussex, U.K.; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010); Murat Aydemir, Images of Bliss: 
Ejaculation, Masculinity, Meaning (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007); Gaston 
Bachelard, The Poetics of Space (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994 [1964]); Wendy Hui Kyong 
Chun, Programmed Visions: Software and Memory, Software Studies (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 2011); Jacques Derrida, The Ear of the Other: Otobiography, Transference, Translation 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1988); Gregory Flaxman, ed. The Brain Is the Screen 
(University of Minnesota Press, 2000); Heather Love, Feeling Backward: Loss and the Politics of 
Queer History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007); Patricia MacCormack, 
Cinesexuality (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008); Brian Massumi, Parables for the 
Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002). 
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engagements with the queerness of images.28 More specifically, I argue that strange 
mediations between and by images queer their relationship to pictures because images 
persistently destabilize each attempt to solidify the boundaries or normalization of 
bodies, subjectivities and orientations.29 
1.2 Approaching the Strangeness of Images through the Queerness of Children 
I foreground queer theories and methods over others to interrogate the 
queerness of images, how images queer, and their connections with bodies.30 Inherent 
                                            
28 Although Judith Halberstam has started to explore the possibility for queer theories to be 
used as a means to reconsider visual culture studies, I maintain that the queerness of visual 
culture has not received enough scholarly attention. Halberstam writes about a "transgender 
aesthetic" in her book In a Queer Time and Place and on the "queer art of failure" in the book 
by the same title. See Halberstam, Queer Art of Failure; ——, In a Queer Time and Place: 
Transgender Bodies, Subcultural Lives, Sexual Cultures (New York: New York University Press, 
2005), especially "Chapter 4: The Transgender Look". 
29 Unless otherwise noted, I use the word "queer" and imply its gerund form "queering." 
Queering, in various tensed configurations, functions as critical methodology and practice of 
undoing. See, as explanations of this meaning or examples of this use: Judith Butler, Bodies 
That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex" (New York: Routledge, 1993); Lee Edelman, 
"Queer Theory: Unstating Desire," GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 2, no. 4 (1995); 
Halberstam, Queer Time and Place; Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Tendencies (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1993); ——, Novel Gazing: Queer Readings in Fiction (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1997); Kathryn Bond Stockton, Beautiful Bottom, Beautiful Shame: Where 
"Black" Meets "Queer" (Durham: Duke University, 2006); ——, The Queer Child, or Growing 
Sideways in the Twentieth Century (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009); Michael Warner, 
The Trouble with Normal: Sex, Politics, and the Ethics of Queer Life (New York: Free Press, 
1999). 
30 Although it is not fully elaborated here, I incorporate a range of theories to address how the 
meaning and methodological value of queerness grows as the arguments progress. The 
theories I explore extend to the work of other critical scholarship by authors like Leo Bersani, 
on the reconsideration of subjectivity and desire through self-shattering; Lee Edelman, ranging 
from the graphical forms of bodies to theories about the death drive; Judith Halberstam, 
regarding queer temporalities, spaces and lives that work against heteronormative structures; 
and theories that offer new intersections with queer theory (Deleuzian philosophy, post-
humanism, etc.) See: Leo Bersani, "Is the Rectum a Grave?," October 43(1987); ——, Homos 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1995); Lee Edelman, Homographesis: 
Essays in Gay Literary and Cultural Theory (New York: Routledge, 1994); ——, No Future: 
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similarities between the processes of mediating, queering, and imaging emerge when I 
address how images, media, and technologies maintain fluctuating relationships 
between bodies and desires as well as subject and discursive formations. I account for 
these similarities by placing theories about visual culture and (digital) media in 
conversation, and by queering theoretical and methodological approaches to the 
image at the intersection between visual culture studies and (new) media studies. 
Queer theory functions as a radically deconstructive framework, an 
epistemology "affirm[ing] the contingency of the term" queer, as Judith Butler explains, 
which allows queer to "take on meanings that cannot now be anticipated."31 Queer 
theory emerged from gay and lesbian studies (with homosexuality at the center of 
political and identitarian disciplinary foci) and, as David L. Eng, Judith Halberstam and 
José Muñoz explain, functions as an "ironic historical moment" when "queer liberalism" 
became a pervasive vision for normalized queer politics. While the history and 
emergence of queer theory is important to their arguments, I do not maintain their 
focus on the political implications for various social identities even though these 
concerns remain important lines of inquiry. At the same time, and like these authors, I 
do remain attentive to what is "queer" within queer studies by returning to Judith 
Butler's conceptualization of (critical) queerness, whereby "queer" functions as a term 
"contingent on its potential obsolescence" while "necessarily at odds with any 
fortification of its critical reach." Like these authors, I would affirm that this 
                                                                                                                                             
Queer Theory and the Death Drive (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); Halberstam, Queer 
Time and Place. 
31 Butler, Bodies That Matter: 230. 
 22 
conceptualization of queerness remains "one of the field's key theoretical and political 
promises."32 
The epistemology and methodologies emerging from queer theory refigure 
positivist logics by maligning normalcy and normalization. "Queer" tends toward the 
indeterminable, the in-between, and the both/and; and my critical methods remain 
indebted to forms of critique within queer(ing) theories that employ these 
argumentative logics and styles of writing, which aim to estrange structural logics.33 
These are writings by queer literati who use and abuse writing—productively, 
fetishistically, erotically—to de-construct denotations by turning, torquing or twisting 
linguistic-phrase and, in this process, estrange readers from the meaning that texts are 
                                            
32 To this end, Eng, Halberstam, and Muñoz explain why questioning the queerness of queer 
studies reaffirms the epistemology of queerness in "what might be called the 'subjectless' 
critique of queer studies." See David L. Eng, Judith Halberstam, and José Esteban Muñoz, 
"Introduction: What's Queer About Queer Studies Now?," Social Text 84-85 23, no. 3-4 (2005): 
3-4. 
33 An array of scholars direct us to various oblique or opaque capabilities afforded by queer 
theory, which I generalize here based on a great synopsis found in Noreen Giffney's collection, 
Queering the Non/Human, which references scholars writing about queer fluidity (Epps or 
Tuhkanen), indeterminacy (Freccero), indefinability (Stacey and Street), unknowability (Morland 
and Willox), impossibility or irreducibility (Edelman 2004), unthinkability (Dowson 2000), 
unintelligibility (Haver 1997 or Halberstam), meaninglessness (Winnubst 2007 or Halberstam), 
and unrepresentability (Noble 2006). See Thomas A. Dowson, "Why Queer Archaeology? An 
Introduction," World Archaeology 12, no. 2 (2000); Edelman, No Future; Brad Epps, "The Fetish 
of Fluidity," in Homosexuality and Psychoanalysis, ed. Tim Dean and Christopher Lane 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); Carla Freccero, Queer/Early/Modern (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2006); Halberstam, "Animating Revolt; ——, Queer Art of Failure; 
William Haver, "Queer Research; or, How to Practise Invention to the Brink of Intelligibility," in 
Eight Technologies of Otherness, ed. S Golding (New York: Routledge, 1997); Iian Morland and 
Annabelle Willox, eds., Queer Theory (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Jean Bobby 
Noble, Sons of the Movement: Ftms Risking Incoherence on a Post-Queer Cultural Landscape 
(Toronto: Women's Press, 2006); Jackie Stacey and Sarah Street, eds., Queer Screen (New 
York: 2007); Mikko Tuhkanen, "Queer Hybridity," in Deleuze and Queer Theory, ed. Chrysanthi 
Nigianni and Merl Storr, Deleuze Connections (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009); 
Shannon Winnubst, "Bataille's Queer Pleasures: The Universe as Spider or Spit," in Reading 
Bataille Now, ed. Shannon Winnubst (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007). 
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expected to make.34 Calvin Thomas addresses this post-structural mode or method of 
theoretical writing to question:  
Can simply reading (queer) theory turn a reader who isn't lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, or transgendered into some "sort of" a "queer"? Assuming the 
possibility of juicing up the erotic acts of reading and writing with a 
sufficient charge of creatively abrasive energy, can merely reading 
(queerly written) theory—as opposed to actually [fucking] "queerly"—
transform or provoke an otherwise heterosexual or "straight" subject, 
who has never come with, into, onto or even in the vicinity of a person of 
his or her own sex, into becoming what Eve Sedgwick might call one of 
                                            
34 This is not to suggest that writings by queer theorists offer textual style unique to and 
contained on within "queer theory" scholarship. Rather, this stylistic form exists within 
innumerable post-structural writings, ranging from Jacques Lacan (who employs purposeful 
puns through (aural) words with two denotative meanings) and Jacques Derrida (who writes of 
difference through différance to illustrate how aural and visual distinctions (even in the word 
"différance") work to destabilize positive differentials or differences within language) to Gilles 
Deleuze (who rejects the linguistic turn altogether to illustrate how difference need not remain 
contingent upon language and negation but, instead, can arise through the positive 
accumulation of differences among a multitude of minoritarian languages, politics and 
identities). See Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus; Jacques Derrida, "Differánce," in 
Margins of Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Jacques Lacan, Écrits: 
The First Complete Edition in English, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006); 
Chrysanthi Nigianni and Merl Storr, Deleuze and Queer Theory, Deleuze Connections 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009). 
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"those other people who vibrate to the chord of queer without having 
much same-sex eroticism?"35 
By pivoting his questions through word play, Thomas queers Theory itself. He plays 
with language—possibly like children play, which I address below—to estrange 
normalized or the normalization of frameworks like "Theory," and, in this process, 
allows strange meanings to flourish and proliferate. We could turn to queer theory's 
perverse cousin, Deconstruction, to understand these processes of strange-making 
and making-strange, but we have much (if not more) to learn by parsing our 
understanding of the Child.  
●●● 
To address the queerness of images I shift to the Child, the figure who has yet 
to directly reflect upon her position within fetal photographs. The Child bears striking 
similarities to how I use Mitchell's conceptualization of the image and provides several 
insights about the queerness of images within visual culture. In her book The Queer 
Child, or Growing Sideways in the Twentieth Century, Kathryn Bond Stockton explains 
how cultural investments in the Child, as "anticontaminant" or "cherished ideal," 
emerge from misperceptions about how children grow. It is the Child, she argues, who 
                                            
35 I did take liberty to replace the word "f***ing," which is not present in the published version of 
Thomas's essay but was present in an earlier draft. See Calvin Thomas, "On Being Post-
Normal: Heterosexuality after Queer Theory," in The Ashgate Research Companion to Queer 
Theory, ed. Michael O'Rourke and Noreen Giffney (Ashgate, 2009), his emphasis. Thomas 
quotes from Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, "Queer Performativity: Henry James’s the Art of the 
Novel,” GLQ: Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies," GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 
1, no. 1 (1993). One could similarly consider Lee Edelman's essay on Barbara Johnson and 
metaphor, where Edelman employs mindful metaphors and literary-(like-)ness to address 
Johnson's writing on being mindful about metaphor—even when her mindfulness fails, 
because of literary-(misdirected)ness. See Lee Edelman, "The Student of Metaphor," 
differences 17, no. 3 (2006). 
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"presents the most apt domain in which to understand the broad and narrow poles of 
the word queer."36 Consider what children are often shown or seen doing: They 
approach a destination but, as Stockton explains, "swerve, delay; ride on a metaphor 
they tend to make material and so imagine relations of their own. My dog is my wife, 
my dolly is my child. Not uncommonly, children are shown as having a knack for 
metaphorical substitution…by which they reconceive relations to time."37  
Children prompt meaning to grow sideways by "putting people and 
things…oddly beside themselves" and, Stockton suggests, as children twist 
conventional, connotative configurations they illustrate what all (queer) theorists must 
do: engage with "literary indirections and linguistic seductions."38 To this end, Stockton 
uses a reflexive method to theorize the Child and analyze figures of children: she 
places children oddly beside themselves to illustrate how children grow sideways 
similar to (and because of) the strangely sideways, metaphoric relations and meanings 
they make. This method of critical inquiry resonates with the reflexive methodology 
Thomas employs to address how (queer) Theory can queer its readers because of the 
theories that queerly structure the form of and our access to Theory itself. 
                                            
36 Here I cite Stockton's argument from an essay published before her book The Queer Child. 
Stockton includes several versions of queer children in this essay and expands her accounts of 
these children in her book. Within the context of these quotes, Stockton posits an additional 
connection between children and queerness in her book, arguing for the possibility to "[bring] 
back the word gay—in the context of children—as the new queer." See Kathryn Bond 
Stockton, "Growing Sideways, or Versions of the Queer Child: The Ghost, the Homosexual, the 
Freudian, the Innocent, and the Interval of Animal," in Curiouser: On the Queerness of Children, 
ed. Steven Bruhm and Natasha Hurley (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), 
283; ——, The Queer Child: FN8, 245-246, her emphasis. 
37 ——, The Queer Child: 15. 
38 ——, "Growing Sideways," 277-283. 
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I am invested in constructing a meta-methodological framework to employ these 
modes for queer(ing) theories and to weave and twist literatures that intersect between 
studies of media and visual culture.39 To explore the queerness of images—and how 
images queer—requires putting images "oddly beside themselves," and, to facilitate 
this exploration, I push writings about images and visual culture to places where they 
must co-mingle, influence, and/or contaminate each other. As a first step toward this, I 
compare the strange movements of children to how visual culture moves, mediates, 
and attempts to mitigate its strangeness. I not only address how children strangely 
move (or are made to move strangely) in fetal photographs but I also expose how the 
mobility of images undermines normative restrictions preventing our ability to picture 
queer children within fetal photographs. If the sonogram illustrates how visual culture 
moves strangely through processes like imaging and imagining, figures for queer 
children expose how the stability of visual culture fails when debased by the 
strangeness of images. Ultimately, this process allows us to understand how an 
oblique approach to visual culture facilitates the possibility to unfold and expose ec-
static, avisual movements hidden within thresholds beyond and between surfaces of 
visibility. 
                                            
39 This framework could be compared with what Karen Barad calls a "diffractive" 
methodological approach, which she defines as a "transdisciplinary approach that remains 
rigorously attentive to important details of specialised arguments within a given field, in an 
effort to foster constructive engagements across (and a reworking of) disciplinary boundaries." 
This methodological approach is also referenced and utilized in the collection Queering the 
Non/Human. See Karan Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the 
Entanglement of Matter and Meaning (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 25; Halberstam, 
"Animating Revolt," especially 6. 
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1.3 Seeing Queerly with a Child-Like Eye 
 Let us first inspect various ways children imagine themselves in relation to the 
demands of parental fantasies and expectations. While the sonogram provides the 
possibility to render a visual representation for an unborn child, the resulting fetal 
photograph shifts between recognizability and intelligibility. Every time parents 
encounter a fetal photograph and imagine the will-be-born child and her future, the 
child who is born can only encounter these projected, imaged representations 
retroactively—or, as is often the case, never at all. In contrast to fantasies about will-
be-born children, mechanisms like metaphor and sideways sight facilitate the child's 
ability to reframe temporal relations. These mechanisms also structure the sight (and 
often the plight) of queer children, which will provide instructive approaches to visual 
culture.  
We can look to Ludovic, the main character in the film Ma Vie En Rose (My Life 
in Pink, Berliner, 1997), as a child who does not conform to the heteronormative 
fantasies his parents would have projected onto his fetal photograph. Throughout this 
film, family members constantly confront Ludovic with concerns about his non-
normative gender behavior. At the start of the film, he dons his sister's princess dress 
for a neighborhood party (Figure 1.3). When Ludovic fails to visibly conform to gender, 
his father Pierre tries to save face by introducing his son as the family "joker," but, as 
we learn, this is not a joking matter for Ludovic (Figure 1.4). 
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Figure 1.3 Ludovic dons his sister's dress 
 
 
Figure 1.4 Ludovic's dress is not a joking matter 
In another scene, we watch Ludovic pronounce a teddybear the vicar, who is to 
preside over the pretend marriage he stages with his friend Jerome. Jerome's mother 
overhears them exchanging vows. She moves closer to lurk in the doorway, sees 
Ludovic wearing a dress belonging to her deceased daughter and, on behalf of the 
teddy bear vicar, hears him say: "now, kiss." The shot cuts—kiss, interrupted—and she 
faints. When Ludovic's mother appears and shows signs of shock and surprise, his 
child-like imagination transitions into an out-of-body fantasy to avoid his impending 
punishment. The TV personality who plays the role of Pam, a Barbie-like doll, comes to 
his rescue and helps him fly away. Jerome and Pam accompany Ludovic as he flies 
into fantasy, but he looks down while flying away and sees himself being dragged 
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home by his mother. He begins to fall until he crashes back into his body and reality 
where his mother will scold him for his behavior. 
Stockton's book pushes us to reflect upon dynamics like these and, while she 
primarily traces fictional forms of children through the twentieth century, she notes 
changes among children just before and in the twenty-first century: 
Whereas it might have happened for a child growing up any time before 
the 1990s that college could be the first occasion for encountering 
another gay person, children now in the twenty-first century, while they 
are still children, will at least see and quite possibly know queer, including 
transgendered, people.40 
While we begin to see more queer people near the end of the twentieth century, one 
wonders how often we choose not to see homosexual children—acting as 
"homosexual" and "child" simultaneously—when even a fictional, gender-queer child 
like Ludovic is forced to have his same-sex kiss cut short. Ludovic remains limited by 
his experience, a lack of knowledge about matters pertaining to sexuality, but he is 
expected to conform to gender norms because he shows signs of a potentially sexual 
identity he does not understand. This is how cultural perceptions about innocence wed 
the Child and our figurations of children with time. Children eventually grow up, can 
eventually show signs of more knowledge or understanding, but only after it is deemed 
temporally appropriate; that is, after we, as adults, "say it's time."41 Although, as I 
                                            
40 Stockton, The Queer Child: 49. 
41 Ibid., 6. 
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explain in the examples that follow, queer children are often seen torquing this timeline 
through strange ways of seeing. 
1.4 Naive Sight and the Child Queered by Freud  
Another queer child, "the child queered by Freud," is a not-so-innocent, "not-
yet-straight-child." This child, Stockton explains, has seemingly "aggressive wishes. 
From wanting the mother to have its child, to wanting to have its father's baby, to 
wanting to kill its rival lover, the Freudian child (the child penned by Freud) looks 
remarkably, threateningly precocious: sexual and aggressive." Stockton explores this 
"dangerous" child in her analysis on the film The Children's Hour (Wyler, 1961), where 
we are confronted by a child who refuses her innocence, seeming antithetical to the 
demands of "at least two centuries...of childhood."42 The narrative in The Children's 
Hour follows the story of Karen Wright (Audrey Hepburn) and Martha Dobie (Shirley 
MacLaine), who run the Wright and Dobie School for Girls, and the film becomes 
centered on their relationship after their student, Mary Tillman, discloses information 
about their relationship, which will culminate in the closure of the school.  
Mary is a precocious child who refuses her innocence because of "unnamed 
aggressive motivation[s]"43: whether she looks jealous or shows signs of resentment for 
being disciplined at school, she becomes an aggressive child who is motivated by too 
much knowledge for a child because she knows too much to fit within normative 
cultural configurations for childhood innocence. Stockton's analysis of this film clarifies 
                                            
42 Ibid., 27-30. 
43 Ibid. 
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why Mary functions as a queer child within the narrative, but we also begin to see how 
the child queered by Freud engages with visual culture by addressing moments when 
Mary is framed in relation to modes of visual perception. While the film provides 
dialogue to clarify what Mary sees, hears, and says, we are provided with various 
framings to acknowledge how she navigates and tries to untangle the complicated 
intersection between sight, sound, and speech. 
In one scene, we see Mary in close-up, framed tightly, secretly spying on her 
co-headmistresses (Figure 1.5). A set of stairs confine her sight to a partial view of the 
interactions between Karen and Martha, but close-up reaction-shots of Mary's 
surprised expression do not obscure our ability to see how she responds to Karen 
kissing Martha's cheek. When Mary slinks to hide behind the stairs, we see a close-up 
of a perplexed expression on her face. As the scene closes, her sight is offered a 
greater sense of significance through a transition to an extreme-close-up of her eyes, 
which remain frozen in the frame; but, as we come to find out, what Mary actually sees 
in this scene becomes less important than how she sees (Figure 1.6). This is to say: 
Mary's mode of visual perception conjoins her limited point-of-view with other pieces 
of information she overhears and, in doing so, reveals one possible method to see the 
"unseeable." 
Mary reveals to us how she sees the unseeable during a scene later in the film 
when she runs away from school and, hoping she will not be forced to return, tries to 
justify this behavior to her grandmother. Mary initially tries to tell her grandmother 
about her experience at school (being "scared" and "punished") but is rebuffed as 
being imaginative. Mary shifts tactics and tells her grandmother about things she heard 
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while gossiping with schoolmates earlier in the film. Mary had learned about Martha 
being called "unnatural" by other adults, and proceeds to tell her grandmother about 
Martha's unnaturalness and about other "strange, funny noises" she has overheard. 
This idle gossip garners little attention from Mary's grandmother until she proclaims to 
have "seen things ... bad things!" These things Mary has seen are so bad, she explains, 
they cannot even be spoken aloud—they must be whispered.  
 
Figure 1.5 Seeing Mary spying 
 
 
Figure 1.6 Seeing how Mary sees 
This child—like other children queered by Freud—illustrates one type of 
engagement with what Jacque Ranciere calls the "regime of imageness." Ranciere 
questions how presence and re-presentability moves within and among images, and 
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determines that these movements emerge in the form of "hyper-resemblance[s]" 
because they mobilize above and beyond the confines of the seeable and sayable.44 
Regardless of Mary's actual knowledge and her limited point-of-view, she must merely 
speak to her grandmother about what she sees to appear truthful rather than childishly 
imaginative. Mary not only shows us how we can direct ourselves (and others) to see 
the unseeable, but she conflates the unseeable with the unsayable under another sign: 
"unnatural." Mary cannot fully comprehend how "unnatural" becomes meaningful for 
adults, who seem to cling to the stickiness of this signifier, and, thus, reveals the power 
of "naive" sight when it couples with metaphor to provide (albeit, accurate) 
interpretation of what she hears without understanding the ramifications of the 
meaning she makes.  
Mary's claims sever her from a position of childlike understanding because she 
appears to have learned too much about adult-oriented matters. This is also what 
remains instructive and menacing within the film, as Stockton points out: "the inversion 
of child/adult conventions. ...A pupil schools a teacher through the clarifying act of her 
deception. The pupil's lie reveals to the teacher (Martha) her own feelings, making her 
pregnant, one might say, with the child's suggestion of her (retrospective) 
queerness."45 Mary reframes her temporal position beyond the confines of an 
"innocent" child because she severs herself from child-like sight to see otherwise and, 
thus, produces meaningful images that mobilize above and beyond the confines of the 
                                            
44 Jacques Ranciere, The Future of the Image, trans. Gregory Elliott (London: Verso, 2009 
[2003]), 2, 8. 
45 Stockton, The Queer Child: 29. 
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visible. Further, Mary's ability to speak about sights she cannot comprehend—
incomprehensible largely because she lies about the sights she has seen—allow this 
schoolgirl to torque vision sideways and school us about visual culture. Mary lies about 
what she has seen but, in doing so, reveals how easily it becomes possible to see 
beyond the surfaces of visibility. Our ability to see beyond surface becomes important 
if we are to return to the sonogram and examine queer formulations of aesthetics, and, 
like the sexual child queered by Freud, to illuminate how un(fore)seeable si(gh)tes arise 
by thwarting our misperceptions about visibility as the sign and limit of truth within 
visual culture. 
1.5 The Failure to See Queerly and the Ghostly Gay Child 
The ability for the previous children to reframe temporal relations through 
metaphor and sideways sight becomes the plight of another queer child: the "ghostly 
gay child," the queer child who illustrates how visual culture mobilizes aslant when time 
becomes torqued by, and tamed through, delay. This queer child, with "clear-cut 
same-sex preference," would be sexual, is too adult and, thus, cannot exist within 
cultural configurations of the Child. By refusing a designation for this child, Stockton 
explains, she exists as a contradiction to how we culturally construct the sexual 
orientation of children: "the tendency to treat all children as straight while we culturally 
consider them asexual."46 
Refusing the growth of this sexual child locks her in past-tense, asynchronous 
form, and while this is how adults often access childhood—through memories of 
                                            
46 ——, "Growing Sideways." 
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childhood—this is the only form of existence made available to the gay child. The 
phrase "gay child," Stockton explains, "is a gravestone marker for where and when a 
straight person died. Straight person dead; gay child now born." This child is born 
retroactively, a retroactive rebirth where the phrase "I am Gay" ends the possibility for 
"growing up" straight, thereby giving birth to a gay childhood which will (and could) 
never be lived. It is, Stockton concludes, an "efficient means for aborting 'gay kids'." 
The ghostly gay child becomes a figure who forces us to consider why she lives within 
past-tense form. This child cannot appear in fetal photographs and forces us to 
address how the clarity of our vision has the potential to fail when confronted by 
avisual imaging processes.47 
We confront this queer child in the Canadian film The Hanging Garden 
(Fitzgerald, 1997), where we will see Sweet William, the main character, as a ghostly 
gay child who literally and metaphorically hangs in asynchronous temporal form. Sweet 
William returns to visit his family for the first time in ten years and will see himself in the 
family garden as a fat teen, hanging from a rope in spectral form. Sweet William tells 
his mother that "skinny was the only thing you couldn't make me be," and even when 
his pre-fat, ghost-child form walks through the kitchen (to sneak snacks like he did as a 
child), his mother remains unable to see this version of her son. She only sees the 
result of Sweet William's literal sideways growth: a fat child who functions as a visible 
sign of difference from his younger, once-was-skinny, could-have-been-straight form. 
                                            
47 Ibid; ——, The Queer Child: 7. 
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Thus, in Stockton's account, fatness "is the visible effect...of a child unable to grow 
'up' in his family as his preferred self."48 
We later watch Sweet William (as a teenager) attempt suicide by hanging. 
William carries a white chair into the garden and hangs a noose from a tree. This shot 
cuts to a close-up of his feet on the chair, which was not placed in a level position and 
wobbles under his weight. We see shots of the garden—windblown trees and vibrant 
flowers—before Sweet William finally fits the noose around his neck, places one foot 
on the back of the chair, and falls. As Sweet William falls, the shots rapidly cut to 
close-ups of his hanging: enlarged eyes swaying between edges of the frame, hand 
extending from shock and tension, and a tongue hanging from his gasping mouth. As 
his eyes close, the shots return to this sequence but with a difference: his swaying legs 
stretch to stabilize on the chair, his hands reach to loosen the rope around his neck, 
but his flailing feet cause the chair to fumble from the frame. With Sweet William's last 
effort to reframe his fate, the film transitions to shots of his body becoming lifeless, 
intercut with shots of flowers dying in time-lapse, photographic form. 
The dense metaphors of straight growth and growing upright—both up and 
"right"—wither and die in this garden. Sweet William's fat spectral form hangs 
heavily—is a metaphor that hangs heavily—for a childhood that did and could not grow 
into straightness. The next scene shows Sweet William wake up in adult form, gasping 
like an infant taking his first breath. This transition takes time and tries to tame the 
effect of its gaps: it asks us to contemplate why this version of the queer child hides in 
                                            
48 ——, The Queer Child: 20-21. 
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time, forced to experience childhood retroactively; and it also asks us to interrogate 
why homosexual children are prevented from the ability to access or create self-
images in the present—as children—rather than remaining relegated to images and re-
presentations from the standpoint of adulthood. 
In contrast to where the ghostly gay child typically resides, in memories of 
impossible (was-not-gay-then) childhoods, The Hanging Garden forces this retroactive 
life into visibility by providing a visible representation for the ghostly gay child. The 
spectre of Sweet William's childhood occupies a visible site of uncertainty because we 
cannot determine if he actually attempted suicide or distinguish whose perspective 
gives his hanging body its haunting, "in memoriam" form. But, nonetheless, his body 
hangs in the present to haunt the gay childhood that could never take shape in his past 
(Figure 1.7). This film provides a hauntingly sublime visible form for the gay child, who 
pierces the surface of visibility in a punctum-like fashion. This film also provides us with 
a visible representation we can optically register but, in contrast to Barthes's ontology 
of photography, this image does not carry traces of an intractable past because this 
child can only exist in fabricated, imaged form.  
If the ontology of the photographic implies an intractable past-presence, the 
ghostly gay child questions the ontogenic fact of photographic representability and 
forces us to question how she can be photographically represented. Her oblique 
perspective about visibility pushes us to see how she becomes positioned within an 
unlivable representation, where the over-emphasis on the visible surfaces of pictures, 
like fetal photographs, eradicates any trace of her form. This child is left with what 
Akira Lippit calls an atomic trace, "a timeless image of timelessness," which "inscribes 
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an end of visuality, an aporia, a point after which visuality is seared by the forces of an 
insurmountable avisuality."49 The "insurmountable" atomic trace of this ghostly gay 
child becomes a shameful, un-visible livery; but, this child embraces this shame by 
marking and challenging pictorial and photographic representations while emphatically 
attesting to the ontological fact of photographic traceability as an heteronormative 
affect that relies upon the over-emphasis of visible surfaces. 
 
Figure 1.7 Gay child hangs in haunting, asynchronous form 
●●● 
The sonogram already affirms these dynamics through its constantly changing 
visual form. Each pulse of ultrasound becomes a radiating, rhythmic force like other 
technologies of the inside Lippit addresses, and each ultrasonic pulse renders another 
picture, another fetal form, which could, but will not, be captured and pictured in 
photographic form. Ultrasounds lend visibility to imaging processes and facilitate our 
                                            
49 Lippit, Atomic Light: 82. 
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ability to visualize an array of images that would otherwise remain unseen and 
unimaginable. We experience avisuality through these images of concealed space, of 
otherwise un-visible uncertainty. This is the embodied experience of visual culture 
whereby signifiers, in Katherine Hayles's words, "flicker" or glitch as our perceptions 
produce images becoming enfolded and unfolded within complex feedback loops.50 
While our perception of ultrasound images can produce meaning from understandable 
patterns of signification, meaning escapes just as easily. A new picture flickers with 
every pulse of ultrasound, images transform into other images, and we experience 
avisuality as a "crisis in visuality"—every visible trace becoming a trace of un-
visibility.51 This crisis extends to the circumstances of all pictures as they destabilize 
and flicker within thresholds between static forms of visibility. Images circulate within 
this threshold, making this an intrinsically unstable space where pictures are affected 
and queered by images before they become rendered as meaningful surfaces of 
visibility. 
This is why the ghostly gay child compounds and draws attention to this visual 
crisis. If and when heterosexual futures are projected onto the fetal photograph of an 
unborn child, the ghostly gay child affirms the potential for these fantasies to fail as 
readily as each ultrasound flickers into and out of visibility on a sonogram screen. This 
                                            
50 I expand upon the concept of flickering signifiers in Chapter Three, and explore Marks's 
writings about enfolding and unfolding in my discussion about computational memory and 
glitches in Chapter Five. See N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies 
in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). On 
enfolding/unfolding, see Laura U. Marks, Touch: Sensuous Theory and Multisensory Media 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2002). On the fold, see Timothy Murray, Digital Baroque: 
New Media Art and Cinematic Folds, Electronic Mediations (Minneapolis: University of 
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51 Lippit, Atomic Light: 92-23. 
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is why every fetal photograph signifies meaning beyond its surface and, more 
significantly, pictures potentially explosive confrontations with the heterosexual 
matrix;52 this child hides beyond the surface of fetal photographs and reveals the 
always-already-present potential for any child to "come out" queerly, to twist 
heteronormative fantasies sideways, and to necessitate a re-visioning and re-imaging 
of the child beyond fantasies of heterosexual futurity.53 The ghostly gay child not only 
illuminates oblique, and often opaque, imaging processes, but she also reveals how we 
treat most (if not all) images like her, like children: we attempt to relegate them to a 
realm of decipherable and meaningful representation, while children and images 
continually fail to fit this form and embrace the shame from the failure to fulfill our 
expectations. 
1.6 The Child Queered by Innocence and by Color 
Children must frequently grapple with the shame that so easily sticks to cultural 
perceptions of failure and, to this end, I want to shift to a final version of the queer child 
to address the significance of children who visibly fail to fit cultural expectations. In 
doing so, I illustrate how we engage with—and why we should learn to value—images 
that facilitate and embrace the failures of their pictorial companions. We encounter one 
such version of this final, queer and fictional child in the film Precious: Based on the 
Novel 'Push' by Sapphire (Lee Daniels, 2009). Unlike the other queer children I have 
                                            
52 Judith Butler, "Imitation and Gender Insubordination," in Inside/Out: Lesbian Theories, Gay 
Theories, ed. Diana Fuss (New York: Routledge, 1991), 316; ——, "Melancholy Gender / 
Refused Identification," in Constructing Masculinity, ed. Maurice Berger, Brian Wallis, and 
Simon Watson (New York: Routledge, 1995), 24. 
53 This statement is connected with what Lee Edelman writes about the Child and reproductive 
futurism in No Future. See Edelman, No Future. 
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addressed, Claireece "Precious" Jones (hereafter, Precious) is a child who oscillates 
between different versions of children, making visible an inconsistent and often 
precarious position where children of color and lower classes are frequently cast.  
While the first child I addressed, the child queered by innocence, is defined by 
her distance from the adulthood she must approach, her normative strangeness, 
Stockton argues, "may explain why children, as an idea, are likely to be both white and 
middle-class." Precious is neither White nor middle-class but, instead, is a child who is 
undoubtedly queered by the circumstances of her life that emerge from or, minimally, 
are coupled with cultural renderings for color and class. Despite their differences, 
Sapphire's book and the adaptation directed by Daniels both portray Precious as a 
character who experiences a life that does not conform to cultural fantasies about 
childhood. Precious is like other non-White children Stockton writes about, who are 
most commonly made visible through "depictions of streetwise children" with 
experiences that are "hard to square with innocence" because they are made visible 
living lives outside of or beyond cultural conceptions of childhood.54 
In the film, Precious's story forces various types of failure into visibility, 
becoming most visible for spectators within sequences about her memories and 
fantasies. The conjunction between fantasy and failure comes to the fore near the start 
of this film, in a sequence when Precious is seen slaving over the stove to cook dinner 
for Mary, her abusive and slobbish mother who sits on the sofa in the living room. 
Although Mary is not fully in focus, we see her reach for a television remote she swiftly 
                                            
54 Stockton, The Queer Child: 30-32, her emphasis. 
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pitches at Precious's head, which causes her daughter to collapse on the kitchen floor. 
It is perhaps misleading to suggest that Precious simply collapses onto the kitchen 
floor because, as Alessandra Raengo clarifies in her analysis of this scene, this "cut in 
mid-motion shows Precious falling not on the kitchen floor, but rather backward onto a 
bed."55 The abruptness of this cut transports spectators to another space and time 
where we see Precious's body on a bed in front of a shadowy figure in the doorway.  
This man approaches Precious from the doorway while asynchronous sounds, 
similar to plastic and metal scraping along cement, accompany a close-up shot of him 
removing his belt. The shot cuts to the man at the edge of the bed preparing to fuck 
Precious and she closes her eyes before her body begins to bounce in unison with 
sounds of old, squeaky mattress springs. This sequence cuts again, to three different 
shots: a close-up of metal springs (accompanied by even louder sounds of metal 
squeaking) is followed by another close-up (and sounds) of eggs sizzling in a frying pan 
and, finally, we hear a loud horn accompanying the close-up shot of a Vaseline jar 
being opened. This brief but visceral montage sequence returns to a shot of this man, 
reaching into his pants while we hear a deep industrial hum, before shifting to sounds 
of a baby crying when the shot cuts back to Precious on the bed. Although this scene 
will continue with more disjunctive pairings between pictures and sounds, the narrative 
doesn't fully clarify what is occurring within the sequence until spectators see a close-
up shot of Precious's slightly-pained face when the man says: "Yes, you like that? Yea, 
daddy loves you." 
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This scene not only makes a sexual encounter between child and adult visible, 
but does so by laying bare a child's experience with incest and molestation. This is an 
inexorable reality for many children, which, as Precious's story reveals, remains 
inescapable even in moments of fantasy. At the same time, it remains puzzling to 
consider how and why this scene unfolds through disjunctive audio/visual events56 and, 
more specifically, why it remains so difficult to parse Precious's facial expressions in 
what is clearly her recollection of the past. Does this scene merely attempt to provide a 
visible representation for the chaotic traffic of memories and images, which often 
remain difficult to translate into visibly representable forms?57 Is this scene meant to 
provide an array of pictures to be openly interpreted by spectators? Stockton 
poignantly articulates how innocence is unequally extended to non-White or non-
middle-class children and, more disturbing still, how the extension of this innocence 
carries particular requirements: to gain access to "this equal-opportunity innocence" 
these children are not only brutalized but the brutality directed toward these children is 
visible as if it were "worthy of our sight."58  
Precious is portrayed as a child who certainly is not innocent to adult forms of 
sexuality—she has had sex and bears two of her father's children—but this sequence 
about sexual experience in the filmic version of Precious's story does not clarify if her 
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countermotions engage or avoid sexual pleasure during this encounter.59 Sapphire's 
novel and the film both offer insight about Precious's perceptions of her father, 
although it is only in the novel where Precious's confusion about her experiences with 
sexual pleasure are made explicit.60 But, Precious's confusion cannot compensate for 
the brutality of her experiences, which must seemingly be made visible in the film 
adaptation for spectators to understand and imagine the possibility of her innocence 
as a child.61  
We gain further insight about the visibility of Precious's unconscious 
recollections when the scene transitions and breaks from its viscerally visual account 
of her experience with incestual rape. Visible gaps in this sequence facilitate the 
mobilization of images within thresholds between realities, memories, and fantasies. 
                                            
59 Ibid. Stockton provides insight about images like these in her writing about Bastard Out of 
Carolina (Allison), where "brutality" is meant to show "the child's need for protection" whereby 
"weakness" is utilized and necessary to simply gesture at the possibility of a non-White child's 
innocence. Stockton writes about Bone's experience in this novel to explore where her 
innocence exists. She questions: "innocence of what? Not of sexuality; the child sadly knows 
what is being done to her and she is bearing it. Rather, she is innocent of any consent [...], 
there is not sexual countermotion on Bone's part. No erotic pleasure in her own world, and no 
mystery surrounding her motives. Knowingly, and fully unambiguously, Bone does not 
consent." See also Dorothy Allison, Bastard out of Carolina (New York: Plume Books, 2012; 
repr., Twentieth Anniversary). 
60 In the novel, Precious recounts her feelings about sex while she is pregnant with a second 
child by her father: "I try to forget I got baby in me. I hated borning the first one. No fun. Hurt. 
Now again. I think my daddy. He stink, the white shit drip off his dick. Lick it lick it. I HATE that. 
But then I feel the hot sauce hot cha cha feeling when he be fucking me. I get so confuse. I 
HATE him. But my pussy be popping. He say that, 'Big Mama your pussy is popping!' I HATE 
myself when I feel good. 'How long you gonna stand there like you retarded.' I start to tell her 
don't, don't call me that, but all, everything, is out me. I jus' want to lay down, listen to radio, 
look at picture of Farrakhan, a real man, who don't fuck his daughter, fuck children. Everything 
feel like it is too big for my mind. Can't nuffin' fit when I think 'bout Daddy." See Ramona 
Lofton Sapphire, Push, a Novel by Sapphire (New York: Vintage Contemporaries / Vintage 
Books, 1997), 57-58. 
61 Others also write about this compulsion to make visible—and, thus, draw attention to—the 
spectacle of pained, non-White bodies. See, for example, Christina Sharpe, Monstrous 
Intimacies: Making Post-Slavery Subjects (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010). 
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The visibility of these gaps reveals how this film refuses to separate the sediment of 
what Stockton calls a "tonal stack," which she bases on Roland Barthes's reference to 
vertical din.62 Stockton asserts that Precious's poetics in the novel Push prompt 
signification to grow, to "rip between ear and eye," but also to slip from our grasp 
when we attempt to make meaning (or make meaning seeable) within a text that opens 
up toward different modes of decipherability.63 By extending Stockton's analysis to the 
film, the visceral experience of this tonal stack becomes meaningful through the gaps 
between states of visibility. 
Precious's recollections construct a gap in the movement from memory to 
fantasy, where signification slips because of irreconcilable differences between the 
visibility of pictures and images slipping from the surface of visibility as much as the 
slippages between sight and sound in this scene. As Precious looks away from her 
father and stares toward the ceiling, her point-of-view focuses on paint beginning to 
peel, sheetrock beginning to crumble, and wood beams beginning to crack away from 
the ceiling. A warm glow begins to show through the corroding materials and the scene 
of a memory slowly, almost haptically, transports us elsewhere. This transition 
transports Precious and us into fantasy, where she dons a large and luxurious red 
gown while she walks among reporters, photographers and fans who fawn over her.  
                                            
62 For Barthes, vertical din is the noise produced by "the verticality of language and of its 
destruction." See Roland Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text, trans. Richard Miller (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 1975), 12; Kathryn Bond Stockton, "Somewhere a Child Is Desiring You: A 
Thought Experiment for Those Not in Need / Kid Orientalism: How a Global Future for Child 
Sexuality Is Now Surfacing," (Center for 21st Century Studies, University of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee, 2012), 33. 
63 Stockton suggests possibilities ranging from "everyday lyrics of domestic enslavement" and 
"sexual abuse" to signifiers that become stuck to "state neglect" through levels of illiteracy 
revealed by Precious's prose. ——, "Kid Orientalism." 
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Perhaps Precious escapes the horrors of memory by mobilizing fantasies of 
fame and fortune, which make visible what Heather Love calls "Backward feelings" that 
often "serve as an index to the ruined state of the social world." At the same time, Love 
pointedly notes how "queers face a strange choice: is it better to move on toward a 
brighter future or to hang back and cling to the past?"64 Precious thwarts the polarity 
between memories of her past and fantasies about her future when she pivots from the 
plight of the ghostly gay child (who could not live in the past) toward meaningful modes 
of engagement with fantasies, which remain potentially uncomfortable for spectators 
because of the gaps they produce for our sense of visual clarity. 
Raengo draws our attention to the precision of detail within this scene to 
illuminate how "paratactic transition" structures and enables the possibility for visual 
movements to "suture together various forms of abuse and fantasy." While it is 
possible that "these are movements we would be prone to complete if they did not 
lead to unexpected destinations," Raengo explains, "they also lead one to hesitate 
before, rather than invest in, the film's sensible figuration." Raengo's arguments about 
Precious's fantasies provide pointed clarity about the function of sensorial stimuli, 
which "come from, and pull, in opposite directions" while simultaneously producing a 
"profoundly troubling chiasm—the chiasm that connects, in a reversible relation, 
pleasure and abuse."65 I would add a parallel point of inquiry to expand upon Raengo's 
insights about this reversible relation: is there a logic that accompanies the reversibility 
                                            
64 Love, Feeling Backward: 27. 
65 Raengo, On the Sleeve: 64-66. 
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of these pictures by conforming to typical cultural imaginings about non-White, non-
middle-class children? 
Like the ghostly gay child, Precious's fantasies and plights reiterate why some 
images never become visible but, more specifically, take us to the darker side of 
avisual images about children—where children are not even afforded the possibility to 
fit within images of the Child because they cannot thwart the visibility of their color and 
class. Thus, one of the most troubling forms of the chiasm Raengo addresses emerges 
from unspoken engagements with images we attach to non-White, non-middle-class 
children: Precious is made visible in more abusive situations than the Innocent Child—
or worse, must be made visible taking more abuse than the Innocent Child—who is so 
frequently and inappropriately imagined as White and middle-class.  
Precious may escape her memories by imaging and imagining a future through 
fantasy, but a different sequence reveals why her fantasies cannot escape the confines 
of her brutal, lived reality. Later in the film, sounds of a music box melody accompany 
Precious showering before school when we transition to a slow pan across pictures of 
Cyndi Lauper lining the walls of her bedroom. These shots abruptly cut to a close-up of 
Precious staring directly into the camera and a reverse-shot reveals Precious looking 
into the mirror, but the most shocking revelation comes from who she sees reflected in 
the mirror: Precious sees her reflection in the form of a girl who is visibly thinner than 
herself and, thus, probably not pregnant but, more significantly, also as a girl who is 
White and middle-class (Figure 1.8). While the first memory/fantasy sequence reiterates 
problematic forms of visibility imposed upon non-White and underprivileged children, 
who become visible through violence before they can be framed by cultural fantasies 
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about innocence, the second fantasy sequence compounds this problematic by 
revealing the impossibility for non-White children to escape the visibility of their skin. 
This fantasy shows us Precious seeing herself in the eyes of an/other body, and this 
fantasy—like fantasies about Oprah-moments of fame—becomes her only option to 
image and imagine another life she could live when cultural constructions of bodies 
aim to limit our engagement with visual culture to surface-orientated engagements that 
need not extend beyond the visible surface of skin. 
 
Figure 1.8 Precious seeing herself as a White child 
Our ability to see Precious seeing herself as a White child becomes another 
instance where the queerness of images explode into visibility. What we see in this 
film, beyond images of fantasy, is an array of paths to explore images becoming 
strangely stuck to bodies. Precious reveals the queerness of images that cannot 
mobilize into literal states of visibility and, thus, becomes queered by images of color 
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and class that vertiginously fold back upon and hit, as their limit, an actual, lived 
body.66 Precious's self-image, as a White, middle-class teen, becomes an image that 
can only fail because what spectators see can only be imagined or imaged within 
fantasy—from fetal photograph to her present state, hers is an image for an 
impossible, never-will-be visible body. This is to say: Precious has imaged herself far 
beyond what could have been imagined through her fetal photographs and, within her 
present moment, her self-image remains trapped within her reflections as an 
acknowledgement of her engagement with unimaginable forms of visuality. 
1.7 Aesthetics of Failure 
In addition to how the film Precious engages with issues like sexuality and 
literacy, this film foregrounds modes of engagement with visual culture where images 
circulate within thresholds around pictures. These are thresholds where images move 
strangely, are becoming ec-static, and reveal the potential for pictures to fail to 
become meaningful if the only meaning they produce can emerge from what remains 
visible on their surfaces. Precious, like the other queer children I have addressed, 
teaches us to torque our vision, teach us to see obliquely and otherwise, and provide 
methods for us to engage with and understand visual forms for aesthetics of failure. An 
aesthetics of failure arises from reiterative and vertiginous noises produced by images 
as they thwart our aims for visual mastery. Because images remain difficult—and, more 
often, impossible—to render into visibility, we must approach these images obliquely 
                                            
66 I engage with these types of images again in Chapter Three but from an opposing position. 
In that chapter I explore the differences between pictures of Michael Jackson's adult body that 
do not conform to images of his past. 
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to see how they becoming meaningful beyond the confines of picturable surfaces. This 
mode of engagement with visual culture begins the pathway toward understanding the 
queerness of images and various aesthetics of failure that follow. 
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2. EMBRACING THE SHAME OF VISIBLE ABSENCE: STARING AT PIXELATED 
PICTURES TO WONDER ABOUT DEBASED, LACKING BODIES 
I want to continue to explore aesthetics of failure through child-like 
engagements within visual culture. Queer children reveal pathways to refigure how 
shame attaches to relationships with pictures when they fail to fulfill fantasies based on 
their visible surfaces. These children reveal these pathways by torquing our vision to 
see the threshold where images move queerly, by disrupting (heteronormative) 
orientations toward an ontogenic emphasis on visible traces within pictures, and by 
refiguring how we understand our relationship to visual failure. In this chapter, I shift my 
discussion regarding what we learn about visual culture from queer children who 
refigure images projected upon fetal photographs to explore child-like engagements 
with the imperfections of visible, living bodies. Like the fantasies projected upon fetal 
photographs that do not come into fruition, our ability to imagine perfection does not 
necessarily counteract the sense of failure arising from perceptions about or 
encounters with pictures of imperfection. 
This chapter engages with aesthetics of failure by addressing the images of 
"normal" bodies lingering within and around pictures of abnormal bodies, which 
extends to an exploration of images people project upon bodies by imagining what 
should be seeable within the boundaries of the visible. To facilitate this engagement I 
address the visibility of imperfection through an ocular behavior children frequently 
employ: staring. Children, especially those who have yet to acquire language, are not 
only prone to staring but their under-developed social skills lend them the leniency to 
contradict social rules about staring. Until they are taught to conform to social norms, 
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children show us how and why we might want to wonder about wonders or become 
stunned by the spectacle of unordinary sightings. The curiosity of children reveals how 
staring, in its most common form, renders strangeness into the familiar. On the one 
hand, staring makes the strange familiar through encounters with visible surfaces by 
facilitating what Martin Jay calls "epistemological vision." This form of vision operates 
as uni-directional interpretation from a distance and can occur while staring and trying 
to make meaning out of unordinary, unfamiliar, and/or uncomfortable sights.1 On the 
other hand, we can consider how staring has the potential to function beyond an 
ocularcentric emphasis on surface. Staring, as we learn from David Michael Levin, 
reveals how our interpretations of the visible emphasize "present-at-hand" surfaces 
and neglect the "concealed essence of 're-presentation'." Levin asks us to consider 
how "the visible deeply objects" to our surface-orientations and, thus, invites us to 
contemplate how staring grants access to avisual images beyond the visible surfaces 
that might draw our attention and stares.2  
Objects have the potential to become visible while protesting human projections 
because of what W.J.T. Mitchell notes as the capacity for images to remain 
autonomous as much as they function as tools.3 This autonomy emerges from the 
mobility and mediation of images, which prompts Mitchell to suggest that the "primal 
                                            
1 Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 274-275. 
2 Martin Jay also notes how Levin bases his arguments on Heidegger's criticism of 
epistemological vision. See David Michael Levin, The Opening of Vision: Nihilism and the 
Postmodern Situation (New York: Routledge, 1988), 68; Jay, "Visual Turn." 
3 I expand this discussion about autonomous objects and tools in Chapter Four, where I 
explore the categorical distinctions between objects and things. 
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scene" in visual culture emerges from what "Levinas calls the face of the Other," 
perhaps beginning, he notes, "with the face of the Mother."4 This primal scene is a 
staring encounter, and often facilitates and structures power relations, but, as Martin 
Jay is right to remind us, "downcast eyes" do not always provide an escape.5 I explore 
how acts of staring can subvert power dynamics within looking relations by closely 
examining the function of images within staring encounters. To this end, I extend my 
discussion about the threshold of images from the previous chapter by addressing how 
acts of staring facilitate the movement of images within a threshold where visible 
surfaces and bodies operate within a bi-directional relationship;6 and, in turn, my focus 
on imperfect, queer bodies illuminates how staring facilitates an ocular sense of 
wonder to subvert power dynamics rather than perpetuating aspirations for visual 
mastery.  
Unlike the shame and stigma so often attributed to imperfect or abnormal 
bodies, Rosemarie Garland-Thomson reminds us that "ordinary" or "normal, properly 
presentable" bodies are provided "civil inattention—that is, the freedom to be 
                                            
4 Mitchell, "Showing Seeing," 175; ——, What Do Pictures Want?: 351. This primal scene is 
addressed as the "gaze" by other thinkers, like Jacques Lacan and Sartre. See Jacques Lacan, 
The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (the Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI), 
ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1998), especially “The Split 
Between the Eye and the Gaze”; Jean Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on 
Phenomenalogical Ontology, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (London: Methuen, 1958). 
5 Jay, Downcast Eyes. 
6 I have already addressed how images mobilize within thresholds beyond visible surfaces and, 
in this context, these movements resonate with what W.J.T. Mitchell addresses as the capacity 
of images to function as "go-betweens in social transactions." See Mitchell, "Showing Seeing," 
175. 
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inconspicuous, not to be a staree."7 Staring relations focused upon unordinary or 
otherwise non-normative bodies often inspire shame for a staree who will then strive 
for conformity. At the same time, many bodily imperfections cannot conform to 
ordinariness or normalcy. Childish staring provides a different form of engagement with 
visual culture whereby embracing the alternative to dwell on unordinary, unfamiliar, and 
uncomfortable sights of shame enables new modes of engagement with what Jay calls 
"ocular-eccentric" sights.8 My exploration of shame sticking to visible signs for 
imperfection or non-normativity reveals another context to understand visible forms of 
failure, which, as I address later in this chapter, also become visible through the shame 
that sticks to failure as it is experienced by digital pictures. 
●●● 
I begin with a brief introduction to Ngozi Onwurah's autobiographical film, The 
Body Beautiful (1991), to address how body parts—the female breast in particular—
can betray desires for a "Normal" or "Ideal" body. This betrayal can create a lived 
experience with shame that sticks to signifiers for gender, reproductivity, sexuality, and 
                                            
7 Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, Staring: How We Look (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2009), 35. 
8 Jay, Downcast Eyes: 591-592. 
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eroticism.9 The Body Beautiful provides another perspective on the visibility of 
relationships between bodies from a child-like point-of-view, albeit a retroactive 
account of memories from the vantage point of an adult filmmaker. Onwurah structures 
this narrative as an account of her memories, and considers the connections between 
bodies through her relationship with her mother, Madge Onwurah, to determine how 
her mother is defined as a woman after her mastectomy. Diana Mafe posits The Body 
Beautiful as a "seldom discussed yet highly subversive text" because of how it 
engages with, among other things, "cinematic representations of the (lacking) female 
body."10 The visibility of nude female bodies contribute to the subversiveness of this 
film but it is often perceived as highly subversive because Madge's mastectomy scar 
remains relentlessly visible within the filmic frame. 
I explore the visibility of bodies and looking relations between bodies through 
three types of imaging movement. First, I address W.J.T Mitchell's argument about 
looking relations within visual culture's primal scene by complicating the visible signs 
for sex and gender in relation to the maternal body. Perceptions of sex and gender 
differences can emerge within the context of looking relations, which I clarify by 
                                            
9 Other scholarship has addressed how this film explores the impact of breast cancer on 
familial relationships and provides a framework to discuss the relationships between family 
members of different races (playing out in this film by drawing attention to Ngozi being the 
child of a British mother and African father). On gendered and race relations, see E. Ann 
Kaplan, Looking for the Other: Feminism, Film and the Imperial Gaze (New York: Routledge, 
1997), especially Chapter 9. On wommanness and raced bodies, see Diana Adesola Mafe, 
"Misplaced Bodies Probing Racial and Gender Signifiers in Ngozi Onwurah's the Body 
Beautiful," Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies 29, no. 1 (2008). On the relationship between 
mothers and daughters, see Andrea Liss, Feminist Art and the Maternal (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2009). On politicized or heterosexist medical treatments and 
services, see Lisa Cartwright, "Community and the Public Body in Breast Cancer Media 
Activism," Cultural Studies 12, no. 2 (1998). 
10 Mafe, "Misplaced Bodies," 37. 
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addressing how shame sticks to perceptions of imperfect bodies and how clothing 
functions as a visible trace for sex and gender in movements through thresholds 
beyond the visible. 
Second, I address how the sight of a mastectomy scar structures visible 
difference between images of a lacking, absent breast and the virtual image of a once-
was breast. I address this form of visible difference through an analysis of looking 
relations in the film The Body Beautiful to contemplate how shame is made visible. 
While The Body Beautiful directs viewers to engage with "complex responses like 
recognition, identification and [the] denial of bodily signs,"11 Lisa Cartwright explains, I 
became interested in the visible (aged, gendered, and raced) differences prompting 
Ngozi Onwurah to address avisual relationships between bodies within this film. These 
differences refigure how the film engages with forms of visibility by shifting from a 
visible mark or sign of difference to looking relations and staring encounters. A 
shameful staring encounter arises when looking relations become an interface to 
oscillate between the visible absence of Madge's breast and images of her once-was-
visible breast. I then interrogate how staring encounters can mobilize looking relations 
toward pathways where this sense of shame is embraced. 
In the final section, I extend my discussion about differences between bodily 
forms and embodied imperfections to digital pictures. I address how digital pictures 
experience a sense of shame arising from the visibility of digital pixels. For digital 
pictures, the pixel becomes a visible sign of difference and, in the case of pixelization, 
                                            
11 Cartwright, "Cancer Media Activism," 133. 
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has the potential to facilitate a sense of failure by revealing how digital pixels cannot 
Photoshop images of fantasy into pictorial realities. To this end, I address how 
pixelization in an advertisement campaign about breast cancer continues to produce 
movements between presence and absence, how these movements put visibility at a 
distance, and provide a mode of engagement within staring relations that allow us to 
embrace states of shameful visibility beyond the artifacts I examine in this chapter. 
2.1 Disfiguring Distance: the Scarred Gap Between Present and Absent 
One of the first things I felt when I was facing 
the diagnosis of breast cancer was, "Shit, now 
I guess I really must be a woman."  
—Eve Sedgwick12 
I want to address the relationship between breast cancer and gender before I 
attend to the visible differences between female breasts and mastectomy scars. In the 
chapter "White Glasses" from her book Tendencies, Eve Sedgwick offers an account 
of her reactions after learning she had developed breast cancer. One might wonder 
how breast cancer becomes the signifier for and the fact of Sedgwick's womanness, 
as the above epigraph suggests, when she was always resistant to heteronormative 
gender identity and performance. Sedgwick was "nonprocreative by choice," had a 
"sense of femininity" that was not "routed through a pretty appearance in the imagined 
view of heterosexual men," and admitted that her "mammary globes, though pleasing 
in [herself] and in others who sported them, were nonetheless relatively peripheral to 
                                            
12 Sedgwick, Tendencies: 256. 
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the complex places where sexuality and gender identity really happen."13 Upon being 
diagnosed, Sedgwick was responding, like any woman must respond, to the cultural 
ideologies that construct meaning about female breasts. 
These are normative cultural ideologies that render gender in relation to female 
breasts. Breast cancer enters into this web of culturally over-coded meanings, 
becoming a part of the female body and a condition for how women define themselves 
in relation to their bodies, because, as Alisa Solomon explains, it occurs within this 
"iconic lump of flesh."14 American society has increasingly "glorified the erotic nature of 
the female breast," as James Olson explains. Olson clarifies how broader cultural 
contexts further situate breasts as erotic symbols and distinctly visible signifiers for 
women and femininity because, for humans, they appear as an "external, visual sign of 
puberty" rather than developing during a female's first pregnancy.15 
Cultural and personal perspectives about female breasts intersect with concerns 
about cancer at the start of the film The Body Beautiful, when we learn about Madge 
Onwurah's experience with breast cancer while she was pregnant with her son. 
Madge's voice-over narration addresses her breast as a force that began to polarize 
her position as a woman, positioning her experience as a fight between reproductive 
faculties and cancer. "For nine months," she tells us, "they grew inside of me—the 
cancer and the child—life and death fighting for possession of my body. Each day, as 
they grew stronger, I must grow weaker." Only two days after her son was born, she 
                                            
13 Ibid. 
14 Alisa Solomon, "The Politics of Breast Cancer," Camera Obscura 10, no. 1 (1992): 158. 
15 James S. Olson, Bathsheba's Breast: Women, Cancer, and History (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2002), 109-110. 
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explains, "the doctors removed my breast—the price they had demanded in return for 
my life."  
Madge is required to have a mastectomy if she wants to live and this choice 
initiates her experiences with cultural ideologies that govern visual perceptions about 
lacking female bodies. The film continually confronts spectators with the voice-over 
from a doctor who instructs Madge about how to compensate for her visible lack. 
"When packing your hospital requirements," the doctor's voice-over suggests, "include 
a few tiny safety pins, a needle, some thread, some of your husbands large white 
handkerchiefs, and a pure silk scarf—if you have one. This kit is to help you experiment 
with a temporary breast form, so that you leave the hospital feeling at least partially 
compensated." By this doctor's estimation, Madge has the potential to feel "partially" 
compensated by re-constructing a form and façade for her excised breast from her 
husband's handkerchiefs but, despite the option to construct a breast-form through 
façade, her experience of absence and lack will not end when she leaves the hospital. 
"The inability of the male medical voice to acknowledge the trauma of the mastectomy" 
and "the literally patronizing suggestion that breasts are somewhat replaceable," Diana 
Mafe argues, become telling comments about "the objectification of the breast cancer 
survivor" and reveal why "the male gaze remains incapable of seeing past Madge's 
lack of a breast to her femininity."16 At the same time it is possible to complicate Mafe's 
claim by addressing two competing modes of visibility within the film.  
                                            
16 Mafe, "Misplaced Bodies," 42. 
 60 
While this doctor provides a normative prescription to compensate for an 
experience of loss he may not fully understand through his personal experiences, he 
also, whether inadvertent or not, makes accurate reference to the mimetic function of 
gender performance. More specifically, this doctor reiterates a particularly queer 
description of gender performance: femininity as it is penned by Sigmund Freud. In his 
Three Essays on the Theories of Sexuality, Freud has difficulty addressing what 
constitutes gender. He aims to more thoroughly theorize masculinity and femininity in 
his later work and, in his lecture on femininity, Freud lends particular specificity to his 
perception of gender. It is Freud's contention that his lecture "brings forward nothing 
but observed facts, almost without any speculative additions," and, in doing so, he 
proceeds to answer the "riddle of the nature of femininity."17 Anatomical distinctions do 
not constitute gender for Freud but, instead, gender emerges from experiences with 
biological development after children recognize the differences between sexed 
bodies.18 Females experience gender through differences between sexed reproductive 
organs, which is an experience of difference emerging from the lack of a penis and 
results in the experience of genital deficiency as a condition for the development of 
their sexual identity and behavior.  
Freud's rendering of gender becomes strange and rather interesting if we 
inspect how he addresses the form and function of femininity arising from its 
                                            
17 Sigmund Freud, "Femininity," in New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, ed. James 
Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1974), 113-114. 
18 Freud differentiates between sexes according to (visible or internal) reproductive organs, 
secondary sexual characteristics (such as non-reproductive organs or body shapes), and other 
"atrophied similarities" (such as nipples). See ——, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, 
trans. James Strachey (New York: Basic Books, 1962). 
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connection to clothing and shame, which, he tells us, "is considered to be a feminine 
characteristic par excellance."19 Women, Freud explains, have made "few contributions 
to the discoveries and inventions in the history of civilization" besides what may be 
their only contribution to society: "plaiting and weaving."20 The unconscious motivation 
for the development of this technique, Freud explains, arose from women who wove 
clothing into a modern version of cover modeled after pubic hair. Clothing, thus, is 
meant to fulfill a woman's aim to cover the genital deficiency she bears—bare and 
visible genital deficiency if the clothing were not there. 
Kathryn Bond Stockton complicates Freud's reference to cloth-making and 
considers how this description of (gendered) clothing also connects with queerness 
through shame. Stockton argues that queerness emerges from clothing when the 
perpetual performance of gender is woven into a material lie that we buy: a "weave" of 
cloth can be worn as a wrapping, is rendered to conceal our sex behind gender but, in 
the process, only guarantees estrangement from the purpose of this surface. While 
gender might become attached to clothing as visual objects, its circulation does not 
eradicate unseen, queer qualities that mobilize beyond surface-orientated perceptions. 
In contrast to Freud's description of clothing as a mask for genital deficiency, Stockton 
clarifies how culturally-coded cloth "reveals the category (male or female) of the 
person's genitals it purports to cover." It is an inescapable "bold revelation," a material 
                                            
19 ——, "Femininity," 132, his emphasis. 
20 Ibid., 132. 
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surface-sign for the unseen, which makes us strange for adhering to the conventions of 
clothing as cover.21 
Clothing undoes our claims to control their meaning as covers and queers us by 
flaunting an aversion to our conventional fabric-aided configurations of gender. 
Rendering gender and sex through cloth-things positions us between two concomitant 
choices: undress to reveal what is not invisible in the first place or embrace the shame 
of being queered by cloth. In one sense, this becomes a daily experience for women 
with mastectomies when, as Eve Sedgwick recalls, "just getting dressed in the morning 
means deciding how many breasts I will be able to recognize" (albeit unlikely for many 
women to hear "a voice" whispering "three").22 At the same time, Stockton explains, 
"Where skin and cloth more obviously and dramatically diverge from each 
other as forms of surface is in their perceived degrees of permanence. 
Given that a person can more easily remove her clothes than her skin and 
can change kinds of clothes (from feminine to masculine, from glamorous 
to plainstyle), certain cultural imperatives that ask for a person's 
compliance—you must wear this, you can't wear that—are hard to 
duplicate with skin."23 
The voice of Madge's doctor provides commentary about the visibility of her 
mastectomy scar and, whether intentional or not, reveals how the visibility of gender 
depends upon the surface to which it will stick. A faux breast form might allow Madge 
                                            
21 Stockton, Beautiful Bottom, Beautiful Shame: 44. 
22 Sedgwick, Tendencies: 257. 
23 Stockton, Beautiful Bottom, Beautiful Shame: 40. 
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to alter the contours of her body, but the mimetic function of handkerchiefs sewn into 
the shape of a breast cannot alter the scar that remains on her skin. Rather, her 
mastectomy remains the inescapable, bold revelation cloth rarely covers within the 
film. 
2.2 Staring at the Shame of (Virtual) Visibility 
In contrast to the ease with which women can change their clothing, Madge's 
mastectomy is permanent. Ngozi's narration emphasizes this permanence when she 
likens her mother's mastectomy to blindness—an irreversible circumstance she cannot 
imagine.24 This occurs, on the one hand, because Madge's scar is visible within the 
filmic frame. Madge's experience with the visibility of sex, gender, and sexuality is 
conditioned by the visible lack of breast tissue. This experience structures her gender 
as a lack or absence within a culture demanding present and visible manifestations of 
femininity. This experience produces a visual gap between a cultural image of breasts 
as visibly present in contrast to their recognizable absence at the site/sight of a scar, 
which is a visible absence conditioning the experience of many women who have had 
a mastectomy and cannot, do not, or refuse to get prosthetic implants.25 
On the other hand, the visibility of Madge's scar and, by extension, the contours 
of her body function like all visible dichotomies within the film. Madge determined it 
"was almost possible" to love her scar because it allowed her to be with her children, 
                                            
24 Mafe also addresses this scene and its impact on Ngozi's understanding about her mother. 
See Mafe, "Misplaced Bodies," 47. 
25 As examples, see Solomon's discussion about the pressure placed on women to receive 
reconstructive surgery and Audre Lorde's writing about the "atrocity" of breast reconstruction 
in Audre Lorde, The Cancer Journals, 2nd edition ed. (San Francisco: Spinsters Ink, 1988). 
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who became her "shield" by protecting her from "rejection and disgust" but "most of 
all," she explains, from "pity." Ngozi, Madge tells us, became a "model daughter" who 
"joined that elite breed of women, penciled in by men who decided on a sliding scale 
of beauty that stops at women like me." It is puzzling how Madge's children effectively 
shield her from the shame of her scar when Ngozi affirms her mother's differently 
visible body because of her work as a runway and photography model (Figures 2.1 & 
2.2). As we later learn, perceptions about visual standards of gender and beauty do not 
stop with men but, as Lisa Cartwright explains, become recognizable to us (and Ngozi) 
through Madge's humiliation—humiliation brought on by the stares of other women.26  
In one of the most significant scenes in the film, Ngozi persuades her mother to 
go to a sauna, but Madge's reluctance persists even after Ngozi tells her about 80-
year-old grannies who enjoy the experience in Sweden. The sauna is filled with 
"women of the world" who choose to be topless because, Ngozi tells us, "hang-ups 
are out." It is in this where Madge's humiliation becomes visible, where spectators 
witness the disgust and pity inspired by the sight of Madge's scar. The scene begins 
with a shot-reverse-shot to place us within Madge's perspective. The camera slowly 
pans the room as she looks at each woman through the steam, then it returns to a shot 
of Madge, who shows signs of discomfort and remains the only woman covering her 
breasts with a towel. Madge begins to fall asleep and, as her body begins to relax, her 
towel droops below her chest and reveals her scar.  
                                            
26 Cartwright, "Cancer Media Activism," 133. 
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Figure 2.1 Ngozi Onwurah, model daughter 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Madge Onwurah, mother modeling like daughter 
We, like Ngozi, will see Madge from the perspective of the other women after 
her scar is exposed, but Madge will not remain the centrally-framed figure. Instead, the 
scar is reframed as the central sight of the reaction-shots. The multi-directional stares 
that structure these looking relations within the sauna allow Ngozi to see Madge from 
another point-of-view. Beforehand, Ngozi's perception of her mother's scar was 
framed by familiarity because, as Ngozi tells us earlier in the film, she and her brother 
had grown accustomed to seeing Madge's naked body. Ngozi's is positioned to see 
these women stare at Madge and her perceptions are reframed when she and forced 
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to contemplate what these women imagine after reacting to the sight of her mother's 
scar. 
Ngozi's voice-over narration becomes puzzling accompaniment to the reactions 
from the women in the sauna before Madge wakes up: "I remember that day in the 
sauna as the first day my mother appeared before me as a woman. I was forced to see 
her as others might." With these words, we should begin to wonder about several 
things: What does Ngozi see when she sees her mother from the point-of-view of 
another? How does the sight of women staring reveal Madge as a woman? And, by 
extension, why does the sight of a scar become a sign of femininity for Ngozi (or any 
spectator) when seeing these women stare at Madge's scar? We can begin to address 
these questions by inquiring about the production of these images as a visible form for 
staring encounters to determine how the sight of Madge's scar produces multiple 
images simultaneously. 
When the first woman sees Madge's scar in the sauna, her surprised reaction 
quickly shifts to an uneasy stare and mobilizes a series of stares from the other women 
in the sauna. As Rosemarie Garland-Thomson explains, the meaning we gather from 
staring encounters remains "unstable and open-ended." Staring often begins as an 
"ocular inquiry" to initiate other cognitive or "intellectual" inquiries, such as curiosity 
and observation; but, although staring may aim to "make the unknown intelligible" or 
"incorporate the unusual into our understandings of the usual," staring encounters do 
not guarantee specific understanding will arise from our observations.27 This is 
                                            
27 Garland-Thomson, Staring: 39, 47-48. 
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illustrated in the sauna scene because staring had the potential to fulfill a sense of 
curiosity through observation. Instead, we soon see these looking relations extend 
beyond observation-oriented staring when the reaction-shots change and resist 
transforming an "unordinary" sight into something familiar. 
  
Figure 2.3 Madge, exposed in sauna 
 
Figure 2.4 Camera close-up on Madge's scar 
The shot-lengths decrease between point-of-view and reaction-shots when 
Madge's scar is exposed, which provokes emotive, non-verbal reactions from the 
women and the camera. While the women are initially unable to look away from the 
scar, it is the camera that frames her scar with increasing closeness and clarity (Figures 
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2.3 & 2.4). In other words, the camera cannot not look closer and illustrates why, as 
Garland-Thomson suggests, "the kind of visual scrutiny leveled by a stare is both 
impersonal and intimate."28 The camera foregrounds the ability for staring to facilitate 
intimate engagements with surfaces of visible things and, in doing so, spectators sense 
an intimately impersonal form of scrutiny emerging from these women while the 
camera traces a series of reaction-shots to show us how they stare. 
This is reiterated by the camera as an intimate engagement with the visible 
surface of Madge's body and these reaction-shots allow us to see how these women 
reconcile the differences between what they expected as opposed to what they 
actually encounter within their field of vision. The camera also reveals why the 
reactions from these women are not simply physiological responses to an unordinary 
sight in an attempt to render Madge's scar into legibility, but rather, reactions to the 
unordinariness of an unexpected sight. These women do not need to observe or 
contemplate the sight of Madge's mastectomy scar because they know what her scar 
signifies and, more tellingly, spectators learn this because the camera shows these 
women turn to look away (Figures 2.5 - 2.8). 
                                            
28 Ibid., 33. 
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Figure 2.5 In sauna, staring  
 
Figure 2.6 In sauna, looking away 
 
Figure 2.7 In sauna, staring 
 
Figure 2.8 In sauna, looking away 
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For the women in the sauna, Madge's scar makes an unexpected absence 
visible—the absence of breast tissue connected to her body—but her breast continues 
to exist through imaging processes because the scar-line bears the burden of a virtual 
gap. As the camera frames the stares of these women it reveals how our ocular 
perceptions initiate virtual imaging processes, which mobilize and become meaningful 
between ocular perception and cognition, between what is "seeable" or "sayable" and 
what is imagined or imaged. Like other visible objects, Madge's scar functions as a site 
where imaging processes mobilize our perceptions and projections within the "hinge" 
or threshold of virtuality, which, as Brian Massumi explains, is an "otherwise empty and 
dimensionless plane" between our visual perceptions of "object[s] in the world."29 
Within this threshold, the scar becomes meaningful by providing a "synesthetic [form 
of] experience," "combining senses, tenses, and dimensions on a single surface" of 
perception.30 Massumi's discussion about perception draws our attention to the prefix 
                                            
29 I do not use the terms virtual or virtuality (especially in my discussions about images) in the 
context of "virtual reality" and/or artificial reality but, instead, echo the sentiments theorized by 
scholars who do not see these terms in opposition to reality or the Real. These terms refer to 
processes within deterritorialized or transcendental spaces, where the possibilities of 
"becoming reality" accumulate and comprise a different form of reality that is both real and not 
real simultaneously. For examples, see: Gilles Deleuze on general theories about both terms in 
relation to film, in Cinema 2: The Time-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1989). David J. Gunkel on how the virtual is created by the co-presence of 
real and unreal actualities, in Thinking Otherwise: Philosophy, Communication, Technology 
(West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2007). Mark B.N. Hansen on how virtuality 
disconnects the body schema from the body image, in Bodies in Code. Akria Mizuta Lippit 
about the connections between virtuality and avisuality, in Atomic Light. And, Brian Massumi 
on the topological plane of virtuality that exists outside of cognition, in Parables. 
30 These processes also function similarly to what Massumi calls a biogram, as the container 
for these processes shift from surface to "hypersurface" within the virtual. See in Massumi, 
Parables: 187-190. 
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of surface to recognize how our perceptions collapse as if they are isolated 
experiences and as if visible surfaces are sites with intrinsic meaning. 
Our ocular perceptions of visible surfaces mobilize within this virtual threshold, 
where we must reconcile and organize our perceptions based on an array of 
incompatible or incompossible images. These imaging processes allow us to engage 
with visible objects beyond their surface, which we might understand as virtual sur-
faces emerging from the threshold where images queer the surfaces of visible objects. 
Within this threshold, images refigure visible surfaces by queering how we attribute 
meaning to visual objects and by surpassing the limitations of surface and reflexively 
rendering virtual meanings through unseeable, avisual processes and experiences.31 
Thus, within virtuality, visible surfaces open up to images that can become pregnant 
with past images, memories, and experiences at the same time that they can open up 
to images of undeterminable futures.  
These virtual imaging processes allow any scar to facilitate the production of 
(multiple) images because, Winfried Menninghaus explains, "the scar is a flaw on the 
skin's closed surface" that functions as "a reminder of the chemical processes [that 
                                            
31 This argument is connected with what Massumi writes about memories within virtuality. For 
Massumi, memory is topological—a "process of arriving at a form through continuous 
deformation"—and is enacted across and between durations of time. Every temporal duration, 
he explains, includes the potentiality for "productive interferences, or in-between effects 
(affects)." In other words, gaps emerge in-between memory and cognition and create the 
possibility for the body to receive other intersensorial stimuli that can affect memories before 
they enter cognition. These gaps occur in "hypertime," as Massumi explains, when the 
transportation of sensorial experiences can be stimulated and cause these "experiences (and 
temporalities) to meld together, intermingle, contaminate or move in-between each other." The 
possibility for memories to become stimulated, even virtually altered, before cognitive 
processing or recollection not only reveals its fickle or volatile nature, but also reveals how 
perceptions of (subjective) experiences are flexible and uncertain because they can "smudge." 
ibid., 184, 195-200. 
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had raged] beneath."32 Madge's scar functions within a visual economy of disgust like 
most scars, which debase the sealed surface of the body by functioning as visible 
reminders of "disgusting" wounds, of no-longer present and only imaginable sites of 
lacerated flesh. Within this context, scars become ideal examples for the queerness of 
images because they are continually imaged beyond their surfaces but, more 
specifically, because they take the form of a visible surface that requires an onlooker to 
consider the culmination of once-were-visible processes leading to the currently visible 
condition on the surface of skin. Thus, Madge's scar functions as a visible mark for her 
experiences with the pain(s) of body-altering surgery and remains a visible sign for 
particular experiences with cancer that renders multiple images simultaneously: images 
for the presence of an absence; images of an abject breast that is a debased image for 
the places where parts were cut or cast away from the body; and, in addition to these 
images of disfigurement, images of a once-was-visible, pre-cancerous breast.  
The possibility for multiple, co-existing images of Madge's scar to emerge from 
a virtual threshold also reveals its threateningly abject visual form because, as Julia 
Kristeva tells us, "abjection is above all ambiguity" and "it does not radically cut off the 
subject from what threatens it."33 In other words, each glimpse of Madge's scar 
mobilizes motions that reopen the scar of the mastectomy in an "as if" movement, 
where the metaphor of absence splits in two directions: we see the scar as the 
absence of a breast and, in turn, this initiates an avisual rendering of a breast that 
                                            
32 Winfried Menninghaus, Disgust: Theory and History of a Strong Sensation, trans. Howard 
Eiland and Joel Golb (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), 78. 
33 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. L.S. Roudiez (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1982), 9. 
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once-was. This is a metaphoric movement that re-imagines a breast within the present, 
as a constant, albeit virtually present and presently distant, reminder of its absence; 
but it is also a projected sign of woman's lack, re-imagined and lacking in the present, 
in the form of a scar-line. 
If we return to the stares of the women in the sauna, we should ask what these 
women find disgusting about the sight of Madge's scar and, more specifically, why 
disgust prompts them to look away. These women can choose to look away because 
they know what they have seen; they do not need to acquire additional information 
about what they know they have seen. Unlike the women, the camera continues to 
frame these looking relations with increasing clarity and, in doing so, lingers long 
enough for us to make meaning of the images circulating beyond the surface of 
Madge's scar. In the broadest sense, Madge's body confronts the expectations of 
women in the sauna because she is visible and does not conform to their images of a 
"normal" female body with two visible breasts. In this way, Madge's body confronts 
these women's perceptions about the female body in several ways. Her scar reveals 
how "normal" bodies are never visible because normalcy operates through images 
projected onto visible surfaces by people who imagine what can or should be seeable 
and, more specifically, the visibility of her scar draws attention to how breasts need not 
function as the sign for femininity these women understand as an acceptable form for 
publicly visible female bodies.34  
                                            
34 As Garland-Thomson explains, normalcy becomes an illusion "people reach for in creating 
self-presentations, particularly those in the public eye." Garland-Thomson, Staring: 45. 
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Yet, if these women stare at and then desire distance from the sight of Madge's 
scar, we should also inquire about how her scar makes visible the possibility for any 
woman's body to bear the mark of a similar scar. This is why mastectomy scars also 
represent, as Lisa Cartwright argues, "the unimaginable, unimage-able fear that any 
woman might one day be disfigured by breast cancer."35 While breasts are often 
associated with puberty, eroticism, and reproductivity, as the cultural historian Marilyn 
Yalom explains, they are simultaneously and "increasingly associated with cancer and 
death. [...] Breasts literally incarnate the existential tension between Eros and 
Thanatos—life and death—in a visible and palpable form."36 Cartwright and Yalom 
reveal how breasts become more than visible signs for reproductive potential because 
they function simultaneously as signifiers for mastectomies and breast cancer, and 
facilitate potent fears about the life-threatening possibility they will need to be 
removed.  
At the same time, while it is possible for people to distance themselves from 
their fear about the threat of cancer by avoiding images that draw attention to this 
threat, the fear and threat of potential futures with cancer are always and only 
imaginable. If these women turn away because of threatening thoughts about a 
potential future with breast cancer, they simply portray the fundamentally affective 
relationship all people experience in relation to virtual images of threat. The turning-
away from Madge's scar can be understood as a response to what Brian Massumi 
                                            
35 Cartwright, "Cancer Media Activism," 133. 
36 Marilyn Yalom, A History of the Breast (New York: Knopf, 1997), 124. 
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calls the "affectively presented" quality of threat.37 This is the quality of threat that 
becomes "contagious" and reveals why the stares from one woman initiate a series of 
stares from multiple women before transforming into shocked and startled reactions.38 
These women are affected by Madge's scar because, as Massumi explains, "in the 
past there was a future threat;" before these women saw the scar it is possible that the 
"threat" of breast cancer was always and only an imagined threat.39  
At the same time, a mastectomy scar is an odd visible sign for breast cancer 
because it does not index cancer. Mastectomy scars can contribute to how we image 
breast cancer, but these scars only allow us to imagine a previous experience with 
breast cancer that will ideally never resurface with another cancerous trace. This is the 
perversity of signs for threat, as Massumi illustrates, because "threat has no actual 
referent."40 Mastectomy scars are perverse signs for breast cancer because of how 
signs function as "vehicle[s] for making presently felt the potential force of the 
objectively absent."41 If mastectomy scars are signs for past experiences with cancer, 
Madge's scar becomes a sign for excised cancerous tissue, a sign for the hope for a 
future without cancer, and these women are affected by a threat that is not visible and 
can only be virtually imaged within the sauna. 
                                            
37 Brian Massumi, "The Future Birth of the Affective Fact: The Political Ontology of Threat," in 
The Affect Theory Reader, ed. Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2010), 61-62. 
38 Ibid., 58. 
39 Ibid., 53. 
40 Ibid., 59. 
41 Ibid., 63. 
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Thus, these looking relations function as a form of staring aiming to gain power 
over a complex visual field. These stares are a social interaction that enables these 
women to assign stigma to the site of Madge's scar because of their knowledge and 
perceptions about the significance of mastectomy scars. These stares are fueled by 
disgust and facilitate power relations because, Menninghaus explains, "disgusts's 
intention toward the object only knows the 'for us' of a strange 'thing' with which no 
dialog takes place, but which simply deserves, because and to the extent it comes 
close to us, an immediate act of distancing."42 These women provide themselves 
distance from the sight of Madge's scar when they shift from stares to look away. 
Ngozi's perception of her mother's ordinariness is challenged by the stares and 
abreactions of these women, allowing us to understand why these intimate looking 
relations remain impersonal when she (or any spectator) tries to dissect what these 
women think they know about the meaning of a scar they only see from a distance. 
This is to say, all of these meanings and images emerge within a few seconds, 
between the time it takes for Ngozi to tell us about her realization and the moment 
when Madge wakes up, realizing her towel has fallen and has exposed her scar.  
Madge quickly and shamefully re-covers her body with the towel, but she 
cannot cover what the other women and we have already seen. The towel is a cover 
like clothing, a cover that does not cover, rendering its form like un-covered, bare and 
visible breast (and genital) deficiency. This is the persistent, shameful form of gender 
performed on and by the body. This is a shameful visible performance without an 
                                            
42 Menninghaus, Disgust: 85. 
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origin—but, as I explain, is a form of shame that digital pictures instruct us to embrace. 
I return to The Body Beautiful at the end of this chapter after I explore images of breast 
cancer in digital contexts, which provide insight about looking relations that undermine 
visual mastery. 
2.3 Digital Shame; or, Wondering About the Shame of Pixels 
Queering is at its heart a process of wonder.  
—Jeffrey J. Cohen43 
In January of 2000, the Breast Cancer Fund started what would become the 
short-lived San Francisco ad campaign "Obsessed with Breasts," which aimed to 
address America's obsession with breasts by suggesting that "we should be no less 
obsessed with eradicating the disease that afflicts them."44 I first encountered these 
advertisements within the context of controversy. While living in Utah, I saw a report on 
the evening news about this breast cancer awareness campaign as it began to gain 
worldwide media attention. These advertisements looked rather familiar—one looked 
like a cover for Cosmopolitan magazine while the other two looked like advertisements 
for Calvin Klein and Victoria's Secret (Figures 2.9 & 2.10). 
                                            
43 Jeffrey Cohen, Medieval Identity Machines (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2003), 110. 
44 Greg Baird and Andrea R. Martin, "Press Statement About the Breast Cancer Fund's 
"Obsessed with Breasts" Campaign," Breast Cancer Fund Website, Retrieved March 26, 2012, 
http://www.breastcancerfund.org/media/press-releases/obsessed-with-breasts.html. 
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Figure 2.9 "It's No Secret," pixels recreated 
 
 
Figure 2.10 "Obsessed with Breasts," pixels recreated 
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The news program I was watching noted how people began to protest the 
public display of these advertisements, which, as Thomas Bivins notes, prompted at 
least one billboard company to refuse to post the advertisement within the space they 
had donated to the Breast Cancer Fund.45 The story piqued my interest when the 
reporter began to discuss the controversial nature of censorship while, on my TV 
screen, I saw pixelated chests of the women in the advertisements because they 
featured topless models. I understood why a television network would censor images 
of female breasts to comply with FCC guidelines on obscenity and indecency, which is 
why I was not surprised by their decision to pixelate the advertisements.46 The network 
was merely reinforcing sexual difference within visual culture, whereby bare chests of 
men are presentable and seen while the chests of women are rendered unseeable and 
obscene.  
The Breast Cancer Fund recognized why these advertisements had the potential 
to "shock or disturb some people," but as I began to see the content of these 
advertisements mimicking common slogans ("Obsessed with Breasts" rather than 
Calvin Klein's "Obsession" and "It's No Secret" rather than Victoria's Secret), I became 
puzzled about the decision to censor these advertisements on billboards.47 The 
                                            
45 Thomas H. Bivins, Mixed Media: Moral Distinctions in Advertising, Public Relations, and 
Journalism, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 1999). 
46 As I would learn four years later, a public network will go to great lengths to maintain 
distance from the accidental appearance of a breast on television, when wardrobe 
malfunctions cause a sheathed nipple to show up in the middle of a SuperBowl half-time show. 
Others have also written about Janet Jackson's wardrobe malfunction; see, as examples, 
Nicole Fleetwood's writings about "Nipplegate" in Troubling Vision: Performance, Visuality, and 
Blackness (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 131-132; Garland-Thomson, Staring: 
145-147. 
47 Baird and Martin, "Press Statement". 
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controversial nature of the visual content became textually apparent beyond the 
pixelization of the advertisements when the title "Mastectomy" topped the 
advertisement styled to look like a Cosmopolitan magazine cover (Figure 2.11). 
Contrary to this network's intentions to render female breasts and their associations 
out of visibility, pixelization resulted in distortion of another kind because these 
advertisements contained female chests without visible breasts.  
 
Figure 2.11 "Mastecomy" advertisement 
The breasts I first imagined, as visible but hidden behind the pixels on TV, began 
to change after seeing the title of the magazine-styled advertisement. I began to 
 81 
imagine mastectomy scars behind the pixelization and I realized how the rather 
conventional and recognizable format of these advertisements would be reconfigured 
when seeing or, in my case, imaging mastectomy scars beyond the pixels. The 
pixelation became a greater concern when I began to wonder what it might mean for 
pixelization to conflate—even eradicate—the visual differences between breasts and 
mastectomy scars. 
Similar to the sight of Madge's scar, the "Obsessed with Breasts" campaign 
advertisements produce movements between the presence of a mastectomy scar (that 
is, an absence of a visible breast) and virtual images for the presence of absence (that 
is, imaginings of once-were visible breasts). The pixelization of these scars on 
television, on the other hand, attempts to end these movements, to deform or disfigure 
the images produced within the virtual gap between presence and absence. At the 
same time, pixelization conjoins different states of visibility and complicates several 
concerns I have already addressed in this chapter.  
The dictionary defines a pixel as the "smallest element of an image that can be 
individually processed in a video display system" and functions as a measurable unit 
that often goes unseen by our optical faculties. Pixels become measurable through 
spatial organization because, as Sean Cubitt explains, every pixel on a display is bit-
mapped and "derives its address from ... the pixel whose position is written '(0,0)'." At 
the same time, this is an arbitrary zero-point—what Cubitt calls the "nonidentity" of an 
"unstable" origin—and as pixels change in relation to this arbitrary origin point they 
reveal a form of mobility within a temporal logic: "Each pixel address is symbolized by 
its distance from zero, its difference from the nonidentical, the fullness of that 
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apparently empty address (0,0). As original difference, the absent pixel (0,0) of origin is 
both essential and nonexistent. Its resultant instability is the perpetual source of 
movement." While I agree with his formulation of the pixel as a discrete but "formless" 
unit, Cubitt does not fully explore how pixelation and the process of pixelization 
recontextualize the visible form and functionality of pixels beyond their limitation as 
"bounded figures" within spatial or temporal arrangements.48  
Pixels draw attention to the differences between visible presence and absence 
by reconfiguring their relationship to space and time. Through this process, pixels lend 
visible form to the otherwise unseen movements of images within visual culture and, 
thus, provide a palpable form to encounter imaging processes.49 Pixels draw attention 
to the artifice of visual wholeness when they become visible through pixelation, which 
is a state when pixels are large enough to be drawn to our attention while on display 
(e.g. a low-resolution screen). Pixelization is a similar but more precise form of 
pixelation, because it implies a process was used to deliberately lower or reduce visual 
resolution (e.g. pixel art, such as contemporary video games created with an 8-bit 
aesthetic based on older game system technological limitations). Pixels materialize 
through pixelation and pixelization by disrupting and deforming visual clarity and, by 
                                            
48 Cubitt also defines the pixel as "formless" in contrast to other (digital) forms of media like the 
"cut," which is a concept I address specifically in Chapter Three. See Sean Cubitt, The Cinema 
Effect (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), 32-33, 43, 48-49. 
49 Although Cubitt does not make reference to the book co-authored by Yve-Alain Bois and 
Rosalind Krauss, his argument about the formlessness of the pixel resonates with how they 
conceptualize the formless at the start of the book. Bois writes: "the formless has only an 
operational existence: it is a performative, like obscene words, the violence of which derives 
less from semantics than from the very act of their delivery." See Yve-Alain Bois and Rosalind 
E. Krauss, Formless: A User's Guide (New York: Zone Books, 1997), 18. 
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doing so, begin to demonstrate their queerness when, as I explain below, they 
embrace the shame that sticks to this fractured and failed form of visibility. 
I refer to this materialization of pixels as a moment when visual clarity is 
debased. Debasement has been written about as a synonym for shame beyond purely 
"negative" connotations, and I want to contemplate what conditions facilitate our 
embrace of these shameful and debased experiences.50 Michael Taussig, for example, 
clarifies how debasement reveals the "doubleness of the word 'base' as both 
substantial support and as obscene or abject."51 Pixels engage in both of these forms 
of debased relations because they are the "base" unit required for digital display—
pixels are the smallest part capable of supporting and de-basing their whole— and 
become obscenely recognizable by "disfiguring" or "deforming" visual clarity through 
pixelation and pixelization.  
                                            
50 Critical theorists have engaged with the concept of shame in various ways and, within the 
realm of queer theory, shame is often suggested as something to embrace rather than avoid. 
See these writings as a sample of scholarship where shame is not only understood through 
negative connotations: George Bataille, Michael Taussig, and Kathryn Bond Stockton on 
debasement; George Bataille and Sharon Patricia Holland on death; Leo Bersani on self-
shattering; Lee Edelman on debasement and the death drive; Judith Halberstam on failure and 
losing; Julia Kristeva on abjection; Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Kathryn Bond Stockton on 
shame; and Sharon Patricia Holland and Kathryn Bond Stockton who explore the connections 
between shame and Blackness. See Georges Bataille, Visions of Excess: 1927-1939, trans. 
Allan Stoekl (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985); ——, Erotism: Death & 
Sensuality, 1st City lights ed. (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1986); Bersani, "Rectum; ——, 
Homos; Lee Edelman, "Tearooms and Sympathy, or, the Epistemology of the Water Closet," in 
The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader, ed. Henry Abelove, Michele Aina Barale, and David M. 
Halperin (New York: Routledge, 1993); Halberstam, Queer Art of Failure; Sharon Patricia 
Holland, Raising the Dead: Readings of Death and (Black) Subjectivity, New Americanists 
(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2000); Kristeva, Powers of Horror; Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); ——, 
Novel Gazing; Stockton, Beautiful Bottom, Beautiful Shame; Michael Taussig, Defacement: 
Public Secrecy and the Labor of the Negative (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). 
51 ——, Defacement: 53. 
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Within the context of debasement, digital pixelation and pixelization do not 
utilize or engage with base-ness and shame in the same way. Digital pixelation 
internalizes the shame of the pixel form by putting the pixel on display as a base unit of 
visibility. Pixelation draws attention to the façade of visual clarity by leaving pixels 
within a perpetual state of low resolution visibility, and remains in this state of shameful 
visibility by prompting spectators to imagine digital pictures bit-mapped with fewer 
visible pixels. In contrast, pixelization embraces the shame of the pixel form by 
purposefully rendering pixels into visibility. Pixelization disrupts our ability to map and 
trace the relationship between pixels by deforming and disfiguring how pixels function 
as parts within a mappable whole. 
Pixels become visible signs of debasement within the context of my previous 
discussion about pixelzation being used to cover mastectomy scars in the "Obsessed 
with Breasts" advertisements. Television screens map pixels as discrete units of light 
(for example, assigning a red, blue, or green color to each pixel), which combine to 
form a picture on a screen. The pixelization rendered over the female chests in these 
advertisements was likely achieved by creating each pixel by averaging the colors 
below the area it covers, but the resulting pixels merely construct a partially unclear 
picture with uncertain (but still similarly colored) attributes. While the pixelized part of a 
television screen can reduce picture clarity, the visible pixels are anything but opaque 
covers. This is to say, the process of rendering large pixels over the chests of these 
women does not imply that the mastectomy scars are not or do not continue to be 
imaged behind or beyond the pixels. Rather, the pixels intended to hide the visibility of 
scars in these advertisements become pictures of queer visual movement: the pixels 
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rendered over these advertisements mobilize images below the surface of visibility, 
beyond the visible sight of scars, and, thus, become meta-pictures for the ever-present 
threshold of imaging processes informing our culturally over-coded perceptions of 
female bodies—whether breasts are visible or not. The intention but failure to disrupt 
visual clarity results in queer visual movements whereby the following question 
presents itself: what cannot be imagined behind these pixels? 
●●● 
While reading about the Obsessed with Breasts campaign, I came across a lot of 
information about Andrea Martin, the director of the Breast Cancer Fund who initiated 
the campaign. As I read No Family History, Sabrina McCormick recounted much of the 
information I already knew about the campaign: Martin was inspired by Matuschka's 
mastectomy photographs in Time magazine; this inspiration prompted Martin to create 
a similar advertisement campaign; the campaign would include billboards and posters 
with young women who had mastectomy scars and were topless; and these images, 
McCormick reveals in her book, "were of models who typified beauty—thin, young, 
white—with Andrea's mastectomy scar digitally drawn onto the photograph."52 Much to 
my surprise, I did not imagine that these pixels did not cover bodies with mastectomy 
scars. In this context, the pixelization on my television screen functioned as a cover I 
would never been able to anticipate: these pixels functioned as cover for mastectomy 
scars that were already digital covers because they were rendered as layers upon 
bodies without mastectomy scars. 
                                            
52 Sabrina McCormick, No Family History: The Environmental Links to Breast Cancer (New 
York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2009), 127, my emphasis. 
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The rendering of these pixels through a process of pixelization initially allowed 
me to produce multiple images. Pixelization allowed me to simultaneously imagine a 
breast before a scar, followed by a breast and a scar. Pixelization also constructed a 
mode of visibility where pixels become more than a breast or a scar. This is the 
distance produced by pixelization whereby images of topless models can come to 
contain every imaginable image of breasts, every imaginable image of mastectomy 
scars, or neither. These pixelated advertisements also enfold darker connotations that 
stick with images of breasts and mastectomy scars, such as the images about the 
possibility for anybody to picture themselves with breast cancer.53 
The pixelization of the Obsessed with Breasts advertisements reveals the 
differential relationships and spaces between individual pixels and makes visible the 
threshold where images move queerly while queering the boundaries of pixels. This 
form of pixelization asks us to look at, stare at, and wonder about what it is we think 
we see. As pixels become visible through pixelization they draw our attention to their 
imprecision and engage us in an affective looking relationship similar to what Vivian 
Sobchack calls the enchanting form of digital fragmentation.54 These pixels embrace 
the shame of uncertainty and draw our attention and stares by providing us with a 
sense of wonder. We are affected by the virtual possibilities of pixels because their 
                                            
53 Retrospectively, knowing these advertisements digitally reproduce pictures of Martin's 
mastectomy scars on the bodies of other women, we might also take note of why these pixels 
become pictures to address the association some women make between mastectomy scars 
and death—a connotative association moving more toward denotation if we consider Martin's 
death in 2001, caused by the spread of cancer from her breast to her brain. See ibid., 
especially 130. 
54 This is based on what Vivian Sobchack writes in the section "Frames Within Frames" in 
"Nostalgia for a Digital Object: Regrets on the Quickening of Quicktime," Millennium Film 
Journal 34(1999), http://mfj-online.org/journalPages/MFJ34/VivianSobchack.html. 
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simple, yet stunning form allows us to imagine how we might construct a pictorial form 
for images that would otherwise remain unseeable. 
At the same time, the visibility of pixels independent from a bit-map is unlikely to 
prompt the same sense of wonder we experience when processes like pixelation and 
pixelization debase visual clarity. Tom R. Chambers's minimalist pixel art, for example, 
utilizes pixelation to make reference to and refigure the traditions of Abstractionism 
and Minimalism within a digital medium.55 Excising and displaying an individual pixel 
from any work in his minimalist "Pixelscape" series (Figures 2.12 & 2.13) would render 
little sense of wonder in comparison to the relationship between pixels he makes 
visible within cascades of pixelated color blocks. More specifically, it is the loss of 
visual clarity emerging from processes of pixelation and pixelization that seductively 
affects us and prompts us to contemplate why we wonder about the absence of or 
uncertainty surrounding visual clarity. 
The wonder of pixelization also draws us into a baroque experience with visual 
culture through baroque looking relations. This is an experience within a threshold 
between the folds of visible space(s) where our engagement with the visible surfaces of 
matter do not direct us toward an experience of visual mastery. Pixelization becomes a 
picture for a threshold similar to the Deleuzian fold, which, Anna Munster explains, 
operates as a temporal and spatial location where "matter cannot be divided into 
atomistic units—parts that add up to a whole—but instead is both continuous and 
differentiated in and between its parts." Our experience with pixelization further aligns 
                                            
55 Tom Chambers discusses the progression of his pixel art on his personal website. See Tom 
R. Chambers, "The Pixel as Minimal Art," Retrieved May 1, 2013, 
http://www.tomrchambers.com/pixma.html. 
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with what Munster calls the "baroque aesthetic," which is an experience where we can 
sense "a deep ripple that disturbs the firm opposition between clear and confused 
perceptions" by appearing "as cultural symptoms of the cracks and ruptures opened 
up when dualities fail to maintain their due distance from each other." More specific 
still, pixelization becomes a visible and affective pictorial form for the baroque 
aesthetic and, in turn, reveals how engagements with visible surfaces are enriched by 
childish, persistent forms of staring.56  
 
Figure 2.12 Pixelscape, by Chambers 
  
Figure 2.13 Single pixel extracted from Pixelscape 
Our experience of pixelization as a baroque aesthetic relation creates an 
invitation to engage in what Rosemarie Garland-Thomson calls "baroque staring." 
Baroque staring functions as a childish form of staring and engagement with visual 
                                            
56 Anna Munster, Materializing New Media: Embodiment in Information Aesthetics (Hanover: 
Darmouth College Press, 2006), 42-43. 
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culture because, as she explains, it "eludes logical narrative, defying the search for 
meaning inherent in the knowledge producing human stare." This stare, so keenly 
aimed away from knowledge and mastery over the visual field, foregrounds the 
possibility for an aesthetic relation where the debasement and shame arising from 
uncertainty, unclarity, and failed intelligibility is expected and embraced. 
Garland-Thomson's exploration of baroque staring becomes strikingly relevant 
to the artifacts I have addressed thus far because she specifically discusses its 
emergence while looking at Matuschka's Time magazine cover, which she extends to 
the "Obsessed with Breasts" campaign. She suggests that these visual artifacts push 
us "to look hard, not so much at what we do not want to see, but [at that] which we are 
not supposed to stare. To see a wound where we expect a breast demands not just 
attention, but an explanation, a new reality."57 What I find intriguing in her arguments, 
beyond how baroque stares draw her toward these stunning sights, is a striking 
absence she does not address: like most others writing about the "Obsessed with 
Breasts" campaign advertisements, Garland-Thomson does not know about or 
account for the digitally produced mastectomy scars.  
I find this glaring absence to be troubling, although I continue to find Garland-
Thomson's analysis valuable and instructive because, whether she (or anyone) saw 
these advertisements on billboards, television, or another media platform, she 
suggests that we know what we see. Her argument suggests that we are shocked 
because we know what is and should not be visible and, thus, know what we should 
                                            
57 Garland-Thomson, Staring: 154. 
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not be staring at. It seems likely that people who saw the "Obsessed with Breasts" 
campaign imagined these bodies as having "real" scars. To suggest that we "know" 
what we see seems misleading, then, because this suggestion distances us from the 
possibility to embrace the benefits of open-ended engagements with baroque staring 
where what we know is not as important as the possibilities of what we imag(in)e. 
While we can stare at these advertisements, and these scars could become 
recognizable or familiar, Garland-Thomson also reminds us about the ethical dilemma 
we face by misrecognizing others. "To be recognizable," she explains,  
"a person must appear as distinct from a generic, generalized figure. To 
be recognized is to become familiar, no longer strange. […] Recognition, 
then relies on a combination of identification and differentiation. [...] I 
recognize you by seeing your similarity and your difference to me, and 
then I make your strangeness familiar. In other words, I see you as you 
are."58  
Whether pixelized on television or not, the mastectomy scars we see in the "Obsessed 
with Breasts" campaign are digital renderings with specific impact. Unlike Matuschka's 
portraits or Madge Onwurah's body in the sauna, these advertisements render a 
digitzed body with a photographic trace we cannot follow if we cannot image Andrea 
Martin's body.  
We can aim to move beyond this dilemma by utilizing baroque staring to frame 
our looking relations. Baroque staring expands our ability to engage with visual culture 
                                            
58 Ibid., 158. 
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through images that operate beyond and debase the fixity of pictorial surfaces. This 
form of debasement puts visuality into question by facilitating the possibility to dwell 
within visual culture without needing to fully understand all that is visible with perfect 
clarity. The process of pixelization facilitates a mode of engagement with visual culture 
to extend this dynamic beyond digital contexts. Pixelization illustrates one means to 
collapse the distances between meanings that stick (shamefully or not) to our images 
of females, women, femininity, and, more generally, sex, gender, and sexuality. To this 
end, I want to return to and complicate the moments following Ngozi's declaration 
about seeing her mother as a woman. I aim to produce a pixelated sense of wonder 
about images surrounding The Body Beautiful by facilitating looking relations directed 
away from mastery over the meaningfulness of these images. The scene that follows 
Madge's experience in the sauna shows us how, as an adult, Ngozi attempts to 
confront the images and messages that prompt Madge to experience shame because 
of her scar. This scene forces Ngozi to confront her experience in the sauna and the 
possibility that her mother is not defined by her scar.  
The scene I am describing begins with Madge and Ngozi sitting in a pub while 
they watch a group of young men across the room. Ngozi stares at them with disgust 
while they engage in sexual banter about women's breasts but, as the camera shifts to 
a close-up of one young man, we watch Madge stare timidly but desirously as her 
voice-over begins: 
"I saw the look in his eyes and remembered it from somewhere in the 
past. A youth, a mere boy; I wanted him for his very ordinariness, his 
 92 
outrageous normality. A single caress from him would smooth out the 
deformities,..." 
Madge's voice-over transports her elsewhere, to a place of memories about Ngozi's 
father that is also a place where her present fantasies include this young man. We see 
him holding her as she kisses his chest, and her voice over continues: "...give me back 
the right to be desired for my body and not in spite of it. A forbidden fantasy, a fairytale 
without a beginning." What becomes most striking in this scene, beyond how Madge 
finally speaks about her desires as a woman, are the changes to the film's audio-visual 
rhythms. 
As the scene continues, it transports us outside of the pub where we found 
Nozomi and Madge to their opposite experiences with life. Madge's fantasy is intercut 
with shots of Nozomi at a photography shoot, and the use of cutting positions us to 
see how both women contemplate their conflicting self-perceptions and perceptions of 
each other. We see make-up being applied to Ngozi's body and the shot cuts to 
Madge's fantasy, where she lays on a bed before being joined by the boy who caught 
her eye in the pub. We see this young man laying on top of Madge, kissing her, before 
we hear a voice we have heard before: "It's important for you to realize that you are far 
from being the first woman to face the prospect of losing a breast." The voice of the 
doctor who told Madge how she could partially compensate for her excised breast 
returns and positions her within a fantasy that cannot escape the demands to 
acknowledge the visibility of her absent breast.  
The shot cuts again to Ngozi laughing and smiling, and we hear her 
photographer talking about her nipples going soft. In close-up, we watch a hand icing 
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Ngozi's nipple; we cut again, to the boy kissing Madge on her scar, but—kiss 
interrupted—we hear Ngozi through voice-over from moments before Madge 
reluctantly entered the sauna: "Oh, come on mom, don't be so uptight." As the scene 
progresses the array of voice-overs increase, including a repetition of the younger 
Ngozi's voice calling her mother a "titless-cow" at the start of the film. Simultaneously, 
the length of each shot continues to decrease until it becomes apparent that the 
sounds and events in Madge's fantasy and Ngozi's photography shoot affect each 
other. These locations and experiences fold into each other and, as these spaces 
intertwine, we see Madge begin to flinch or close her eyes with discomfort while Ngozi 
appears increasingly frustrated by the chaotic form of her mother's fantasy.  
As Ngozi's frustrations increase, she begins to scream "touch her" and "do it, 
you bastard" toward the camera. Finally, the foldings between both places collapse: as 
voice-overs persist and Ngozi's screams continue, we see Ngozi's hand enter into 
Madge's fantasy to hold the man's hand on her mother's scar (Figure 2.14). Ngozi's 
other hand follows shortly after to help hold his hand and head on Madge's scar but, 
as the voice-overs and Ngozi's yelling persists, Madge begins to speak back, asking 
them to stop before she forcefully, almost sobbingly, begs them to stop. The scene 
cuts to a look of defeat on Ngozi's face before returning to Madge, who looks as if she 
can finally relax and enjoy the fantasy she has shared with her daughter. This scene 
draws to a close while we watch Ngozi, rather than Madge, smoking a post-coital 
cigarette.  
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Figure 2.14 Nozomi entering Madge's fantasy 
After Ngozi stands and the camera pans around her naked body, we see her 
staring in a mirror, holding down her own breasts because, as I mentioned before, she 
will try to imagine "what it would be like to have no breasts," but Ngozi realizes that it is 
impossible to even imagine the experience of a life without her breasts. This moment of 
understanding positions Ngozi to experience pixelated vision because, no matter how 
she tries to imagine her life without breasts, the images she produces cannot allow her 
to see and know life through Madge's experience in a different body. Ngozi has 
realized she cannot know her mother based on how she sees her mother, and this 
moment of recognition is what inspires Ngozi's shift toward embracing the uncertainty 
of baroque looking relations. Nogozi's looking relations position her to become 
perplexed and stunned by the sights she has seen—she is stunned because she will 
never fully understand and can only stare and wonder about the wonderousness of her 
mother.  
Our ability to enact these types of looking relations will position us to traverse 
the distance from looking to know and master toward seeing with wonder. These are 
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distances pixels traverse by estranging our ability to make meaning based on singular 
or standardized points of focus. Pixels embrace the shame of visible states that remain 
fragmented or out of focus because, most broadly, they direct us to wonder about 
images that will congeal into pictorial surfaces. Pixels embrace the shame of 
uncertainty or a lack in visual clarity because they know that pixelization affirms the 
presence of more to imagine, image, and know about what is around or otherwise 
beyond the visible surfaces we see. Embracing a pixelated point-of-view, or any 
shameful experience emerging from visual uncertainty, enables engagements with the 
threshold where virtual images facilitate our sense of wonder and, in doing so, queer 
our ability to determine or extract meaning merely by engaging with the surface of 
visual culture. Yet, this shameful embrace is also closely trailed by experiences of 
disorientation. The wonder that emerges from pixelated uncertainties or the intimacy of 
staring and baroque looking relations will shift in new directions in the next chapter. 
There, I depart from precise discussions about pixelated vision but continue to discuss 
wonder through aesthetics of cutting, where I emphasize how precise, captivating 
details about bodies that facilitate our sense of wonder can also cut away from and 
beyond the surfaces of bodies. These cutting aesthetics shift our sense of fascination 
and wonder into disorientating experiences that reiterate how queerly images move 
beyond the surfaces of visual culture.  
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3.  CUTTING VISUAL AESTHETICS: OBLIQUELY ORIENTATING THE BODY 
THROUGH MICHAEL JACKSON 
Have you seen my Childhood? I'm searching 
for the world that I come from. 'Cause I've 
been looking around, in the lost and found of 
my heart. No one understands me, they view it 
as such strange eccentricities. 'Cause I keep 
kidding around, Like a child, but pardon me. 
People say I'm not okay, 'cause I love such 
elementary things. It's been my fate to 
compensate, for the Childhood I've never 
known.  
—Michael Jackson, "Childhood" (1995). 
Michael Jackson has been given many nicknames. Most prominently, he is 
known by what was, at first, his self-designation as the "King of Pop," but this title has 
little resemblance to his other, less prestigious monikers. From "Wacko Jacko" to 
"Turd" (the name he penned in letters to Lisa Marie Presley), Jackson has continually 
been situated in debased relations, which took their most controversial (and public) 
form when he was designated "the pedophile" in discussions about his relationships 
with children. In his essay, "Producing Erotic Children," James Kincaid reminds us of a 
popular joke circulating about Jackson in the 1990s: "How do you know when Michael 
Jackson is having a party? By all the Big Wheels parked in the driveway." Kincaid 
explains how this joke, which took many forms but retained similar punch-lines, 
functions within a purposeful, culturally-manufactured narrative about children. The 
children who are not mentioned in the punchline of this joke are far from absent 
because, similar to my discussion about the Child in Chapter One, this joke carries the 
burden of cultural narratives about innocence being "lost and sullied." More poignantly, 
Kincaid is right to suggest that a figure like Jackson would be invented if he did not 
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exist because he functions as a "handy fabrication and focus for our passions that we 
can abuse and pretend to disown."1  
These children exist in Kincaid's joke because they are imaged into existence: 
no longer do these children sit on their Big Wheels but, instead, they materialize within 
images of sexually abusive relations that could take place in Jackson's palatial 
Neverland Ranch. In broader terms, a dilemma (and irony) emerges from our cultural 
fantasies about childhood innocence in the form of a contradiction: to imagine an 
innocent child requires that she is simultaneously imagined within a position where she 
loses her innocence through violation. While trying to determine or define Jackson's 
relationships with real or fictional children would prove to be a futile and problematic 
endeavor of projection, Jackson offers some insight to his perceptions about childhood 
and childishness in the lyrics for his song "Childhood" (1995). In a broad sense, this 
song reflects his perspective about growing up differently, knowing he was unable to 
be like a child during his childhood, and reveals his affinities with the ghostly gay child 
who can only exist as a child through images from the retroactive perspective of 
adulthood. 
In more precise terms, the lyrics for "Childhood" also reveal Jackson's 
awareness of cultural perceptions about his "strangeness" and "eccentricity" as an 
adult. "From the public's perspective," David Yuan explains, "Jackson's enfreakment 
did not occur until after he became an adult, when his behavior seemed to become 
                                            
1 James R. Kincaid, "Producing Erotic Children," in Curiouser: On the Queerness of Children, 
ed. Steven Bruhm and Natasha Hurley (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), 
5-6. 
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progressively more bizarre and disturbing."2 In this context, I find it necessary to 
explicate how and why Jackson becomes framed by queer tropes like strangeness. I 
argue that the persistent visibility of Jackson's body facilitates public perceptions, 
epithets, and jokes about his freakishness more than any other factor. I turn my 
attention to Jackson's body, which has been pictured and made visible in many forms, 
to explore how he functions as a surface or canvas to imagine debased relations; and, 
more specifically, I address how Jackson's body creates images to challenge 
normative or "proper" orientations toward and between the surfaces of bodies. 
3.1 Cutting Queer Orientations: Aesthetic Cuts and Visible Disorientation 
Jackson—previously and aptly titled "possessor of the PomoBod"3—functions 
as a locus that precipitates, prompts, and provokes visual disorientation. I explore how 
this disorientation arises from the visibility of Jackson's body undergoing de- and re-
construction. It is important to remain attentive to our orientations toward objects and 
bodies, as Sara Ahmed explains, because our "orientations shape not only how we 
inhabit space, but how we apprehend this world of shared inhabitance, as well as 
'who' or 'what' we direct our energy and attention toward." Ahmed does suggest that 
disorientating encounters with "deviant" objects can be re-orientated. To this end, I 
                                            
2 David D. Yuan, "The Celebrity Freak: Michael Jackson’s Grotesque Glory," in Freakery: 
Cultural Spectacles of the Extraordinary Body, ed. Rosemarie Garland-Thomson (New York: 
New York University Press, 1996), 369. 
3 Lance Olsen, "Introduction: The Michael Jacksonization of American Fiction," ANQ 5(1992): 
172. 
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address how the disorientation emerging from the sight of Jackson's body can be re-
orientated toward an aim of many queer theorists: making the "strange" familiar.4  
The sight of Jackson's body not only fosters an experience of disorientation but 
also functions as an experience with fascinating forms for the unstable body. 
Jackson's body is an extravagant site to explore the visible form of bodies because his 
body cuts the structural confines of visible certainty within scopic regimes that reduce 
race to chromatic contrast, gender to binary oppositions between sexes, and 
embodiment to the boundaries of flesh. To expand upon my discussions about 
fascination and looking relations from the previous chapter, I address how Jackson's 
visibly changing body provides insights about the transitional properties of bodies that 
attract, cut, and hold meaning in fascinating ways. Cutting, in fact, influences the thrust 
of this chapter. A cut, as transitional action in gerund form, can imply particular types 
of motion. Cutting to analogy: a cinematic cut can be understood as a motion that 
literally breaks or slices the connection between frames to offer some form of transition 
toward another framing, whereby filmic meaning is moved or carried from one frame to 
another through cuts. However, to only explore cutting as the movement to break and 
suture filmic frames would limit how we understand the aesthetic function of visible 
cuts outside of framed, dialectical oppositions.5 
                                            
4 Sara Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2007), 3-11. 
5 A model for dialectical montage—where dialectical oppositions between or within shots 
prompt (political) understanding—is initially and productively theorized by Sergei Eisenstein in 
Film Form: Essays in Film Theory, 1st ed. (New York,: Harcourt, 1977 [1949]). For other 
discussions about the filmic functions of cutting or suture, see: Pavle Levi, "The Crevice and 
the Stitch," Critical Quarterly 51, no. 3 (2009); Kaja Silverman, The Subject of Semiotics (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1983). 
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I want to contextualize the cut within broader formulations by returning to its 
properties Sean Cubitt distinguishes from the pixel I discuss in the previous chapter. 
"Cutting," Cubitt explains, "proliferates in the endless attempt to structure the 
boundless flow of the pixel." For Cubitt, the cut enables a spectator to simultaneously 
inhabit three temporalities: although a spectator must travel "at exactly the same 
speed as the film," cuts facilitate a spectator's ability to imagine what happens 
"beyond the frame as a movement toward the future, while also composing a 
retrospective account of what has passed."6 These movements prompted by the 
visibility of cuts become similar to what I address as the movements arising while we 
wonder about the visible forms of pixelation. An individual pixel is unlikely to prompt a 
sense of wonder or contribute to the production of images when it is isolated from a 
spatial relationship to other pixels in a bit-mapped display. In contrast, the process of 
pixelization prompts a sense of wonder because it makes the spatial relationship 
between pixels visible in an unclear form; and, more specifically, pixelization becomes 
an aesthetic form for pixel visibility that reveals why the production and proliferation of 
visual meaning need not depend on visual clarity but, instead, emerges from a 
threshold beyond visual perceptions where images proliferate.  
Similar to how I previously address the process of pixelization, Kathryn Bond 
Stockton's writes about the capacity for (visible) forms of cutting transitions to produce 
visual movement that produce a patina to facilitate our fascination. Take any text and 
begin with a detail, Stockton explains, and each "compelling detail (or striking set of 
                                            
6 Cubitt, The Cinema Effect: 50-51. 
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details)" allows us to engage a text with "a kind of love—or at least an intensification of 
our attraction or attention."7 This detail "can also be said to cut the text … since it may 
carry the mind away, and thus in a sense cut the viewer away, from the forward flow of 
plot or message by drawing attention to itself as a source of fascination."8 Fascination, 
then, should also be understood as a cut-away, which becomes filled by this 
production of meaningful connections. This meaningfulness of the cut is, here, made 
full: each break from the forward flow of messages simultaneously functions as "a kind 
of holding pen," to "hold our interest," where we find within the cut, "tucked in the cut 
(and, therefore, held in it)," "a cache of interest that may take many forms."9 Stockton 
reveals how forms of fascination facilitate our understanding of visual transitions and, 
in turn, I elaborate upon and leverage connections between attraction, cutting and 
holding to reconsider how our perceptions of visible signifiers or boundaries for bodies 
mobilize beyond the presence or absence of particular traits.  
To this end, I explore the cut by considering divisions or transitions for all the 
possibilities they contain, where cuts produce movements across and beyond (as in 
transgression), through (to transform or transcend) or from (to break, split, or alienate) 
one visible site to another. It is within this context that I extend beyond my discussion 
about Baroque aesthetics from the previous chapter. I will account for how we make 
sense of the "cracks and ruptures" in our perceptions of and orientations toward 
                                            
7 Stockton, Beautiful Bottom, Beautiful Shame: 106. 
8 Ibid., 107. These cutting textual details closely relate to Barthes's conceptualization of the 
punctum, which Stockton later addresses in relation to aesthetic wounding. See also: Barthes, 
Camera Lucida. 
9 Stockton, Beautiful Bottom, Beautiful Shame: 107. 
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bodies when the visible certainty of their boundaries fail. I argue that Jackson's body is 
an ideal text to explore why our participation in staring relations provide different forms 
of affective engagement with aesthetics and, in turn, provides the possibility for us to 
revel in the cutting discomforts of our uncertain orientations toward queer bodies 
within visual culture. Jackson's body, as I explain, occupies an in-between, 
hyphenated space and reveals how the visible traits of human bodies need not be 
confined dialectically but, instead, can become visible through images that perpetually 
force onlookers to reconcile dissonant signifiers. In other words, rather than reiterating 
a scopic ontology that differentiates between the visibility of bodies within either/or 
binaries (Black or White, masculine or feminine, etc.), Jackson's body is visible 
because of traits that remain both/and (Black, White, post-Black, masculine, feminine, 
androgynous, and ... ).  
The visibility of Jackson's transitional body also reveals fascinating details that 
continue to oscillate between historical moments or memories and posthumous 
visibilities within the present. Through cyborgian theft, Jackson's body enters the 
space between discrete pictures of bodies and reveals how pictures of bodies can be 
refigured beyond decisive signification. I argue that Jackson provides us with images 
that deconstruct the visible signifiers for race, gender, and sexuality. Even 
posthumously, which is the final context I explore, imagining Jackson's body often 
cannot and need not correlate with his lived-body. Jackson's body becomes visible 
and occupies space outside of live-ness, as a hyphenate that can only be imaged 
within processes that transitionally cut and re-stitch our every attempt to identify with 
or picture the human-bodied form. Our images of Jackson have the potential to 
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refigure our orientations toward the boundaries of human bodies by making possible a 
means of perpetual reorientation through the visible form of work that must be done to 
and with the body.10 
3.2 Picturing Jackson: Look! He was a Black Man 
The release of the Thriller album (1982) offered pictures and videos of Michael 
Jackson as a site of public spectacle, and contributed to questions about the "fact" of 
Jackson's Blackness.11 Questions about Jackson's body intensified with the release of 
subsequent albums, which provided additional visual representations to facilitate 
public fascination about his appearance. This fascination with and intensification of 
interest in Jackson speaks to his popularity, and "the role of the 'popular' in popular 
culture," Stuart Hall reminds us, "is to fix the authenticity of popular forms, rooting 
them in experiences of popular communities from which they draw strength."12 Cultural 
fascination about Jackson's raced body can prompt questions about the community 
from which Jackson's popularity arises or whether Jackson was neatly categorized 
within the realm of Black popular culture. 
                                            
10 On the work of reorientation, see Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology: 100. 
11 An intentional pun on the original chapter title "The Fact of Blackness" in Frantz Fanon's 
Black Skin, White Masks—re-translated to "The Lived Experience of a Black Man" in 2008. The 
fact of inaccurate translation productively stimulated (visual culture) scholars to re-consider 
and re-theorize the fact(less)ness of visual Blackness. A primary example can be found in 
Stuart Hall's discussion in "The After-Life." See Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, trans. 
Richard Philcox, Second ed. (New York: Grove Press, 2008); Stuart Hall, "The after-Life of 
Frantz Fanon: Why Fanon? Why Now? Why Black Skin, White Masks?," in The Fact of 
Blackness: Frantz Fanon and Visual Representation, ed. Alan Read (WA: Bay Press, 1996). 
12 ——, "What Is This 'Black' in Black Popular Culture?," in Black Popular Culture, ed. Gina 
Dent (Seattle, WA: Bay Press, 1992), 26. 
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Hall, for example, provides various ways to consider where Blackness resides in 
popular culture. "By definition," Hall explains, "black popular culture is a contradictory 
space. It is a sight of strategic contestation." Hall identifies style, music, and the body 
as the central factors prompting these forms of difference and contestation, and, more 
specifically, he is clear to remind us that the body was typically the only accessible 
form of cultural capital available for Black people. As Blackness was being worked into 
the "canvases of representation," the body becomes a mark of difference that 
mobilizes Black popular culture: "[a] mark of difference inside forms of popular 
culture—which are by definition contradictory and which therefore appear as impure, 
threatened by incorporation or exclusion."13 At the same time, while Hall focuses on the 
problematics that arise when racial signifiers like Black are biologically attached to 
bodies, his conceptualization of the problematically fixed signifier does not account for 
the ways in which Blackness is understood in relation to a body that was signifying but 
can no longer signify Black.  
Kobena Mercer moves toward a more precise path to inquire about the impact 
of Jackson's changing appearance relative to his growing popularity after the release 
of the Thriller album: The former "cute child dressed in gaudy flower-power gear" while 
"sporting a huge 'Afro' hairstyle" transformed into a young adult who became "a 
paragon of racial and sexual ambiguity."14 These ambiguities prompt a number of initial 
questions about Jackson's Blackness: Is Jackson Black? If so, how do we understand 
                                            
13 Ibid., 26-28, his emphasis. 
14 Kobena. Mercer, "Monster Metaphors: Notes on Michael Jackson's "Thriller," in Sound and 
Vision: The Music Video Reader, ed. Simon Frith, Andrew Goodwin, and Lawrence Grossberg 
(New York: Routledge, 1993), 94. 
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race in relation to the color of skin; or, is it possible to assert that there is a "fact of 
Blackness" when someone sees Jackson? If not, at what point is it possible to mark or 
recognize his transition from Blackness to Whiteness; or, how and in what ways is his 
Blackness concealed or contained?  
If we consider the seemingly simplistic but all too intricate or entangled 
distinctions between black and white, the Oxford English Dictionary tells us that black 
is "the very darkest color," "the opposite of white," or "due to the absence of or 
complete absorption of light" while white is "the opposite of black," or "due to the 
reflection of most wavelengths of visible light." We are afforded these simplistic 
distinctions when color is conceptualized by chromatic properties—black and white 
are distinguishable because they are polarized in relation to light—but when the 
distinctions between Black and White or, more appropriately, Blackness and 
Whiteness are transplanted to skin, they lose the transparency that the physical 
properties of light appear to offer.15 
                                            
15 I want to draw attention to how I capitalize these terms as a means to maintain distinctions 
between their uses. When I write about chromatic properties I do not capitalize the words 
black and white. My use of the terms Black and White are capitalized in the context of 
discussions about race. This is meant to function as a visible textual designation for how these 
terms can frequently be understood as matter-of-fact categories (almost to the degree of 
pronouns) to define bodies based on their race/ethnicity. I remain critical of definitions for race 
being based solely on the chromatic properties of bodies, although there are other scholars 
who devote entire texts to interrogations of the visual and chromatic properties of race. As 
examples, see: Darby English, How to See a Work of Art in Total Darkness (Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press, 2007); W.J.T. Mitchell, Seeing through Race (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2012); Raengo, On the Sleeve. 
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The mobilization of visible signifiers for race gives rise to a complex interchange 
within scopic regimes that attach chromatic properties to the surface of skin.16 
Consider one formulation of how, "in the white world, the man of color encounters 
difficulties in elaborating his body schema. The image of one's body is solely negating. 
It's an image in the third person."17 Frantz Fanon experienced this when a child hailed 
him as Negro ("Look! A Negro!") because, chromatically, "[t]he proof was there, 
implacable. My blackness there, dense and undeniable."18 This occurs in the most 
general sense because inscriptions of race, as Lee Edelman argues, frequently function 
under the guise of synecdoche. Edelman explains how race becomes coded through 
disciplinary inscription, whereby parts of the Black body (like skin pigmentation, blood, 
and sexuality) are expanded to define the whole body. Or, in other words, a part (such 
as one drop of Black blood) is discursively rendered to construct and contaminate the 
                                            
16 Beyond scholarship I have already mentioned, several works address the ontology and 
scopic regimes of race, in addition to the racial tropes I mention here (identifiable signifiers, 
masks un/covering the identity beneath, and lingering shadows of identity-theft), which all 
remain rich fields of inquiry unto themselves. Regarding racial bodies, see Kobena Mercer, 
"Busy in the Ruins of Wretched Phantasia," in Mirage: Enigmas of Race, Difference, and Desire, 
ed. Ragnar Farr (London: Institute of Contemporary Arts: Institute of International Visual Arts, 
1995). Regarding Passing and/or masks, see P. Gabrielle Foreman, "Who's Your Mama? 
"White" Mulatta Genealogies, Early Photography, and Anti-Passing Narratives of Slavery and 
Freedom," American Literary History 14, no. 3 (2002); Hall, "The after Life; Cheryl I. Harris, 
"Whiteness as Property," Harvard Law Review 106, no. 8 (1993); Harryette Mullen, "Optic 
White: Blackness and the Production of Whiteness," Diacritics 24, no. 2-3 (1994); Amy 
Robinson, "Forms of Appearance of Value: Homer Plessy and the Politics of Privacy," in 
Performance and Cultural Politics, ed. Elin Diamond (London and New York: Routledge, 1996). 
Regarding shadows, see Elizabeth Abel, "Shadows," Representation 84(2003); English, Work of 
Art in Total Darkness; Nicholas Mirzoeff, "The Shadow and the Substance: Race, Photography, 
and the Index," in Only Skin Deep: Changing Visions of the American Self, ed. Coco Fusco and 
Brian Wallis (New York: International Center of Photography, 2003); Alice Maurice, The Cinema 
and Its Shadow: Race and Technology in Early Cinema (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2013); Alessandra Raengo, "In the Shadow," Camera Obscura 83 28, no. 2 (2013). 
17 Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks: 90. 
18 Ibid., 96. 
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whole body.19 This surface-orientation is meant to determine race by visible properties 
and Fanon clarifies how this orientation toward bodies emerges from an ontology of 
race that traps Black bodies within a double-bind: "Not only must the black man be 
black; he must be black in relation to the white man."20 Fanon reveals how bodies are 
put into relation by an ontological orientation toward chromatic difference. This 
orientation distinguishes Black bodies from White bodies because of their chromatic 
properties, which function as differentials within a quasi-Saussurian system without 
positive terms.21  
As Jackson's body continues to change, we lose the capacity to identify a 
visible part of his (Black) body that can synecdochtally define the whole of his body. 
Not only does Jackson's body become a site to explore how accumulations of pictures 
complicate our ability to imagine the wholeness of his body, but the visibility of his 
body also prompts us to contemplate why bodies cannot or need not stabilize in a 
singular or uniform fashion. Jackson's body thwarts categorization in ways that are 
similar to what is implicitly addressed in Mercer's discussion about social hieroglyphs. 
Mercer describes Jackson as a social hieroglyph by explaining how Jackson becomes 
visible as "neither child nor man, not clearly either black or white, and with an 
                                            
19 This connects with Fanon's writing on the ontology of race, which Edelman also considers in 
relation to the epidermal properties of skin. Further, Edelman elaborates on writings by Homi 
Bhabha that I will reference later. See the chapter "Part for the (W)Hole" in Edelman, 
Homographesis. 
20 Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks: 90. 
21 This is based on what Alessandra Raengo writes about the differential in On the Sleeve: 130. 
As Saussure explains, "in language there are only differences, and no positive terms." See de 
Saussure, Course in General Linguistics: 118, his emphasis.  
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androgynous image that is neither masculine nor feminine."22 While Mercer suggests 
that Jackson's popularity had much to do with his ambiguous, innovative style, 
metaphor becomes Mercer's means to describe the visible signifiers of bodies and 
identities in transition. Jackson, Mercer suggests, "may sing as sweet as Al Green, 
dance as hard as James Brown, but he looks more like Diana Ross than any black 
male soul artist."23 Mercer's analogy about Jackson's ambiguously gendered body 
functions as an historical node for one state of his visible body. 
 The delimited boundary set up by Mercer—that Jackson looks like a Black 
female instead of a Black male—reveals how Jackson's image fluctuates in relation to 
gendered codes of difference. At the same time, Mercer does not fully interrogate how 
Jackson's body transitions between visible chromatic properties. In contrast, Victoria 
Johnson clarifies why Jackson's self-assigned racial identity begins to conflict with the 
visible chromatic properties of his skin:  
"While Jackson was forced to assert on Oprah that he was 'proud to be a 
black American', his apparently increasing whiteness, or, at the least, 
'aracial' identity (his skin tone has radically changed since he has fallen 
victim to the depigmentation process caused by vitiligo), visually 
paralleled the togetherness message of the major anthems of his 
Dangerous LP and tour ("Black or White" and "Heal the World").24 
                                            
22 Mercer, "Monster Metaphors," 95. 
23 Ibid., 94. 
24 Victoria Johnson, "The Politics of Morphing: Michael Jackson as Science Fiction Border 
Text," The Velvet Light Trap 32(1993): 61. 
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Take note of the intriguing place where Johnson provides a brief description about 
Jackson's victimization: vitiligo becomes a parenthetical excuse for Jackson's skin 
condition and literally cuts or divides the argument that Johnson constructs. By her 
account, Jackson's white pigmentation validates his promotion of (racial) togetherness, 
but his ability to assert Black pride warrants a disclaimer about the visible disconnect 
between the past and present chromatic properties of his skin.25 Johnson employs 
vitiligo—through a (parenthetical) cut—to explain (and perhaps justify) visible 
discontinuity but, more specifically, this parenthetical cut allows grammar to function in 
the stead of, and simultaneous to, how we engage with the visibility of Jackson's body.  
Each picture of Jackson contains various visible signifiers for the material visible 
form of his body and, each time we see or engage with the visibility of Jackson's body, 
we must reconcile how pictures signify his body differently than images. These 
signifiers do not contain intrinsic meaning, but their meaning moves and flickers as we 
try to understand how pictures become confronted by the meanings we produce 
through images.26 This oscillatory process prohibits pictures of Jackson from acting as 
absolute signs for racial ambiguity and, instead, reveals how the act of cutting from 
                                            
25 This discussion about Jackson's possible skin condition (causing pigmentation loss and 
various whitish patches on the skin) circumvents considerations of his visual presence: the 
visibility of Jackson's chromatically black body does not merely deteriorate post-Thriller; 
Jackson's entire body shifts from non-white to white synchronously. Johnson's account of 
Jackson's visibility denies the possibility for his transitional body to operate beyond simplified 
chromatic distinctions, which are then extended to Blackness and Whiteness as racial 
categories. While vitiligo can be addressed as one (among endless) explanation about 
Jackson's visible transformations, this explanation does not clarify how Jackson's body 
operates within visual culture or why the chromatic properties of his body transition away from 
the human form altogether. 
26 Additional information about the semiotic structures of flickering signifiers and non-linear 
visual formations is addressed later in this chapter when I account for the work of Katherine 
Hayles in How We Became Posthuman. 
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pictures to imaging processes also illuminates various types of work done with or to 
race and, by extension, the body. I continue to address the visibility of Jackson's body 
in relation to imaging processes but I want to make visible how I understand the term 
imaging as imag(in)ing. This brief textual cut(-in) is meant to reiterate that, for me, the 
term "imaging" always implies the dual-function of images, as processes meant to 
mediate what we imagine about, as well as what we experience through, material and 
visual objects. I addressed images in this way in the previous two chapters. In Chapter 
One, as images that mediate between fetal photographs and fantasies about the will-
be-born child. In Chapter Two, I discuss the range of potential images emerging from a 
virtual threshold while trying to determine what is visible beyond the pixels covering 
mastectomy scars in the "Obsessed With Breasts" advertisements.27 
●●● 
I could choose from an almost endless array of pictures to write about Michael 
Jackson. The pictures and images I chose to discuss in this chapter each affected me 
in particular ways. I first read Kobena Mercer's essay about Michael Jackson's 
monstrosity over 10 years ago but, after I began to write more rigorously about the 
visibility of Jackson's racialized body and incessantly watched his music videos, there 
were many images I have been unable to forget. From all of the pictures and videos, 
two images of Jackson affected me most out of all of the media I encountered and, to 
this end, these images function as bookends to my critical analysis in this chapter. I 
                                            
27 I address the relationship between images and their material, pictorial forms in Chapter One. 
These forms of non-visual mediation are also explored in depth through phenomenological 
purview in Hansen, Bodies in Code. To consider the materiality of racial photographs and their 
material meaning, see Foreman, "Who's Your Mama?." 
 111 
begin with a picture from the music video "Bad" because, like other videos from the 
Bad album (1987), Jackson is pictured in ways that complicate our understanding of 
and identification with the visible form or presence of his body. Beyond how Jackson is 
pictured in this video, it was a minute detail pertaining to his hairstyle that affected how 
I began to understand his fluctuating states of visibility, which exemplified what Mercer 
describes as an opposition between pictures of Jackson's childhood as opposed to 
how Jackson is pictured as an adult (Figure 3.1). 
 
Figure 3.1 Jackson's hairline, waning from its afro past 
Attraction to the visibility of Jackson's body, and the specific details of his hair, 
invites us to recognize Jackson's past Blackness, when the visible loss of Blackness 
becomes tucked within images that cut to the past. The visible hairline between woven 
and unwoven hair becomes a weave that wanes from Jackson's Afro past: an 
identifiable mark to distinguish between hair that grows from his head—the hair of his 
past or what some might call his "natural" or "original" hair—and the hair that has been 
used as a cover. The cover or new weave of hair we encounter at Jackson's hairline 
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becomes a detail that cuts and pierces a viewer by prompting an emergence of various 
images about the transition that has taken place. 
While this pictured hairline is not the only visible signifier that draws attention to 
Jackson's past, it illuminates one way to understand how once-visible, intricate details 
from the past can become tucked within the present. Jackson's perpetual and visible 
transformations point to past-Blackness and direct us to remain attentive to the visible 
changes of his body. The most significant form of visibility, beyond the intricate detail 
of a hairline, is the omnipresent visibility of Jackson's skin color. The visible chromatic 
properties of Jackson's body complicate images of race and, in the process, refigure 
Fanon's primal scene thusly: "Look! He was a Black Man." This is how Jackson's body 
produces or contributes to images of a racialized body that has been (but possibly 
must always be) Black but that can also be (was becoming, became, will henceforth 
be) White.  
Jackson's transitional visibility cuts a viewer from the ability to categorize 
through binary opposition and, simultaneously, shifts his body into a liminal holding 
pen where meanings gather and proliferate. The stability of Jackson's pictorial 
meanings cut to a virtual threshold where images become increasingly uncertain, and 
this experience with imaging processes is where Jackson's disorienting body is laid 
bare. Jackson's body creates an image of transgression by continually oscillating 
between past and present (or presently absent) chromatic blackness, which 
undermines any temporal connection to visible skin color. The color or tone of 
Jackson's skin is inescapable, unavoidable, when pictures testify to the visibility of a 
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chromatic presence in conflict with our image of Jackson's visible body (and, perhaps, 
racial identity) from his past. 
Jackson's body becomes a visible and malleable body because images of his 
body oscillate between chromatic forms of visibility, which remain contingent upon our 
understanding of the visible present as distinct from what was seeable in the past. 
Blackness wanes within the visible present through perplexing chromatic 
contradictions, only to regain visibility through processes of imaging—where signifiers 
flicker between "past-ness" and "post-ness." 
3.3 Not Quite the Right White 
While the visibility of Jackson's body draws attention to past- or post-
Blackness,28 I want to address how and in what ways these forms of visibility may or 
may not connote Whiteness, and, by extension, how Jackson's body escapes his past 
or whether the images we produce always cut to and hold his body there. In this 
context, consider how images of Jackson's body can orientate us toward encounters 
with mimicry which are elaborated by Homi Bhabha's provocative prose: "Excess or 
slippage produced by the ambivalence of mimicry (almost the same, but not quite) 
does not merely 'rupture' the discourse, but becomes transformed into an uncertainty 
which fixes the colonial subject as a 'partial' presence."29 Visible changes to Jackson's 
body attract us to images of a partial presence residing within the interstices between 
Blackness and Whiteness. Attraction to these images cut to recognizable contrasts 
                                            
28 It is important to note that my use of the hyphenated phrase "post-Blackness" is a temporal 
designation of Jackson's past/post Blackness and not a reference to post-black art. 
29 Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London; New York: Routledge, 1994), 123. 
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between Blackness and Whiteness, and held within this cut are unmistakable forms for 
an unassimilable body that is not Black and not White. If we reconfigure Bhabha's 
notion of mimicry, Jackson's visible unassimilability might be better imagined as 
masked mimicry—a partial presence that is almost the same White but, because 
Blackness becomes tucked within each cut to images of his past, his presence 
remains never quite the "right" White.30 
Jackson's body becomes more visible within the interstices between Blackness 
and Whiteness through his proximity to other bodies in his music videos. In the music 
video "Black or White," we first see Jackson dancing in the midst of "African" people. 
As the video progresses, Jackson mobilizes between scenes with various tropological 
forms for racial bodies—from "African" to "Asian," "American Indian," "Eastern Indian," 
and "Russian" (Figures 3.2 – 3.5). Throughout the video, each of these bodies become 
visible contrasts to Jackson's chromatically lighter skin, which marks Jackson's body 
as a rhythmically mobile body touring "cultural" spaces across scenes without the 
possibility to (mimetically) achieve racial similitude.31 Even if we consider how Jackson 
is pictured alongside bodies with different genders and ages, it remains apparent that 
                                            
30 While Jackson's identity and images do not correlate with the colonial subject, this play on 
Bhabha's words draws on the contextual performance of Whiteness that both performances 
share. Neither occupy the space or employ the identity of Whiteness; rather, both 
subjects/identities perform the function of Whiteness, only ever asymptotically approaching 
that designation. 
31 Lisa Nakamura provides a different way to understand these dynamics in her writings about 
identity tourism and the digitization of race. See Lisa Nakamura, Digitizing Race: Visual 
Cultures of the Internet, Electronic Mediations V 23 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2007); ——, ""Where Do You Want to Go Today?" Cybernetic Tourism, the Internet, and 
Transnationality," ed. Beth E. Kolko, Lisa Nakamura, and Gilbert B. Rodman (New York: 
Routledge, 2000); ——, "Race in/for Cyberspace: Identity Tourism and Racial Passing on the 
Internet," Works and Days 13(1995). 
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he remains unable to mimic any bodily presence within these scenes. To this end, it 
becomes more apparent why the chromatic properties of his skin signify universal 
Whiteness—still not quite the "right White," but an image for "Whiter-than" forms of 
embodiment.  
 
Figure 3.2 "Black or White," Jackson among "Africans" 
 
 
Figure 3.3 "Black or White," Jackson among "Asians" 
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Figure 3.4 "Black or White," Jackson among "American Indians" 
 
 
Figure 3.5 "Black or White," Jackson with "Eastern Indian" 
But what or whose body is the "right" White and how might this differ from 
Jackson's "Whiter-than" body? Sara Ahmed provides some clarification about this 
question when she writes about Whiteness being "lived as a background to 
experience."32 Ahmed writes about Fanon's experience with the corporeal schema 
through his racial interpellation ("Look! A Negro!") and suggests that the corporeal 
                                            
32 Sara Ahmed, "A Phenomenology of Whiteness," Feminist Theory 8, no. 2 (2007): 150. 
 117 
schema "is already racialized" because "race does not just interrupt such a schema, 
but structures its mode of operation. The corporeal schema is of a 'body-at-home'. If 
the world is made white, then the body-at-home is one that can inhabit whiteness."33 
Within this context, the chromatic properties of Jackson's skin come to signify 
"Whiteness" because he inhabits his skin like a "body-at-home." If, as Ahmed explains, 
"race becomes a question of what is within reach, what is available to perceive and to 
do 'things' with," then we might say that Jackson's body orientates through Whiteness 
because the chromatic properties of his skin put particular "things" within proximity.34 
Jackson's proximity to chromatically White properties intrigue me about the brief 
moments when chromatic Blackness caresses the contours of Jackson's body, forcing 
us to reconcile with how he continues to orientate toward differing forms of 
embodiment.  
For example, chromatic blackness is visibly pictured alongside or in proximity to 
Jackson in a scene from the "You Rock My World" (2001) music video, when Jackson 
becomes visible behind a curtain because a backlight projects a shadow of his body 
on a screen (Figure 3.6). In my earlier discussion, I address why chromatic blackness 
became increasingly impossible to picture on the surface of Jackson's body as he 
continued to age. Jackson's body, and our images of Jackson, become in/formed by 
the visibility of a body divided between our images of his once-was-visible 
chromatically darker skin and the visibly present, chromatic Blackness of Jackson's 
                                            
33 Ibid., 153. 
34 Ibid., 154. 
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indexical shadow.35 Thus, this video complicates the relationship between pictures and 
images of Jackson's body by revealing how his shadow becomes the only way in 
which Blackness visibly sticks to his body: when Jackson's Blackness becomes 
tucked within virtual images of his body, his shadow becomes the only remaining 
"fact" of (chromatic) Blackness that can be visibly pictured. 
 
Figure 3.6 "You Rock My World" 
This shadow reconfigures Jackson's body to operate in relation to (and 
simultaneously cut away from) what W.T. Lhamon Jr. calls "Optic Blackness."36 We can 
extend our understanding about the relationship between Jackson's body and the 
visibility of shadows turning to Lhamon Jr. who addresses Optic Blackness through his 
analysis of silhouettes in the works of Kara Walker. Jackson's Blackness can only 
caress the contours of his body in the form of a shadow; and, although his shadow is a 
visible and identifiable form for chromatic Blackness, his shadow only extends from his 
                                            
35 On the shadow, as semiotic index for the human body, see footnote 16 above. 
36 W.T. Lhamon Jr., "Optic Black: Naturalizing the Refusal to Fit," in Black Cultural Traffic: 
Crossroads in Global Performance and Popular Culture, ed. Harry J. Elam Jr. and Kennell 
Jackson (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2005). 
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body as a disembodied, phantasmatic indexical presence. In different words, 
Jackson's body is confronted by a shadow that warps, haunts, and buggers his 
chromatic presence because the chromatic blackness of his shadow can only ever 
function as an extension of and will not transform into part of his body.37  
Shadows continue to haunt and taunt Jackson's body in the music video for 
"Blood on the Dancefloor" (1997). This video continues to draw attention to chromatic 
differences between bodies and the visibility of shadows exaggerates Jackson's 
difference (e.g. dance partners are paired by chromatically differing skin tones while 
Jackson's body remains White than any other body in the video). Many scenes in this 
video are lit to create a high-contrast environment where shadows surround Jackson 
but, unlike Jackson's overtly visible shadow in "You Rock My World," these shadows 
cannot be indexically traced to Jackson's body (Figures 3.7 & 3.8). Instead, it seems as 
if Jackson's shadow is forced out of visibility. 
We could dismiss the absence of Jackson's shadow as circumstances arising 
from a highly constructed mise-en-scene, but this does not clarify why Jackson 
remains lit in such a way that his body cannot cast shadows or why his body is framed 
to prevent spectators from locating shadows extending from the base of his body or 
feet. In these videos, shadows function as a context and preface to image Jackson's 
body beyond human-oriented perceptions: these shadows haunt his increasing 
distance from racial visibility when blackness would remain a visible, chromatic 
property of his skin but also, when they no longer index his body, reveal how 
                                            
37 This function of shadows is drawn from Lhamon Jr.'s discussion. Ibid., especially 115. See 
also Victor Leronim Stoichita, A Short History of the Shadow, Essays in Art and Culture 
(London: Reaktion Books, 1999). 
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Jackson's body loses its proximity to the human form. Not only does the absence of 
these shadows remove any haunting racial signifier, but begins to gesture toward how 
Jackson is no longer subject to signify through a human form of the body within, for 
example, three-dimensional space.  
 
Figure 3.7 "Blood on the Dancefloor" 
 
 
Figure 3.8 "Blood on the Dancefloor" 
Imaging Jackson through these contrasting pictures of chromatic skin tone 
provokes our ability to recognize how his visible body persistently lingers within virtual 
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gaps and, in turn, necessitates that we reconsider the ways we imag(in)e relationships 
between bodies. As Jackson's body continues to thwart boundaries meant to 
differentiate between bodies, we should wonder if the absence of Jackson's shadow 
becomes a haunting testament to his inability to be imag(in)ed as a normally visible 
body. Jackson enters a space of imag(in)ing where signifiers begin to flicker and could 
be said to literally "cut" pictures and images of Jackson's visible body from the 
process of comparative interchange. Within this context, Jackson's continual de- and 
re-construction becomes a visual form to interrogate how bodies cut away from the 
visibility of the human form altogether.  
3.4 Jackson's Miscegenated Body in a Cyborgian "World Without Gender" 
Michael Jackson is a solitary mutant, a 
precursor of a hybridization that is perfect 
because it is universal—the race to end all 
races. Today's young people have no problem 
with a miscegenated society: they already 
inhabit such a universe, and Michael Jackson 
foreshadows what they see as an ideal future. 
Add to this the fact that Michael has had his 
face lifted, his hair straightened, his skin 
lightened—in short, he has been reconstructed 
with the greatest attention to detail.  
—Jean Baudrillard38 
In contrast to how media have often addressed Jackson's appearance 
throughout his career, Nicole Fleetwood notes greater differences among public 
perceptions because of varied recollections about the visible properties of his body. 
Fleetwood draws attention to the initial problem arising from the visible traits of his 
                                            
38 Jean Baudrillard, The Transparency of Evil: Essays on Extreme Phenomena (New York: 
Verso, 1993), 21. 
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raced body—she bluntly states: "Jackson is black and is not black"39—but adds that 
his body becomes meaningful because "there are so many ways to remember him and 
the accumulation of those images."40 But, as images of Jackson begin to proliferate 
and accumulate, how are we able to categorize—let alone inspect and understand—
the body we see within pictures of Jackson? 
Jackson's image of "Whiter-than-ness" even persists in his familial relations and 
is made visible in the video for "Scream" (1995), where he co-stars with his sister Janet 
Jackson. Although siblings may have different skin tones, Michael's skin is much 
lighter than Janet's. If we cut, again, to images from the past, we can recollect 
moments where Jackson's skin tone was more chromatically similar to Janet's darker 
skin tone in this video (Figure 3.9). Cutting to these images positions us to inquire 
about when Jackson's body began to visibly signify its difference from his sister 
relative to and beyond the chromatic properties of their skin. Further, this comparison 
allows us to pause and contemplate how the "Scream" video expands the differences 
between the bodies of these siblings by drawing attention to performances of gender.41  
                                            
39 Fleetwood, Troubling Vision: 211. 
40 Although discussions about Jackson's plastic surgery arise in various contexts, Nicole 
Fleetwood notes an interesting difference between how Jackson's changing appearance has 
been addressed within the media in contrast to responses from the general public. David 
Gates, for example, called Jackson the "Prince of Artifice" in a Newsweek article. In this article, 
Gates explains how Jackson's artifice became most apparent after his adolescence, when "he 
consciously took on the role of Peter Pan ... with what he seemed to believe was an ageless, 
androgynous physical appearance ... thanks to the straightened hair and plastic surgery." 
Gates is also cited by Fleetwood. See ibid., 209-210; David Gates, "Finding Neverland," 
Newsweek, July 13, 2009, 35. 
41 For another example of the visible framing of Jackson's femininity, look to Jackson's 
performance in the music video for "You Are Not Alone" (1995) in comparison to his co-star 
Lisa Marie Presley (who was also his wife at the time of video production). 
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Figure 3.9 "Scream," Jackson siblings, side-by-side 
This video pictures Michael as feminine so explicitly that a discussion about gendered 
"looking relations" in this video would seem rather redundant.42 Jackson's femininity 
becomes apparent in this video in contrast to his gender performance in previous 
videos but also because his body is made more feminine through its visible 
                                            
42 The obligatory reference would obviously be Laura Mulvey's essay on "Visual Pleasure and 
Narrative Cinema," and my decision not to discuss it does not mean to dismiss how influential 
Mulvey's essay was in the development of film theory, and feminist film theory in particular. 
Whether her arguments were polemical or anecdotal, she pioneered discussions about the role 
of gender in the relationship between spectators and the screen. See Laura Mulvey, "Visual 
Pleasure and Narrative Cinema," Screen 16, no. 3 (1975). For an array of expansions and 
criticisms of Mulvey's theory, see the collection by E. Ann Kaplan, ed. Feminism and Film 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000)., especially the essays: Mary Ann Doane, "Film and the 
Masquerade: Theorizing the Female Spectator," in Feminism and Film, ed. E. Ann Kaplan 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); E. Ann Kaplan, "Is the Gaze Male?," in Feminism and 
Film, ed. E. Ann Kaplan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Steve Neale, "Masculinity as 
Spectacle: Reflections on Men and Mainstream Cinema," in Feminism and Film, ed. E. Ann 
Kaplan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Mulvey also readdresses her arguments in 
Visual and Other Pleasures, and Death 24x a Second, which accounts for changes to 
contemporary media technologies and visual culture that refigure cinematic looking relations 
and the position of women as cinematic spectacles. See Laura Mulvey, Death 24x a Second: 
Stillness and the Moving Image (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 190-191; ——, 
Visual and Other Pleasures, Theories of Representation and Difference (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1989). 
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differentiation from his sister Janet, who engages in more masculine performances of 
gender. 
Janet and Michael are frequently framed within the same profilmic space 
throughout this video. The differences between their performances become most 
apparent when Janet visibly engages in "masculine" behaviors: not only does she 
show her anger with more bravado than Michael's display of the same emotion but 
Janet also engages in "male," sexed behavior by standing over a toilet to urinate 
(Figure 3.10). Not only do Janet's masculine behaviors seem successful, but her 
performance is a visible confrontation with a body pictured as female. This 
contradiction between sex and gender begins to undermine how we can reconcile 
pictures of Janet with our images of gender performance and, to some degree, 
resonates with gender performances that fall within the broad category Judith 
Halberstam has labeled "female masculinity."43 More specifically, Janet's performance 
carries an implication for Michael: If Janet can engage in masculine performances of 
gender, which are performances pointing to the failure of masculinity to be anything 
but "a copy with no original,"44 Michael's gender is put into question because he does 
not conform to normative prescriptions for masculinity and becomes more 
questionable for gender performances that fail to fulfill standards masculine expected 
from male bodies. But, is he perceived to be male in the first place? 
                                            
43 Judith Halberstam, Female Masculinity (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998). 
44 This is the phrase Halberstam uses to paraphrase Judith Butler's arguments about 
masculinity as a performance of gender. See ibid., 17, 236; Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: 
Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1999), especially the chapter 
"Subjects of Sex/Gender/Desire". 
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Figure 3.10 "Scream," masculine Janet 
One moment to grapple with Michael's gender performance occurs when each 
person dances alone in front of a large projection screen: When we see Janet, Michael 
fills the screen behind her by reaching toward the edges of the frame, but when 
Michael performs we see an anime character filling the screen behind him (Figures 3.11 
& 3.12). Framing Michael in proximity to an anime character almost hilariously suggests 
a greater level of similarity between Michael and a non-human figure than with his 
sister. This is to say, in the words of Jason King: "If Jackson has widely been perceived 
as a 'space alien drag queen'—supremely freaky in his gender and racial ambiguities—
then the outer-space antics of 'Scream' can be read as a metaphor for Jackson's 
profound sense of alienation from society as a whole."45 Our ability to reconcile images 
of difference we experience while seeing Jackson's body in this context becomes a 
                                            
45 Jason King, "Form and Function: Superstardom and Aesthetics in the Music Videos of 
Michael and Janet Jackson," The Velvet Light Trap: A Journal of Television, Radio and Film 
44(1999): 86. 
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form of disorientation arising from a sense of wonder about the proximity of bodily 
relations.  
 
Figure 3.11 "Scream," projected bodies 
 
 
Figure 3.12 "Scream," projected bodies 
We experience this disorientation because the proximity of bodily relations 
enable us to engage with our perceptions about "likeness." When considering 
proximity and likeness within the context of racial (and familial) relations, Sara Ahmed 
explains how proximity affects how "bodies come to be seen as 'alike', as for instance 
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'sharing whiteness' as a 'characteristic'."46 This experience of disorientation occurs 
when the act of wondering about Jackson's changing body requires us to account for 
our typical orientations toward the "proximity" of human bodies and consider if we 
have been attracted to images of a visible body that is not, or at least not "naturally," 
human. This becomes a form of attraction and fascination that cuts to the recognition 
of a constructed body, and tucked within this cut are the intimate details of the 
technological contributions and productions of Jackson's cyborgian, hybrid body. 
We learn about cyborgs from Donna Haraway, who posits the cyborg as a figure 
for border-bodies operating at the junction between binary breakdowns like 
human/animal and organism/machine.47 For Haraway, the cyborg illustrates how 
humans are discursively constructed through their relationships with non-human 
beings or bodies. She uses running shoes as one example to illustrate how the border 
between human (organism) and technology (machine) breaks down. Although running 
shoes can function as technological supplements for humans by enabling movement, 
they specifically enable mobility beyond "natural" forms of human mobility. Humanist 
frameworks would not refigure the definition for a human who wears running shoes 
because these frameworks construct discursive boundaries for the Human whereby 
the human-wearing-running-shoes remains human rather than becoming a hybridized 
or cyborg being who need not be defined as (wholly) human.  
                                            
46 Ahmed, "Whiteness," 155. 
47 Donna J. Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York: 
Routledge, 1991), 149-181. 
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Similar to the cyborg figure who ruptures the boundaries between binary 
categories, Jackson's body functions as cyborg by disrupting and contaminating 
"natural" forms of embodiment when he signifies "Optic Whiteness." This is a form of 
visibility and signification emerging when, Harryette Mullen explains, "technological 
fantasies feature mechanical production as an asexual reproduction of whiteness."48 
This fantasy is the "contemporary electronic version of the miscegenated text" and 
produces, Mullen argues, "a media cyborg constructed as a white body with a black 
soul."49 Because chromatically Black characteristics are no longer visible on the 
surface of Jackson's body, his Blackness is relegated to the virtual threshold where 
avisual images of his soul reside. Within this regard, I expand upon the asexual and 
technological production of Whiteness by, first, returning to the video for "Black or 
White" to clarify how bodies are made visible through transitions and, second, by 
addressing why images of Jackson operate between the figure of the cyborg and 
figures of miscegenation. 
Mullen's argument about the technological fantasy for racial transcendence is 
made visible near the end of the music video for "Black or White." The fantasy takes its 
form as what Jennifer González calls the "race machine," which is a machination and 
technological illusion for bodily transmutation. The race machine utilizes seamless 
transitions to purposefully disrupt and eradicate the boundaries between visible 
properties on the surfaces of bodies and, as a result, pictures the possibility for any 
body to transition into another—no matter one's age, gender, or race (Figure 3.13).  
                                            
48 Mullen, "Optic White," 77. 
49 Ibid., 85-86. 
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Figure 3.13 "Black or White," race machine 
Transitions are what allow various videos (or pictures) of bodies to intermix—to melt—
because literal cuts between shots or pieces of film are not made visible. Each 
transition contributes to the construction of a visibly malleable and morphological 
utopian fantasy about bodily transition, which aims to hide the technological movement 
and editorial labor occurring outside and, thus, unseeable within the frame. 
 130 
This race machine produces what González considers an "historical elision that 
erases any complex notion of cultural identity" whereby "a hybrid identity is presumed 
to reside in or on the visible markers of the body, the flesh."50 Within these images, 
bodies transition according to identity markers on the surface of skin—one facial 
feature morphs into another or one skin tone blends into the next. This is "a thinly 
veiled fantasy of difference," González claims, especially when we consider the filmic-
focus on faces as "a device that is ultimately mutable and theoretically 
nonidentitarian," which allows "any face…might become like any other face, any 
whatever face, and by doing so implies that the racial discourses attached to those 
signs will fall away."51 González argues that the race machine aims to erase the 
boundaries of racial difference; yet, these morphological changes cannot undo the 
signs attached to the visible presence or surface of bodies. While Jackson remains the 
conspicuous absence among these transitional bodies, the race machine functions as 
a picture for how bodies move through virtual imaging processes and, thus, seeing 
Jackson's body transforming within this scene would be an unnecessarily reiteration of 
how we already imag(in)e his unpredictable, "morphological" body when we reconcile 
the differences between his different forms of visibility. 
Yet, to understand Jackson's transformational body requires us to engage in, as 
Sarah Ahmed suggests, "an even more fundamental critique of the idea that difference 
                                            
50 Jennifer A. González, "The Appended Subject: Race and Identity as Digital Assemblage," in 
Race in Cyberspace, ed. Beth E. Kolko, Lisa Nakamura, and Gilbert B. Rodman (New York: 
Routledge, 2000), 305. 
51 ——, "The Face and the Public: Race, Secrecy, and Digital Art Practice," Camera Obscura 
70, no. 24 (2009): 49-50, her emphasis. 
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only takes a morphological form (race/sex) and that such morphology is, as it were, 
given to the world." Ahmed argues that our ability to understand the differences 
between bodies can be determined by ascertaining the ways bodies become raced 
and sexed as they extend into space. "Differences," Ahmed explains, "are shaped in 
how we take up space, or how we orient ourselves toward objects and others," and 
our ability to understand why disorientation arises from images of Jackson is 
necessary to understand how his body functions as a visible form for the hybridization 
of difference.52  
Jackson's body can only operate as a technologically produced media cyborg 
when images of Jackson emerge from a threshold between identity categories, and 
these images allow us to push Mullen's discussion about miscegenation toward 
Baudrillard's broader use of the term in the epigraph at the start of this section. 
Jackson's body challenges and expands the notion of miscegenation Mullen uses to 
describe Black bodies by enabling the production of images for a hybrid and queer 
form of growth. Jackson's body emerges as a site of growth by making the processes 
of mixing categories or classifications visible but irreconcilable, and, by extension, 
undermines the processes of classification altogether by not morphologically 
transitioning into an identifiable bodily form.53  
Jackson's miscegenation becomes a visible mixture of traits similar to what 
Haraway describes as the "disturbingly and pleasurably tight coupling" of traits 
                                            
52 Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology: 99. 
53 This broader context could emerge by simply acknowledging the Latin roots in the word 
miscegenation, which comes from miscere, meaning "to mix" and genus, meaning "kind." 
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signaled by cyborgs. His miscegenation extends into a technological form made visible 
through the border breakdown between organism and machine in Haraway's cyborg 
ontology. This breakdown, Haraway explains, arises when "disturbingly lively" 
machines confront "frighteningly inert" humans whereby differences like "natural and 
artificial" lose distinction.54 This breakdown reveals a deep-rooted hybridity that is (or, 
has become) part of the human condition, and gestures at what Haraway envisions as 
"the utopian tradition of imagining a world without gender, which is perhaps a world 
without genesis, but maybe also a world without end."55 Jackson epitomizes 
Haraway's vision for a "world without genesis" because his body reveals how the 
biomechanical potential of plastic surgery has the ability to facilitate different forms of 
embodiment no matter what one's technological fantasies may be.56  
Further, pictures of Jackson become critiques of Humanist and heteronormative 
modes of reproduction because they make technological manipulations and alterations 
to the body visible when they are imaged as visibly different from the body in which he 
was born. While the form of reproduction that brings about the birth of a child can lend 
to expectations about how a child's body will extend along particular lines of growth 
and aging within normative logics about "succession and success,"57 Jackson's body 
strays from any orientation toward these pathways because, as he continued to age, 
                                            
54 Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: 152. 
55 Ibid., 150. 
56 Although Jackson's plastic surgery is a valid realm of inquiry, I have chosen to focus on the 
visible manifestations of Jackson's body, which secure un-seen plastic surgery processes. This 
shift productively heightens our awareness of imag(in)ing as a process to reconsider avisuality 
within any picture/d medium. 
57 Halberstam, Queer Art of Failure: 119. 
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his body did not bear "typical," visible signs of aging, which reveals an orientation 
toward non-normative pathways of growing up more closely akin to those I address in 
relation to the queer child in Chapter One. This is why Jackson's body becomes and 
remains disorientating for people who want him to "grow up" because normative 
images of adulthood would necessitate our imaginings to emerge from paths where he 
has rarely been pictured. 
Images of Jackson's body may give us the greatest sense of disorientation 
because we lack pictures that provide visible confirmation about how his body was 
produced. Returning, in this context, to my previous discussion about the shadows 
lingering around images of Jackson would reveal a different spectral form I did not 
previously address: the shadows haunting many pictures of Jackson testify to his 
inability to pass as purely human; his body, in fact, may not always hide its own 
"ghosts in the machine."58 In other words, images of Jackson's body perpetually carry 
the possibility and threat of pictures that could emerge and reveal how Jackson's body 
was produced; and, each signifier for Jackson's body escapes into virtuality only to 
                                            
58 I began using this phrase about "ghosts in the machine" as a way to think about Jackson 
and the spectral presence of race in light of what Mullen and Lhamon Jr. write about the 
production of "Optic White" paint in Ralph Ellison's novel Invisible Man. During the production 
of "Optic White" paint, the whiteness of the paint was explained to be so white that "you could 
paint a chunka coal and you'd have to crack it open with a sledge hammer to prove it wasn't 
white clear through!" This statement by one of the Black factory workers became more telling 
in light of his explanation about how this chromatic quality of white paint was achieved. Not 
only were the chromatic properties of the optic white paint dependent on the chromatic 
properties of black pigment (each container necessitating 10 drops of black paint) but the 
production of this line of paint was dependent on unseen Black bodies to which the worker 
explains: "They got all this machinery, but that ain't everything; we the machines inside the 
machine." See Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man, 2nd Vintage International ed. (New York: Random 
House, 1995 [1947]), 217, his emphasis.  
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return as an image with the haunting potentiality to reveal the laborious technological 
procedures that were necessary to produce his body.  
Although these procedures are not made visible, the non-human technological 
reconstructions become images for work being done to and with Jackson's body and 
suggest a sort of theft: Jackson's inability to visibly "pass"—as a body that is Black or 
White or feminine or masculine or adult or child—emerges not as a means to acquire 
access to a "higher" racial class but, instead, suggests that he has stolen access to a 
mode of visibility that need not operate within systems of racial or bodily exchange and 
identifiability. Jackson's body moves outside of the realm of assimilation and toward 
the possibility to radically construct the form of a body or identity that need not be 
subject to visible distinctions at all.59  
In different words, Jackson's body queers the limitations of categorical 
boundaries like miscegenation and assimilation by functioning as a "chromatic 
aberration."60 This form of aberration emerges when differing wavelengths of light hit a 
lens, become refracted along different angles, and result in a failure to focus. 
Jackson's body functions as a surface to contemplate the failure to connect race with 
the visible properties of chromatics and, as a lens to understand visible forms of the 
human more broadly, Jackson forces us to reconfigure the failure of our surface-
orientated engagements with the body. To image Jackson is to try and reconcile any 
                                            
59 Regarding discussions about assimilation and/or passing, see footnote 16 above. 
60 While I found it intriguing to come across this term long after I had been writing about the 
chromatic properties of Jackson's skin, I have not found reference to the use of this term in 
critical studies of visual culture. Rather, this term is most commonly used in the study of 
optics, as reference to "the material effect produced by the refraction of different wavelengths 
of electromagnetic radiation through slightly different angles, resulting in a failure to focus. It 
causes colored fringes in the images produced by uncorrected lenses" (OED).  
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range of parts that may not compose a whole body; but, to picture Jackson is also to 
produce a form of embodiment that has been "cut away" from the human altogether. 
Thus, in the final section of this chapter, I reveal how Jackson functions as a hyphenate 
who occupies the space between post(-)human and post(-)identity—potentially best 
described as an image for a flickering form of embodiment becoming a visible form for 
the post-identifiable body.  
3.5 Imag(In)ing Post-Humous Presence: Visible Hyphenation and the Visibility of 
Non-Human Forms of Embodiment 
Jackson's visual transmutations have also 
been discussed in terms of a broader 
boundary crossing that moves beyond race 
and gender and moves the icon into the realm 
of the nonhuman, either as one so innocent 
and vulnerable that he was not accustomed to 
social norms or as one whose sense of risk-
taking imagined a life and possibilities outside 
of the strictures and norms of human life. 
—Nicole Fleetwood61 
Jackson's body hides its re-construction but, unlike the race machine hiding the 
labor of its technological production, Jackson's body cannot be visibly pictured in 
transition from one race or gender to another. Instead, he occupies a hyphenated 
terrain within a threshold where our imaging processes become cut from their 
orientations toward the surface-signs for normative human body types. Pictures of 
Jackson become disorientating by perpetually thwarting our orientations toward 
identifiable traits on the surface of his body. This experience of disorientation provides 
us with the possibility to complicate the aesthetic function of cutting—and cutting 
                                            
61 Fleetwood, Troubling Vision: 212.  
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forms of visibility that extend beyond surfaces of visibility to pierce a spectator. I 
address aesthetics of cutting within the context of post-humanism as an aesthetic form 
with capacity to reorientate our engagement with bodily surfaces toward different 
images and forms for embodiment.  
Kathryn Hayles explores the post-human within the context of virtuality to 
elaborate disembodied modes of subjectivity and being.62 For Hayles, cognitive 
processes operate within virtuality as an interface between our material bodies and 
discursive constructions. When discourse is mediated through cognition, Hayles 
argues that signifiers have the potential to flicker and change in unforeseeable ways 
because signification remains irreducible to absent or present meaning.63 Signifiers 
flicker between patterned and random signification and, as Hayles explains, reveal why 
subjectivity can slip or become malleable in the context of the human body, which 
flickers between being defined by the corporeal experience of the body and being 
                                            
62 See Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: specifically Chapter 2: “Virtual Bodies and 
Flickering Signifiers”. 
63 This is, it might seem, similar to Jacques Lacan's discussion about crossings between the 
syntagmatic (metonymic) and paradigmatic (metaphoric) axes of language—where meaning 
slips or slides between signifiers on the syntagmatic chain—until reaching a quilting point of 
understandable meaning. Although, Hayles argues that "flickering" signifiers are not the same 
as what Lacan refers to as "floating" signifiers because his argument about signification 
through lack does not fully account for the materiality of signifiers. See ibid., 30-32; Lacan, 
Écrits: “Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious; or Reason since Freud”. 
 137 
defined by signifiers (and meanings) projected back upon the body.64 Similarly, imaging 
processes always retain a level of unpredictability because they remain dependent on 
our perceptions of pictures, which cut to a feedback loop between understandable 
patterns of signification and the random flickerings of potential, imagined 
meaningfulness. 
More importantly, Hayles notes how flickering signification becomes a way to 
conceptualize a shift from the discursive limitations of the human body toward a more 
malleable interface for post-human forms of embodiment operating within an 
"enmeshed" network of "integrated circuits."65 These networks of signifiers emerge 
when flickering signifiers collide within virtuality, and the resulting "reflexive and 
transformative union" becomes one form of post-human unification to clarify why 
pictures of Jackson stray from signifiers for the normative human body. Hayles 
suggests that this union occurs in a circuit through "cybernetic splice," which is quite 
different from the work of unification that hyphenation is arguably supposed to 
perform. Thus, while Hayles lends insight about the potential for flickering forms of 
embodiment to become signified within virtuality, she also complicates how I utilize 
                                            
64 For a more detailed account of the corporeality and post-humanism, we could turn to Mark 
Hansen's about the relationships between technologies and machines. For Hansen, the body-
in-code is a fundamentally technological body because bodies attain corporeality and 
subjectivity through an intrinsically technic experience. This experience is based on Benjamin's 
notion of shock and accounts for the corporeal experience of human relations with and to 
technology, where humans encounter sensorial and shocking experiences through the use of 
technology—ranging between technologies from the hammer to the computer. See Mark B. N. 
Hansen, Embodying Technesis: Technology Beyond Writing, Studies in Literature and Science 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000); ——, New Philosophy for New Media 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004); ——, Bodies in Code. 
65 Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: 46-47. 
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hyphenation as a means to describe Jackson's forms of embodiment and, thus, these 
distinctions require further elaboration. 
One way to articulate the distinction between splice and hyphen becomes 
apparent in philosophies or writings about the "post-human" when a decision must be 
made about how the term is spelled. In the most general sense, I use a hyphen in the 
term post-human to draw attention to the processes Hayles addresses, whereby words 
that are cut or spaced from connection are simultaneously and visibly re-stitched to 
offer mutual critical reflections. Unlike my use of the term thus far, Hayles bypasses the 
use of the hyphen in posthuman to illustrate how this term implies and connotes a 
mutually constitutive relationship between two terms: "postness" says something 
about "human," which says something about "postness." This spelling also reiterates 
how categorical boundaries between humans and information technologies become 
coupled and function within discursive relationships as I address earlier. Further, 
Hayles's use of the term posthuman is meant to mobilize and enact the capabilities of 
the cybernetic splice by placing "post" and "human" within a tightly fused and reflexive 
circuit of signification.  
In a more specific sense, my use of the hyphen in post-human also aims to draw 
attention to various debates about the post-human within the theoretical body of work 
on post-humanism. Many scholars like Hayles have argued for careful consideration 
when making typographical choices to define terms like post-human when the splice/s 
or hyphen-ing also operate as "graphic and semiotic prostheses."66 One such example 
                                            
66 Ibid., 127. 
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is found in the book Representations of the Post/human by Elaine Graham. In this 
book, Graham specifically chooses to utilize a splice in the term post/human as an 
implicit reference to the uncertainties (and debates) about successors to the human, 
and extends this logic to articulate how the post/human functions as a figure who 
"confounds but also holds up to scrutiny the terms on which the quintessentially 
human will be conceived."67 If, as Judith Butler explains, "there are norms of 
recognition by which the 'human' is constituted, and these norms encode operations of 
power, then it follows that the contest over the future of the 'human' will be a contest 
over the power that works in and through such norms."68 In other words, the hyphen 
also functions as means to reiterate how "human" emerges within and structures 
contingent relations and often remains situated as a standard by which beings are 
defined.69  
I also rely on Butler's argument when I suggest that the visibility of Jackson's 
body allows him to occupy the space of the hyphen within a term like post-human. 
While Butler addresses how the discursive nature of language structures and 
                                            
67 Elaine L. Graham, Representations of the Post/Human: Monsters, Aliens and Others in 
Popular Culture (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), 11. Graham's argument, in 
fact, is echoed in various contexts that are not specific to post-humanism. Diana Fuss, for 
example, argues that the slash functions in between and as an in-between simultaneously by 
drawing attention to limitations, marginal positionalities, borders, and boundaries. See Diana 
Fuss, "Inside/Out," in Inside/Out: Lesbian Theories, Gay Theories, ed. Diana Fuss (New York: 
Routledge, 1991). 
68 Butler, Undoing Gender: 13-14. This perspective is reiterated and/or complicated by a large 
range of scholars who write about cyborgs, post-humans, and non-humans. See, as examples: 
Judith Halberstam and Ira Livingston, Posthuman Bodies, Unnatural Acts (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1995); MacCormack, Posthuman Ethics; Cary Wolfe, What Is 
Posthumanism?, Posthumanities Series (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010); 
Noreen Giffney and Myra J. Hird, eds., Queering the Non/Human (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008). 
69 This argument is also a precursor to my discussion about visibility of non-human "things" in 
Chapter Four. 
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designates boundaries between beings and bodies or subjects and objects,70 Jackson 
comes to occupy the space of the hyphen by simultaneously drawing attention to and 
undermining our ability to see and image boundaries or limitations for bodies within 
visual culture. The final picture I want to address about Jackson illustrates how he 
becomes visible as hyphenate and, more importantly, how his hyphenated visible form 
persists even when his body is not or cannot be pictured. This bodiless picture 
exposes the threshold where images of Jackson circulate, emerging from a 
hyphenated intersection between metaphor and memorial. 
After his untimely death, a public memorial was held for Jackson at the Los 
Angeles Staples Center. During the memorial service, Jackson was put on display 
through pictures that continually flashed on the back of the stage. Pictures of Jackson 
continued to accumulate and positioned his body to linger within limitless virtual 
images produced by spectators in attendance or watching the service being broadcast 
to their televisions at home. Whether being spoken about by family, friends, or fans, 
Jackson was memorialized as a figure who provided the world with a sense of 
wonder—such a precise sense of wonder, in fact, that Jackson was eulogized in ways 
that could have described a child just as easily as it described an adult. While 
spectators heard Brook Shields talk about Jackson's sweet and pure laugh and Rev. Al 
Sharpton tell us why "Michael made us love each other," the most striking tributes 
made reference to Jackson's immortality. Smokey Robinson, for example, said that 
                                            
70 In this book, Butler continues and complicates the line of arguments about gender from her 
earlier works and suggests that gender not only remains contingent on the historical and 
cultural frames or configurations of bodies, but that these historical and cultural contingencies 
construct gender, anatomy and sex as perpetually reconfigured categories. Butler, Undoing 
Gender: 9-10. See also ——, Gender Trouble. 
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"[Jackson] is going to live forever and ever and ever and ever" and, similarly, President 
Barack Obama reflected upon the death of Michael Jackson during an interview with 
CBS, stating: "There are certain people in our popular culture that just capture people's 
imaginations. And in death, they become even larger."71  
These references to immortality became more intriguing in relation to the 
pictures of Jackson continually flashing on the back of the stage throughout the 
memorial service, which seemed to affirm Jackson's inability to (posthumously) 
maintain control over the visibility of his body while, simultaneously, revealing how little 
control Jackson had over images of his body while he was living.72 Jackson's 
postmortem body was never made visible during the memorial service and, although it 
may not be necessary to see Jackson's body pictured posthumously by offering an 
open-casket memorial, this visible absence gestures at another form of imaging that 
has lingered in all I have written about the visibility of Jackson's body: the notion of 
picture or photograph as corpse.  
In Camera Lucida, Barthes writes that photographs take their most haunting 
form when they become figures for the face of death.73 After several descriptions about 
                                            
71 Quoted from an interview with CBS while President Obama was in Moscow, when he was 
asked about the outpouring of emotion related to Michael Jackson's death. 
72 I am writing here, at least in part, in response what Kathy Davis wrote about the control 
Jackson retained over the visibility of his body while he was living. She argued that Jackson's 
"surgical exploits are shaped by, but also transgress, the boundaries of race, gender, age and 
sexuality," but she goes on to suggest that "[his] operations demonstrate the spuriousness of 
categories of race and force his public to see him as an individual in complete control of his 
bodily image." To this statement, she correctly adds: "The image that emerges is a new 
category, made more captivating and volatile by virtue of its multiple transgressions of 
masculinity and heterosexuality." See Kathy Davis, "Surgical Passing: Or Why Michael 
Jackson's Nose Makes "Us" Uneasy," Feminist Theory 4(2003): 85. 
73 Barthes, Camera Lucida: 30-32, 78-79. 
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his engagements with a photograph of his mother in the Winter Garden, Barthes 
concludes that death can be read in photographs. His experiences with this 
photograph allow him to clarify how the punctum extends from the photograph by 
piercing an onlooker. Further, Barthes observes how photographs make an anterior 
future ("this will be and this has been") visible, which he describes as a forceful prick of 
"horror" when he discovers this anterior visibility to function as a flattened form for 
equivalence between future (this person will die) and past (this person has already 
died). "In front of the photograph of my mother as child," Barthes recalls, "I tell myself: 
she is going to die: I shudder […] over a catastrophe which has already occurred. 
Whether or not the subject is already dead, every photograph is this catastrophe." The 
force of the punctum becomes a "defeat of Time" for Barthes because he locates life in 
the photograph of his mother by imaging her youthful past—"that is going to die"—
while also locating an image of death in a photograph exiting beyond the life of his 
mother as a child or an adult—"that is dead."74 
Barthes's discussions about the piercing force of photographs clarifies why 
Jackson did not need to be pictured posthumously—as a corpse in a postmortem 
picture—because each picture projected upon the backdrop of the stage during his 
memorial service left Jackson lingering as a hyphenate between images for all of his 
forms of (in-/animate) embodiment. Similarly, Peter Schwenger clarifies why any "living 
image" carries a "figurative corpse of what has been alive" and requires us to question 
                                            
74 Ibid., 96, his emphasis. 
 143 
the nature of all images.75 Within this context, each photograph or picture of Jackson 
would always and already produce images of corpses for each of the "bodies" Jackson 
occupied and for all of the forms of embodiment Jackson would no longer occupy.  
Schwenger's extends his discussion about the relationship between corpses 
and images by putting Barthes's writings about the image in conversation with what 
Maurice Blanchot writes about cadavers and what Julia Kristeva writes about 
abjection. For Schwenger, these authors reveal why images do not occupy the space 
of subjects or objects because images lend form to bodies so that they can take up 
residence as subjects and objects. In a different way, the visible form of the race 
machine aids Jackson's body in its function as corpse-like images. The race machine 
parallels what Schwenger writes about Eadweard Muybridge's time-lapse 
photography, providing a pictorial representation to make the gaps between visible 
states apparent. In contrast, Jackson's visible forms do not allow us to see—perhaps 
not even obliquely—how or when his body emerges through different states of 
visibility.76 
While any picture of Jackson can proffer limitless images about his life, each of 
the pictures presented during the slideshow at his memorial service could only animate 
his body through an excess of past, pictorial lives. Spectators could remain fascinated 
by or attracted to Jackson's visibility through this large collection of photographs, 
                                            
75 Peter Schwenger, "Corpsing the Image," Critical Inquiry 26(2000): 396. See also Barthes, 
Camera Lucida: 6. 
76 Schwenger, "Corpsing the Image," 400-401, 412. Schwenger argues that the cadaver is its 
own image based on Maurice Blanchot's statement: "The cadaver's strangeness is perhaps 
also that of the image." See "The Two Versions of the Imaginary" in Maurice Blanchot, The 
Space of Literature, trans. Ann Smock (Lincoln, 1982), 256. 
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which also pictured Jackson's vast and varied forms of embodiment; yet these pictures 
became a testament to an impossible fantasy for a unified, perfect picture of Jackson. 
Jackson could not and will never exist within (the fantasy of) a perfect picture but, as 
his memorial service drew to a close, Jackson was granted a mode of visibility beyond 
the photographic form whereby we encounter Jackson's visibly unique and 
hyphenated form of embodiment.  
When Jackson's casket was removed from the front of the stage near the end of 
the service, an instrumental version of "Man in the Mirror" began to play. It seemed all 
too ironic to hear the melody for "Man in the Mirror" as a contrasting statement about 
Jackson's varied forms of embodiment. After all, who does Jackson become, or remain 
visible as, when he has already seemingly thwarted his shadow and now, 
posthumously, is left without the need to reflect upon his changing body in any mirror? 
Or, to ask the question differently, hasn't Jackson's body only ever existed reflectively 
between the images projected upon him (and his pictorial representations)? 
By the time the casket was no longer visible, a single over-head spotlight 
appeared, cutting through blackness on the empty stage, to illuminate and encircle a 
microphone (Figure 3.14). Two more pictures of Jackson were projected onto the 
backdrop of the stage—one of him as a child and the other as an adult—but, despite 
the range of pictures portraying Jackson throughout the memorial service, these 
pictures seemed to provide minimal visible reciprocity for the array of images any 
spectator could construct while reflecting about their memories of Jackson. Rather, the 
illuminated emptiness of this spotlight becomes the ideal, visible form to metaphorize 
the hyphenation of Jackson's body. The illumination of empty space surrounding this 
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microphone pictures Jackson's ideal form of embodiment because his body must be 
imaged in hyphenation: in the spotlight, as pictures of his past flicker into images we 
project upon the space where light lingers around a microphone. Here, Jackson is 
pictured as hyphenate: he becomes a picture for queer forms of embodiment within 
the virtual threshold where images for malleable forms of embodiment proliferate and 
circulate endlessly.77 
 
Figure 3.14 Jackson illuminated as hyphenate 
  
                                            
77 I also see Jackson's hyphenation to function similarly to what Mikko Tuhkanen calls "queer 
hybridity" in his essay by the same title. Tuhkanen thinks queerness through Gloria Anzaldúa's 
figure of the Mestiza to assert that queerness can be figured as a mixing or form of 
connectedness that crosses temporalities and cultures through processes of becoming rather 
than being. See Tuhkanen, "Queer Hybridity." See also Gloria E. Anzaldúa, Bordlands/La 
Frontera: The New Mestiza (San Francisco: Spinsters/Aunt Lute, 1987); Gloria E. Anzaldúa and 
AnaLouise Keating, eds., This Bridge We Call Home: Radical Visions for Transformation (New 
York: Routledge, 2002). 
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●●● 
How have we orientated ourselves to approach the otherness of Jackson's body 
and, more broadly, what does this teach us about disorientation as a necessary 
component for our ability to see other bodies? 
Because Jackson has literally and figuratively cut his body otherwise, in 
response to the first question, I would argue that the visibility of Jackson's malleable 
forms of embodiment allow us to orientate toward an ability to queer human forms of 
the body within visual culture. Jackson's hyphenated form of embodiment illuminates 
how it is possible to rupture the connections between chromatic epidermal signifiers 
and racial identities, and illuminates the possibility to thwart racial indices by 
transgressing the chromatic properties of race. Jackson's hyphenated visibility torques 
normative orientations toward growth and aging, reveals how technological 
productions of bodies can function to thwart heteronormative relations between the 
gender and sex of bodies, and, in doing so, makes his hyphenated relationship to the 
body visible as a disorientating pathway toward queerer forms of relation and 
embodiment. 
At the same time, I would point out that "being orientated" is not the solution. 
Rather, Jackson's body becomes a striking and transgressive form of embodiment that 
extends beyond orientations toward normally-visible human bodies. Efforts to imag(in)e 
Jackson's body torque Sara Ahmed's framing of orientation because these images 
give way to perpetual disorientation instead. Even though staring at Jackson's body in 
pictures can begin with a detail, the process of imaging Jackson cuts our engagement 
from the visible surfaces of pictures and initiates this experience of disorientation: we 
 147 
experience our movements on a pathway that undermines our orientation toward 
Jackson's body because we cannot locate a surface where our images of him should 
be projected. 
It is a utopian fantasy to suggest that images of Jackson completely transform 
our aesthetic or ontological understanding about race, gender, and identity, possibly 
because we often reinstate binary or morphological notions of difference through any 
attempt to structure and normalize their signification. At the same time, my critical 
engagement with the aesthetic function of cutting reveals how Jackson's body 
refigures forms of embodiment beyond the ("will-be-born" or "lacking") human bodies I 
have addressed thus far. It is within this context that I begin to imagine the emergence 
of a different visual culture, where the disorientation produced by aesthetics of cutting 
begins to reveal the noisiness of images emerging around and from non-human bodies 
and beings. This shift will illustrate how our aesthetic engagements with bodies may 
open toward more experiences of disorientation when non-human visual cultures 
render images in opaque or unidentifiable ways. 
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4.  TRACING THE VISIBILITY OF PALPABLE PLASTIC THINGS 
In The Transparency of Evil, Jean Baudrillard constructs an interesting—albeit 
unexpected—comparison between Michael Jackson and Andy Warhol. Baudrillard 
suggests that Warhol's art can be understood as aesthetically similar to Jackson's use 
of the body because, "like Michael Jackson, Andy Warhol is a solitary mutant—a 
precursor, for his part, of a perfect and universal hybridization of art, of a new aesthetic 
to end all aesthetics." For Baudrillard, the similarity between aesthetic styles emerges 
from symbolic transsexuality and facilitates the possibility for subjectivity or subjects to 
float free from the body.1  
In the previous chapter, I addressed how visible transformations of Jackson's 
body objectify the form of the human body by making it visibly pliable and palpable. 
Through Jackson we encounter the human body being imaged beyond the boundaries 
of flesh. This encounter refigures how we orientate toward the (human) body as an 
object through different forms of embodiment within visual culture. Jackson's visible 
and transformational body cuts away from human forms of embodiment. The 
proliferation of images arising from this move, I argue below, can be further understood 
when compared to objects in Warhol's silkscreen art. 
In this chapter, I explore visual culture beyond the human by addressing bodily 
forms of non-human beings. My previous chapters have centered on the malleable 
forms of the human body and because Jackson's body gestures at a visual culture 
where images move away from normative forms of the human body, I remain curious 
                                            
1 Baudrillard conceptualizes this mode of floating free within the context of cyberspace. See 
Baudrillard, Transparency of Evil: 21. 
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about the possibility to understand visual cultures beyond the human body and how 
visual cultures change when the human (body) no longer operates as a central figure of 
exploration or analysis. More succinctly: I am interested in a better understanding of 
visual cultures emerging from or being produced by things, which I refer to as a "visual 
culture of things." 
My exploration of a visual culture of things aims to accomplish several goals. 
First, I have made a terminological choice to address the visual culture of things as 
parallel to but distinct from a visual culture of objects. On the one hand, my choice to 
deploy the term "things" instead of "objects" is meant to draw attention to critiques 
about subject/object dialectics and move from a subject-centered analysis toward 
theories about things we find in the work of thinkers like Bill Brown.2 On the other hand, 
this choice is also meant to provide a theoretical framework that builds toward and into 
                                            
2 As examples of Brown's scholarship on Thing Theory, see: Bill Brown, "Thing Theory," Critical 
Inquiry 28, no. 1 (2001); ——, A Sense of Things: The Object Matter of American Literature 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003). Creating a literature review on subject/object 
dialectics would be task of monumental proportions. So, I will include some examples that 
pertain to topics I discuss throughout my dissertation. Examples of engagements with the 
concepts of subjects, objects, subjectivity, and otherness include: Judith Butler, Giving an 
Account of Oneself, 1st ed. (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005); Michel Foucault, 
Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth (the Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984), trans. Paul 
Rabinow and James D. Faubion, 3 vols. (New York: New Press, 1997); Lacan, Four 
Fundamental Concepts; Freud, Theory of Sexuality; Fredric Jameson, The Prison-House of 
Language; a Critical Account of Structuralism and Russian Formalism, Princeton Essays in 
European and Comparative Literature (Princeton, N.J.,: Princeton University Press, 1972); 
Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis 
(Pittsburgh, PA: Duquenne University Press, 1969); Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 
Rev. 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Bhabha, The Location of Culture. 
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my explicit engagement with contemporary object-oriented philosophies in my final 
chapter about glitch images.3 
Second, I want to shift away from the explicit engagement with visual cultures 
centered anthropocentrically on humans. Although Michael Jackson provides one 
pathway to obliquely orientate our understanding about instances when the human 
body can be made to visibly come undone, it is important to be mindful about the 
moments when the human body insidiously lingers or returns within explorations of the 
non-human. To this end, this chapter articulates how visual culture operates when 
things become central to our understanding about pictures of bodies and beings by 
providing clarity about how and when non-human bodies and beings are imag(in)ed. 
Finally, this chapter aims to expand upon my concluding remarks about 
disorientation in the previous chapter by revealing how our aim to "capture" 
understanding through pictures or images becomes a troubling endeavor within a 
visual culture of things. These visual cultures stray from our full understanding or 
domination toward what Jean-Luc Nancy describes as a more aporetic structure.4 The 
aporetic structure of visual culture arises when pictures and photographs of things are 
                                            
3 I do address work by scholars engaged with object-oriented philosophy and speculative 
realism in this chapter, including scholarship by Graham Harman and Steven Shaviro. In 
Chapter Five, I also incorporate scholarship by Ian Bogost and Levi Bryant, among others. See 
Ian Bogost, Alien Phenomenology, or What It's Like to Be a Thing (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2012); Levi Bryant, The Democracy of Objects (Open Humanities Press, 
2011); Graham Harman, Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects (Chicago: 
Open Court, 2002); Steven Shaviro, "The Universe of Things," Publicly accessible version of a 
paper delivered at the Object-Oriented Ontology symposium at Georgia Tech, Retrieved 2010, 
www.shaviro.com/Othertexts/Things.pdf . 
4 Domination can be contextualized here as the sense of capture Sontag uses in her 
description of photography. Susan Sontag, On Photography (New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 1977), 14. Also referenced in Louis Kaplan, "Photograph/Death Mask: Jean-Luc 
Nancy’s Recasting of the Photographic Image," Journal of Visual Culture 9, no. 1 (2010): 54. 
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at once familiar (because of their familial function as pictures or photographs) and also 
untenable or unreachable (as their familiarity escapes into strangeness).5 Between 
familiar and frustrating interactions, I feel it is important for this chapter to position us 
to contemplate moments when visual culture becomes tactile or even touches us—
possibly what might be an experience of pictures that are "rubbing" us the wrong way.6 
This experience can arise when things (and thingness) shift our orientation toward 
(visible) objects. This can become an obscure and disorienting form of engagement 
with visual culture when we are positioned to see how non-humans see differently from 
ourselves. 
●●● 
I clarify how visual culture operates within these contexts through close analysis 
of Kore-eda Hirokazu's film Air Doll (2009). This film offers a fascinating encounter with 
images of a becoming-sentient sex doll and I address these images as a means to 
explore the lives of objects and things. First, however, I want to dwell on Baudrillard's 
comparison between Michael Jackson and Andy Warhol because I am intrigued by the 
possibility to turn to Warhol's silkscreen art and, in the instance of his reproductions of 
                                            
5 Nancy writes about the aporias produced by photographs because of their un/familial 
functions in The Ground of the Image, especially in the chapter "Nous Autres." This is 
discussed further by Louis Kaplan, who explores a paradox emerging from Nancy's description 
of the aporias produced by photographs. Kaplan suggests Nancy's description produces a 
maddening paradox arising because "the captured object is always already a stray and lost 
image." See Jean-Luc Nancy, The Ground of the Image, Perspectives in Continental 
Philosophy, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005); Kaplan, "Photograph/Death Mask," 
54-57. 
6 My use of "rubbing" in this context is, at least in part, a reference to Jean-Luc Nancy's 
argument that "a photograph is a rubbing or rubbing away of a body." Nancy, The Ground of 
the Image: 107. 
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Campbell's Soup cans, explore forms of embodiment as they are imaged and linger 
around non-human objects.  
In the next section, I aim to begin the approach toward the visual culture of 
things by illustrating something similar to what W.J.T. Mitchell calls "showing seeing." 
Mitchell describes this as a pedagogical practice aiming to "overcome the veil of 
familiarity and self-evidence that surrounds the experience of seeing." This is, in a 
broader sense, what I have aimed to enact throughout my dissertation by 
foregrounding a oblique approach to seeing as a means to engage with the queerness 
of images. I have aimed to expand Mitchell's formulation of "showing seeing" and 
allow the practice of seeing obliquely to "show itself," be "on display," and "accessible 
to analysis," whereby the queerness of images unfolds and becomes visible. To move 
toward understanding about the visual culture of things requires us to extend our 
ocular orientations beyond the surfaces of objects and things so we can see images of 
things becoming ec-static and have the potential to see things showing us how they 
see.7 
4.1 A Thought Problem about Things 
To begin this approach toward the visual culture of things, I want to ask two 
questions which will, or so I hope, sound rather strange: What if Andy Warhol had 
utilized a can of Crisco as the object of his silkscreen portraits rather than cans of 
Campbell's tomato soup? And, by extension, would a can of Crisco function like a can 
of tomato soup within visual culture? 
                                            
7 See Mitchell, "Showing Seeing," 166; ——, What Do Pictures Want? 
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Contextual knowledge about each object would reveal how both emerge in the 
consumer market around the same time (Campbell's Soup in 18988 and Crisco in 
19119), provide similar iconic features (such as shape and textually-informative labels), 
and can be found in similar locations (advertised on billboards, purchased in grocery 
stores, and stored in the kitchen). To contextualize the position of Campbell's tomato 
soup within Warhol's art, we should acknowledge how his silkscreen art has been 
addressed as a political critique of commodification within late capitalism, which, in the 
broadest sense, draws attention to the conjunction between commodity fetishism and 
shifting modes of production.10 This (predominantly Marxist) reading of Warhol's work 
could easily extend to a silk-screened can of Crisco because its commodity properties 
would not reconfigure a general political and economic critique about commodities. 
Yet, unlike scholars such as Baudrillard and Fredrick Jameson who "define 
postmodern simulation in terms of the ubiquity and precedence of the code, the freeing 
of the sign from referential meaning," Steven Shaviro explains how Warhol sees this 
simulation as "a detaching of the body from signification." Shaviro's criticism seems 
                                            
8 Campbell's tomato soup was available to consumer markets by 1897, but the red and white 
label for Campbell's condensed tomato soup was adopted in 1898 after a company executive 
was inspired by the uniform colors at a Cornell / Penn State football game. See Campbell Soup 
Company, "Campbell Story," Retrieved July 01, 2013, 
http://careers.campbellsoupcompany.com/who-we-are/campbell-story. 
9 Crisco shortening was introduced to consumer markets in 1911, by the Procter & Gamble 
company. See The J.M. Smucker Company, "About Crisco - History - Crisco®," Retrieved 
2013, July 01, http://www.crisco.com/About_Crisco/History.aspx. 
10 See Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, Post-
Contemporary Interventions (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991). His first chapter in this 
book, "The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," comes from an earlier essay written for the New 
Left Review, see Jameson, ——, "Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 
New Left Review 146(1984). Another version of this type of Jameson's work can be found in 
the chapter "Postmodernism and Consumer Society," in Hal Foster, The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays 
on Postmodern Culture (New York: New Press, 2002).. 
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warranted based on Baudrillard's arguments in The Transparency of Evil, which focus 
on human subjects and forms of the body rather than utilizing the figure of the 
transsexual or the "mutant" to move away from the human as the center for categorical 
determinations. In contrast, Shaviro addresses Warhol's work as a visual form for and 
function of repetition within post-modern aesthetics. Shaviro asks us to consider why 
Warhol would paint "an interminable series of Campbell's soup can labels" and, in turn, 
explains how "Warhol repeats images in order to drain them of pathos, meaning, and 
memory."11 
Shaviro asserts that Warhol's works construct an aesthetic of flatness, which he 
distinguishes from various modernist approaches to Warhol's work (from Marxist and 
Heideggerian to performative and liberal humanist). "The modernist approach," Shaviro 
explains, "assumes that there is a hidden dimension to Warhol's work," and Shaviro 
clarifies how the aim to interpret this hidden dimension—as an inquiry beyond the 
surface of Warhol's art—can culminate in interpretive failure when "the last resort of 
the hermeneutics of suspicion is to jump to a metalevel: to decipher the very fact of the 
work's indecipherability." In contrast to the modernist approaches, Shaviro's 
postmodern reading "takes quite literally [Warhol's] claim to present nothing but 
surfaces" and this reading provides clarification about why Warhol's Campbell's Soup 
would differ from a silkscreened can of Crisco.12 
                                            
11 Steven Shaviro, The Cinematic Body, Theory out of Bounds (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1993), 203. Shaviro also notes similarities between his argument and what 
Foucault has written about repetition. See Michel Foucault, This Is Not a Pipe (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1983). 
12 Shaviro, The Cinematic Body: 202-205. 
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Shaviro addresses how the orientation toward flatness in Warhol's art facilitates 
an impenetrable lack of depth while also becoming porous and remaining open to "all 
possible interpretations."13 He explains: 
The critic can either praise Warhol's works or condemn them, can 
continue looking at them or can walk away, or can even attempt—
typically and unavoidably—to transform the distance of their indifference 
into the very different distance of critical estrangement and judgment. Yet 
all these strategies ultimately fail, because all of them only add to the 
interminable flood of words, which mimics but never corresponds to 
Warhol's equally interminable flood of images.14 
Shaviro is correct to note very different modes of engagement we might utilize as 
scholars engaged with Warhol's work. My questions about Crisco are meant to extend 
Shaviro's discussion about potential modes of engagement with Warhol's work by 
providing a thought problem with interpretive possibilities along a different path.  
Objects, even within Warhol's postmodern aesthetic of flatness, have the 
potential to torque common divisions between modernist and postmodern forms of 
critical inquiry. In different words, there is the possibility for Warhol's flat aesthetic to 
facilitate an array of interpretive and critical engagements that are, in Shaviro's words, 
"equally plausible and equally unfounded."15 At the same time, objects frequently 
beckon us to engage them from the standpoint of Modernity's child who, Bill Brown 
                                            
13 Ibid., 206. 
14 Ibid., 239. 
15 Ibid., 206. 
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explains, engages with objects beyond their surface whereby they often emerge from 
or escape to the socio-cultural life of Things.16 
Within the context of my previous discussions about surfaces of visibility, I want 
to briefly explain how Crisco would function within a flat aesthetic before exploring how 
it would undermine that form. By extension, this context opens toward the possibility 
to note properties of visible objects that resist being flattened by interpretations 
humans might project upon them. Social and material circumstances surrounding the 
circulation of objects facilitate their resistance to visual mastery and, most broadly, can 
reveal how objects escape into the lively, social world of Things. Thus, I want to 
address the presence of a complication to surface-oriented interpretations of a 
flattened visual aesthetic arising from a (albeit hypothetical) Warholian-styled silkscreen 
print of Crisco when the visible surface of a commodity cannot account for its different 
modes of circulation within a subcultural social life. 
Mark Graham provides an anecdote that gestures at why the subcultural life of 
Crisco cans would draw attention to an array of cultural meanings beyond surface-
orientated engagements with commodification or domesticity. As Graham recalls: 
I was carrying out an inventory of [Grant's] possessions ... when I 
discovered a small, old can of Crisco vegetable oil in a cupboard in his 
guest bathroom. Grant was as surprised as I was to find it there. It was 
rusty and had leaked, leaving a stain on the shelf. Needless to say, the oil 
had never been used for cooking, and the obvious place where one 
                                            
16 I will expand upon some of Brown's work in later sections of this chapter, including "Things 
Thwarting Objectness" and "Ec-Static Air." See Brown, Sense of Things; ——, Things 
(Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2004); ——, "Thing Theory." 
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would have expected to find it was not in his kitchen or guest bathroom 
but in the bottom drawer of his bedroom dresser. [...] Since 1911 Crisco 
has been advertised as an element of traditional heterosexual family life, 
with Mom cooking in the kitchen, sometimes aided by her young 
daughter. Among gay men, the brand is so well known that bars have 
been named after it in, among other places, Berlin, Florence, and 
Stockholm. Baking or fist fucking? Heteronormative gender or hardcore 
gay male sexuality? The can can open in either direction, depending on 
what is known about the thing and which of its uses eclipses the others.17 
A can of Crisco could be flattened in a Warhol-styled silkscreen print, which would lend 
to an array of critical interpretations. Yet, as Graham begins to illustrate, rendering a 
can of Crisco (rather than a can of Campbell's soup) into this visible and serialized 
format would not necessarily be able to flatten or eradicate the array of subcultural 
meanings arising from memories about its use outside the kitchen. 
This functions similarly to Judith Halberstam's discussion about Mandy Merck's 
criticism of Fredrick Jameson's distinction between modernist and postmodernist 
works of art, which Merck directs at Jameson's comments about Vincent van Gogh's 
Peasant Shoes and Warhol's Diamond Dust Shoes. Halberstam asserts that Jameson's 
analysis "falters in the face" of a "buried 'other' history" when Jameson makes a 
distinction between the presence of materiality within van Gogh's work in contrast to 
the paradigm of global capitalism he locates in Warhol's clean, manufactured, 
                                            
17 Mark Graham, "Sexual Things," GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 10, no. 2 (2004): 
300-301. 
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commodified footwear. A Warhol-styled can of Crisco would function closely to what 
Mandy Merck locates as "a queer history of sex work and gay community" within 
Warhol's Shoes because a can of Crisco carries with it an array of dense histories 
about its subcultural life as a sexual object and these histories are impossible to 
eradicate simply by rendering an object visible within a different dimensional format.18 
The can of Crisco is a visible object with the potential to carry the mind away, 
cutting to memories of domestic endeavors within the kitchen as much as its potential 
to be remembered within gay subcultural practices. Or, in more explicit terms: every 
memory of Crisco being scooped and plopped into a bowl of ingredients for a cake is 
paralleled or counter-positioned within memories of its use for bareback fucking and 
fisting in New York's "Vaseline Alley."19 Crisco's expected use as a vegetable-oil 
replacement for other types of fat structured how it was marketed as a cultural 
object—"it's digestible" was one common slogan—but its use-value was repurposed 
beyond the kitchen when books like The Joy of Gay Sex touted that "vegetable 
shortening may be the best lubricant, since it is not only greasy but also digestible."20 
At the same time, after the discovery of HIV and AIDS, uncertainties about the spread 
of viral contagions culminated in decreasing use of Crisco as a lubricant. "Even 
                                            
18 See Halberstam, Queer Time and Place: 100. See Halberstam, Queer Time and Place p. 100; 
See also Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism; Mandy Merck, 
"Figuring out Warhol," in Pop Out: Queer Warhol, ed. J Doyle, J. Flatley, and José Esteban 
Muñoz (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996). 
19 George Chauncey, Gay New York: Gender, Urban Culture, and the Makings of the Gay Male 
World, 1890-1940 (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 182. Also cited in Drew Sawyer, "Crisco, or 
How to Do Queer Theory with Things," Retrieved January 15, 2013, 
http://www.columbia.edu/~sf2220/TT2007/web-content/Pages/drew2.html. 
20 Charles Silverstein and Edmund White, The Joy of Gay Sex: An Intimate Guide for Gay Men 
to the Pleasures of a Gay Lifestyle (New York: Crown Publishers, 1977). Also cited in Sawyer, 
"Crisco, or How to Do Queer Theory with Things". 
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Crisco," Douglas Crimp explained, "the lube we used because it was edible, is now 
forbidden because it breaks down the rubber."21  
These shifting subcultural uses of shortening as lubrication bring us back to 
Graham's anecdote about this object's unexpected discovery in a guest bathroom and 
reiterate why Graham argues for us to "consider sexuality together with things."22 
Graham explains how sexuality severs things from their "relations between people, 
places, materials, and history that have produced them in order to create discrete 
objects;" or, in different words, Things operate and facilitate the relations between 
sexual subjects and objects.23 Crisco operates within multiple, often contradictory, 
relations whereby the shifting uses of this object give way to its thingness. While a silk 
screen of Crisco would, like Warhol's Campbell's Soup Cans, provide a canvas for 
critiques of commodity fetishism within late capitalism, the sexualized, subcultural uses 
                                            
21 Douglas Crimp, "Mourning and Militancy," October 51, no. Winter (1989): 11. I also imagine 
that this thought problem could be extended along another interesting trajectory were it 
extended to inquires about pornography. Not only would this contribute to additional 
subcultural memories about the visibility of Crisco outside of the kitchen, but, within the 
context of Rich Cante and Angelo Restivo's research, also has the potential to facilitate 
insights about how images of Crisco become embedded with spatial relationships that remain 
incredibly relevant within gay male pornography. See Rich Cante and Angelo Restivo, "The 
Cultural-Aesthetic Specificities of All-Male Moving-Image Pornography," in Porn Studies, ed. 
Linda Williams (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004). 
22 Graham, "Sexual Things," 299. 
23 By extension, one of the stakes in examining how things facilitate the relations between 
sexual subjects and objects arises from Graham's use of the term "sever" and his discussion 
about its connection to sexuality (from the Latin secare). This resonates with my discussion 
about "cutting aesthetics" in Chapter Three, and opens up toward the possibility to extend my 
analysis toward the sexual relations emerging from our affective relationship with cutting 
aesthetics. 
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also reveal why the thingness of Crisco continues to emerge within, but also in 
opposition to, domesticated, heteronormative sexual spaces and practices.24  
When shortening used as lubricant is left untouched, rotting, and rancid in a 
bathroom cupboard after sexual practices shifted to alternative objects for lubrication, 
the two-dimensional silk-screen canvas would also begin to bulge from its flatness by 
turning the patina for rancidity into an affirmation of the history about Crisco's social 
life as an object within subcultural sexual practices. In other words, whether or not 
Crisco is flattened in a Warhol-styled silkscreen print, every picture of Crisco is trailed 
by images about its contemporary and historical uses. We learn more about these 
images while attending to the (non-human) social and sexual life of shortening and this 
encounter provides our initial entry to a path of reorientations, toward images of 
objects within a visual culture produced for and by things. 
●●● 
Lingering behind what I have posed as a thought problem about Crisco is the 
central motivation or question driving the present and final chapter of this dissertation: 
what do we gain in an analysis of visual culture by de-centering the human body to 
engage in an explicit account of the lives of things? Phrased in different terms, my 
motivation to interrogate a visual culture of things emerges because of my desire to 
pursue several lines of inquiry about ethical, aesthetic, and ontological formulations of 
non-humans, many of which are currently being formulated within object-oriented 
philosophies.  
                                            
24 Many thanks to Timothy Lyle for engaging with me about broader ways in which Crisco has 
the potential to insidiously infect domestic space. 
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I address the lives of things along speculative trajectories in the hopes that 
some of my engagements with speculative realism can also reveal a queer use value 
for speculative fabulations.25 In part, this is a mode of contemplation aiming to 
interrogate forms of ethical engagement with non-humans and, more importantly, the 
conditions prompting humans to contemplate non-humans as viable candidates for 
ethical and ontological consideration. Initially, as Judith Butler explains, this can require 
us to rethink "where or how the human comes into being" within various social or 
psychical landscapes, which range from the emergence and rearing of children to 
relations like kinship.26 Within the context of my broad concerns in this chapter, I aim to 
extend questions like those Butler poses to determine the steps that are necessary for 
us to understand non-human engagements with and productions of visual culture as 
rigorously as the scholarship devoted to human engagement with visual culture.  
This aim requires us to refigure how objects and things become situated in 
opposition to concepts like the "subject" and can begin with what Judith Butler writes 
about the performative subjective act—to proclaim oneself as a subject by stating "I"—
as her overarching concern in Undoing Gender before extending beyond gender into 
her only (ethical) concern in Giving an Account of Oneself.27 In Giving an Account, 
                                            
25 A current example of discussions about speculative realism can be found in Levi Bryant, Nick 
Srnicek, and Graham Harman, eds., The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism 
(Melbourne, Australia: re.press, 2011). On "speculative fabulation," see Donna Haraway, 
"Speculative Fabulations for Technoculture’s Generations: Taking Care of Unexpected 
Country," Australian Humanities Review, no. 50 (2011), 
http://www.australianhumanitiesreview.org/archive/Issue-May-2011/haraway.html; Haraway, 
"Companion Species." 
26 Butler, Undoing Gender: 13-14. 
27 See ——, "Imitation and Gender; ——, Gender Trouble; ——, Giving an Account. 
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Butler explores the conditional, discursive relationship between self and other as a 
path to critique anthropocentric notions of humanness and explains how making 
claims about oneself implies that those claims are simultaneously made about 
an/other. To consider the meaning of "oneself," Butler explains, requires us to ask the 
"question of life and the question of the human" so that neither question can collapse 
into the other.28 To sever the connection between these questions is to recognize the 
conditional relationship between self and other, subject and object. Recognition of 
these mutually constitutive categories also allows us to reconsider and rework 
dehumanizing discursive structures, which construct ontological accounts for Being 
whereby "certain lives are not considered lives at all."29 
4.2 The Visible Social Life of Things 
Kore-eda Hirokasu's Air Doll (2009) provides a context to interrogate various 
object orientations and, by animating the plastic "object," this film lends visibility to 
images emerging from encounters with visual "things." Air Doll asks us to contemplate 
the lives of things after objects become animated. This film asks us to acknowledge 
how objects become restricted from equitable consideration as beings by, most 
                                            
28 ——, Undoing Gender: 12-17; ——, Giving an Account: especially the sections “Scenes of 
Address” and “The ‘I’ and the ‘You’”. 
29 ——, Undoing Gender: 25. The underlying premises of Butler's arguments are not completely 
alien to other accounts of objects, Things, or Otherness. Lacan is well known for his account of 
the mirror stage as an encounter between self and Other. The infant's encounter with the mirror 
stage becomes the structuring force for a subject who desires and lacks. See Lacan, Écrits: 
"The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience". 
For additional insights about the linguistic structure of negation Lacan utilizes within his work, 
see Peter Brooks and Alex Woloch, Whose Freud? The Place of Psychoanalysis in 
Contemporary Culture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000); Jameson, The Prison-House 
of Language; a Critical Account of Structuralism and Russian Formalism.  
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commonly, rendering them as tender, as commodities with use and exchange values.30 
At the same time, Air Doll portrays the life of things through images of an object 
becoming an autonomous thing; it asks us to recognize how objects become strikingly 
similar to subjects through images of desirous things—a thing who desires; and, to this 
end, Air Doll prompts us to reconfigure how we orientate ourselves in a world beyond 
the surfaces of things, where things can and do live independent lives. 
As Air Doll begins, we watch Hideo traveling by train toward his home. After a 
brief stop at a convenience store, Hideo arrives at his residence and speaks to 
someone off-screen before we cut to a scene at the dinner table. As the camera cuts 
to an over-the-shoulder shot from Hideo's point-of-view we realize he was speaking 
and continues to speak to an inanimate object: a blow-up sex doll he has named 
Nozomi. We sense Nozomi's objectness on the surface of her plastic body and, 
although Hideo personifies her, she remains a silent object who is forced to listen 
rather than being able to speak back to her purchaser.  
As we cut to the next scene in Hideo's bedroom, where we will watch him use 
Nozomi for sex, sound orientates us toward our understanding of her surface much 
more explicitly than the visibility of her body. Each thrust or movement Hideo makes is 
accompanied by sounds of air-filled plastic under pressure. Sounds of moans and 
panting coming from Hideo suppress or distract from our ability to hear the sound of 
human flesh becoming chaffed by plastic. Instead, our attention is drawn to the sounds 
                                            
30 This argument is based partly on the discussion W.J.T. Mitchell provides regarding the 
commodification of images, but I am more specifically making reference to what Bill Brown 
writes about the commodification of objects. See Bill Brown, "The Tyranny of Things (Trivia in 
Karl Marx and Mark Twain)," Critical Inquiry 28, no. 2 (2002); Mitchell, What Do Pictures Want? 
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of Nozomi's plastic exterior. The sounds of strained plastic provide us with a sense of 
the weight and pressure any air doll must support and lures us toward the looming 
possibility that her plastic would pop at the seam were the force of these thrusts to 
become too great.31  
The potential for Nozomi's plastic to pop reiterates her status as an object 
whose purpose is for the sexual gratification of her owner. We will see Nozomi situated 
as an object in multiple sexual encounters throughout the film, which are most visible, 
perhaps, in the moments when post-coital close-ups direct our attention and point-of-
view to her vaginal cup being washed outside of her body. As the scene draws to a 
close, the film transitions to provide a different context for us to understand Nozomi's 
objectness by showing Nozomi straying from how she is expected to function as a 
human-oriented (sexual) object and, through this process, we encounter a sex-object 
becoming a thing. 
4.2.1 Things Thwarting Objectness 
In addition to moments where we see Nozomi within sexual encounters, I turn to 
the audible properties of the film as a means to more broadly examine how the 
differences between human subjects and manufactured objects become situated or 
solidified. Overtly audible sounds of breathing accompany the film's transition to 
                                            
31 This connects with what Steven Connor notes as the "rhetoric of the inflatable" because "the 
inflatable object is frail, delicate, but also ridiculous, always on the point of abject eruption and 
collapse." See Steven Connor, "Next-to-Nothing," Tate 12(2008), 
http://www.tate.org.uk/context-comment/articles/next-nothing. My use of the word "lure" also 
resonates with what Steven Shaviro writes on this topic and the experience of allure in Steven 
Shaviro, Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, and Aesthetics (Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 2009), 2-6; ——, "The Universe of Things" 8-9. 
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daytime and we return to Hideo's home after a few brief scenic shots of the 
surrounding neighborhood in Tokyo. We watch Hideo dress and prepare to leave for 
work while Nozomi remains unclothed in bed. The sounds of breathing persist and 
become attributed to Nozomi when these sounds couple with a wind-chime that jingles 
and moves above her head while Hideo is out of the frame. The sound of Nozomi 
breathing is followed by a visible shift from her state as an inanimate object: we hear 
sounds of strained, stretching plastic similar to the previous night but, in Hideo's 
absence, we watch her legs begin to move and follow a translucent shadow cast from 
her body onto the wall while she walks from the bed toward the window (Figure 4.1). 
 
Figure 4.1 Nozomi's translucent shadow 
The translucence of her shadow becomes an interesting visible manifestation for 
her status as an object in light of Bill Brown's writings about things. "As they circulate 
through our lives," Brown explains, "we look through objects (to see what they disclose 
about history, society, nature, or culture-above all, what they disclose about us), but 
we only catch a glimpse of things. We look through objects because there are codes 
by which our interpretive attention makes them meaningful, because there is a 
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discourse of objectivity that allows us to use them as facts."32 Brown turns to Vladamir 
Nobokov's writings to clarify how objects are relegated to a dialectical position to be 
looked at or through, which becomes a mode of engagement fueling perceptions about 
the transparency of objects. To this, Brown adds, "we don't apprehend things except 
partially or obliquely (as what's beyond our apprehension). In fact, by looking at things 
we render them as objects."33 Yet, spectators are positioned outside of these two 
modes of looking because we do not look at or through Nozomi (as an object). Instead, 
this shadow offers Nozomi a murkier mode of translucent visibility and begins to align 
more closely with the qualities Brown attributes to things.  
Unlike objects, Brown explains, "a thing … can hardly function as a window." 
This is because, Brown continues:  
"We begin to confront the thingness of objects when they stop working 
for us: when the drill breaks, when the car stalls, when the windows get 
filthy, when their flow within the circuits of production and distribution, 
consumption and exhibition, has been arrested, however momentarily. 
The story of objects asserting themselves as things, then, is the story of a 
changed relation to the human subject and thus the story of how the 
                                            
32 Brown, "Thing Theory," 4, my emphasis. 
33 Ibid. 4 FN11, my emphasis. These arguments align with the connection to Shaviro's 
discussion about allure I address in footnote 31. W.J.T. Mitchell also reiterates some of 
Brown's arguments in his discussion about "objects and things." See Mitchell, What Do 
Pictures Want?: 156-158. 
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thing really names less an object than a particular subject-object 
relation."34 
Brown's argument about the ability for things to thwart the binary relationship between 
subject and object resonates with how Nozomi is framed as an air doll. Further, 
Brown's explicit statement about changes in a relationship between human subjects 
and things seems to resonate with the changing relationships between humans and 
tools in Martin Heidegger's book Being and Time. Although his discussion is not 
directly about things, Heidegger's writings about tools have been used to understand 
the relationship between humans and objects. Heidegger explains how the hammer 
functions as an object so long as it is "ready-to-hand" but, if or when the hammer 
breaks, it becomes present-at-hand because its functionality as a ready-to-hand object 
changes.35  
Heidegger's discussion about tools could seem to suggest that a hammer 
becomes visible as a thing once it becomes present-at-hand because the broken 
hammer would then operate outside of human-oriented expectations about its use-
value as a ready-to-hand object. According to this interpretation, Nozomi's status and 
use-value as an inanimate, ready-to-hand sexual object changes in the moment she 
becomes animate and rises from Hideo's bed; and, by extension, it would seem that 
Nozomi's animacy allows her to become present-at-hand (for spectators) by thwarting 
how she was situated as a passive object meant to be ready at hand for Hideo's sexual 
                                            
34 Brown, "Thing Theory," 4. See also ——, "Tyranny of Things." 
35 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joseph Stambaugh, Revised ed. (Albany: SUNY 
Press, 2010). 
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gratification. At the same time, this interpretation of Heidegger's discussion about the 
presence of the hammer has been criticized as limited in its capacity to clarify our 
understanding about objects and things.36 
Rather than suggesting that a broken hammer reveals its thingness by becoming 
present-at-hand and operating outside of our human-oriented expectations about the 
use-value and purpose of hammers as objects, it is important to emphasize what 
Brown notes as our partial and oblique apprehension of thingness. The oblique or 
opaque properties of things are addressed by Steven Shaviro, who explains how "even 
when we have shaped things into tools, and thereby constrained them to serve our 
own purposes, they still have independent lives of their own." Here, the uncertainty 
about how we define or understand thingness arises because of what thinkers like 
Shaviro and Graham Harman describe as the independent "powers" or "innate 
tendencies" of things. Exploring the relationship between tools and humans positions 
us to "confront the paradoxes of nonhuman actants, of vital matter, and of object 
independence," which otherwise, as Shaviro explains, remain situated within 
anthropocentric perspectives about the subservient purpose of tools as objects meant 
to serve the needs of humans and "to be subordinate to our will." This perspective 
about tools is why "we don't even think about our tools," and, yet, as Shaviro explains, 
it is their constant availability that reveals their "strange autonomy and vitality." While 
tools can have a use-value for humans, this does not negate how humans must learn 
                                            
36 See Harman, Tool-Being. See, also, what Shaviro writes in reference to Harman's discussion 
about tool-being in Shaviro, "The Universe of Things". 
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to work with their tools and, more broadly, to find ways to tend to the needs of tools, 
things, or objects as much as our human needs.37 
I want to specifically situate these arguments about tools and things through 
Nozomi's portrayal in Air Doll while also explicating their broader applicability for our 
understanding about a visual culture of things. In either case, we must first grapple 
with the fundamental opacity of objects and things. As Harman explains: "inanimate 
objects are not just manipulable clods of matter, not philosophical dead weight best 
left to 'positive science.' Instead, they are more like undiscovered planets, stony or 
gaseous worlds which ontology is now obliged to colonize with a full array of probes 
and seismic instruments—most of them not invented."38 Harman's discussion about 
the opacity of objects clarifies why engagements with a visual culture of things has the 
potential to become a maddening and disorientating experience, which arises because 
we must choose to embrace our inability to fully understand the thingness of things. I 
embrace this potential for uncertainty not as a means to elide criticism about my 
interpretations of Air Doll but, instead, to affirm the existence of multiple interpretations 
about things and objects that emerge concurrently at any moment in the film and, more 
importantly, to affirm how things maintain a level of opacity that cannot be fully 
elaborated. 
                                            
37 Harman, Tool-Being; Shaviro, "The Universe of Things" 3-4. 
38 Much of Harman's discussion about Tool-Being emerges from his distinction between ontic 
and ontology. In particular, he argues that the interpretation of ontic as "pertaining to objects" 
rather than "pertaining to presence-at-hand" has resulted in several misunderstandings about 
Heidegger's work and, as a result, often leads readers to "move as far away from specific 
objects as possible." See Harman, Tool-Being: 6, 19. 
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4.2.2 Things and/in the Presence of Humans 
After seeing her translucent shadow, Nozomi moves across the room and we 
see her plastic hand extending toward the open window. The sounds of water droplets 
plopping on plastic digits contribute to a tactile sense of the surface of Nozomi's body 
and how this surface functions as her bodied-boundary (Figure 4.2).39 More specifically, 
these sounds lend a sense of texture to the visible surface of Nozomi's body and 
become an audible reiteration of her plasticity because of the visible transformation 
that is about to transpire. The camera lingers momentarily before panning back to 
Nozomi staring at her hand, and spectators encounter an overt visible transformation: 
the panning movement of the camera maintains continuity within the diegetic world but 
produces visual discontinuity because the visible, plastic body of a sex doll is replaced 
by a flesh-bodied actor (Figure 4.3). 
This transition resonates with my discussions about transitional forms of 
visibility in the previous chapter. On the one hand, this transition between the visible 
forms of Nozomi's body is similar to the visible changes someone can imagine while 
staring at Michael Jackson's body and recollecting images of a differently visible body 
from a prior time. Further, the transition from doll to human may not function like the 
(literal) transformations of Jackson's body over the duration of his life but our ability to 
                                            
39 I use the term "tactile" here to draw attention to the intimate, phenomenological experience 
that these images and sounds inspire. For more in-depth discussions about sensorial and 
phenomenological experiences with cinema, see: Jennifer M. Barker, The Tactile Eye: Touch 
and the Cinematic Experience (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009); Laura U. Marks, 
The Skin of the Film: Intercultural Cinema, Embodiment, and the Senses (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2000); ——, Touch; Vivian Carol Sobchack, The Address of the Eye: A 
Phenomenology of Film Experience (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); ——, 
Carnal Thoughts: Embodiment and Moving Image Culture (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2004). 
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understand differences between the visible forms of Jackson's body is accessed from 
a spectatorial position similar to how we see the transformation of Nozomi's body, 
which becomes recognizable as such only from our position as spectators outside of 
the (profilmic) event that is pictured.  
 
Figure 4.2 Water droplets, plopping on plastic digits 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Transition from plastic to flesh 
On the other hand, we can compare Air Doll's panning transition from plastic 
prop to human actor with the façade of transformation I discuss through the race 
machine in Jackson's "Black or White" music video. The pan of the camera in Air Doll 
hides the presence of a cut between shots similar to how cuts and editing are hidden 
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from visibility in the "Black or White" music video. Air Doll and "Black or White" both 
rely upon visible presence as a means to mask the presence of images beyond the 
surface of visibility, but Air Doll ultimately engages with a different form of transition 
than I addressed through Jackson or the race machine in "Black or White." While 
Jackson's body and the race machine provide a way for us to understand how cutting 
transitions facilitate transformational forms for bodies, Air Doll utilizes a pan to 
construct the appearance of a seamless transition and avoid suggesting that Nozomi's 
body has transformed. Because Air Doll does not make the replacement of the plastic 
prop visible and does not acknowledge the presence of a flesh bodied actor 
diegetically, we are positioned to contemplate the significance of Nozomi's transition 
from an inanimate to animate state and how objects become lively things.  
To imagine the visibility of things and how visual cultures are produced by and 
with things rather than about things requires us to contemplate modes of visibility 
beyond humanist and anthropocentric frameworks. Because Nozomi's thingness 
becomes visible or extends from the confines of an anthropomorphic body, it becomes 
even more prescient to interrogate the degree to which Nozomi's thingness becomes 
visible after the plastic prop is replaced by a human actor. Doona Bae, the actor who 
portrays Nozomi, might interact with other characters in the film more easily than her 
inanimate plastic predecessor but the choice to replace an object with a human in a 
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story about the life of an object requires us to see her as an object through the form of 
the human rather than exploring the visible differences between both.40  
The narrative perpetuates how Nozomi is situated as an object meant to interact 
with and like humans because it does not account for the transition to or continued 
visibility of Bae's human body. Further, the visibility of Bae's body positions spectators 
to continually look at Nozomi within a human form of embodiment whereby spectators 
must look at the human body before being able to look toward Nozomi's figuration 
within a visual culture of things. At the same time, the replacement of a plastic prop by 
Bae's body can simultaneously gesture at the visible properties of things that often 
remain slippery and out of sight. 
Bae's entrance into the role as Nozomi provides a different context to think 
about the presence of the absence of the plastic prop as a different condition to 
engage with the visibility of things. The absence of the plastic doll is what becomes 
visible when Bae enters the diegesis in the role of Nozomi, which gestures at a different 
way to understand how thingness often remains opaque or undeterminable. The 
impact of this absence should not be overlooked and, expanding upon my previous 
comments about tools, we should acknowledge what Graham Harman writes about 
presence-at-hand as a mode of relation between beings. "What exists outside of 
human contexts does not have the mode of being of presence-at-hand," Harman 
explains, and this is because "an entity becomes present-at-hand when we relate to it, 
                                            
40 This transformation/replacement contrasts the visible form for the life of a sex doll in the film 
Lars and the Real Girl (Craig Gillespie, 2007), which was released two years prior to Air Doll and 
portrays a different mode of engagement with objects when human projections drive social 
engagements with an overtly-inanimate and inaudibly-responsive sex doll.  
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not when it is independent of us."41 While it is possible for spectators to see a plastic 
sex doll failing to function as a tool for Hideo's sexual gratification, Nozomi does not 
necessarily fail to function as a tool; and, although Hideo will later speak with Nozomi 
about how she has failed to function in accordance with his expectations, her animacy 
resists how her status as a being can be reduced to her visible presence-at-hand.42  
Steven Shaviro offers additional insights about Harman's writings about tool-
being, which also provides more clarification about the shift from plastic doll to human 
actor. "Tool-being does not apply just to the human use of things" because, Shaviro 
explains, its ontological function "involves a radical withdrawal from simple presence." 
We operate within a correlationist point-of-view when we attempt to reduce or equate 
things to presence-at-hand because things are restricted to meanings based only on 
our (human) perceptions. Shaviro goes on to explain how "a thing is always more than 
its qualities; it always exists and acts independently of, and in excess over, the 
particular ways that we grasp and comprehend it."43 In this context, the transition to a 
human actor removes the possibility for the actual plastic doll to remain situated within 
a subject/object dialectic and, more significantly, this act of replacement becomes an 
avisual affirmation or punctation for the ability of things to elide full understanding.  
                                            
41 Harman, Tool-Being: 126, his emphasis. 
42 For a very provocative discussion about the connection between queerness and animacy 
(and how queer animates), see Mel Y. Chen, Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and 
Queer Affect, Perverse Modernities (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012). 
43 Shaviro, "The Universe of Things" 4. The concept of correlationism is discussed explicitly in 
Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency (London; New 
York: Continuum, 2008). 
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This parallels what Steven Shaviro notes as the "double movement of tool-
being—both retreat and eruption." This double movement occurs when the doll is 
replaced by a human actor because the thingness of the actual doll retreats from 
visibility while, at the same time, this replacement spawns a form of tool-being that 
erupts avisually. Thus, the plastic doll retreats from visibility and becomes, as Shaviro 
notes regarding this dual-movement, "irreducible to any correlation of subject and 
object, or of human perceiver and world perceived," while thingness erupts avisually as 
a means to reiterate how "things are forever escaping our grasp." In short, the 
replacement of the plastic doll reveals how things recede into the background of our 
understanding. In light of this, I want to address how this (double) movement 
complicates our ability to rely upon ocular perceptions as the only means whereby we 
encounter or are affected by (the thingness of) things.44 
4.3 Airy Object Orientations: Sound Refiguring the Air Err of our Visual 
Orientations Toward Objects 
Our ocular perceptions about and engagements with Nozomi's thingness are 
complicated by the uses of sound in the film. Thus, I want to expand upon my 
discussion about the moment when Nozomi becomes animate by addressing how 
sound and aural perceptions reorientate our understanding of Nozomi's visible body. 
This exploration of sound is also an extension and elaboration on my discussion about 
the capacity for sound to enrich our understanding of imaging in Chapter One. Sound 
                                            
44 Shaviro bases his discussion about the doubleness of tool-being on writings by Graham 
Harman. My use of the word "recede" is also used in the contexts of what Harman writes 
about the doubleness of tool-being. See Harman, Tool-Being: 44-45; Shaviro, "The Universe of 
Things" 5, 7. 
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enriches our understanding of visual culture by providing a perceptual form of 
engagement with avisual imaging processes; therefore, it becomes useful to clarify 
how sound contributes to our understanding about a visual culture of things when 
things recede from visibility so easily. 
In this context, Michel Chion's reconfiguration of the relationship between the 
audible and visual elements of cinema lends more insight about Nozomi's body. 
Chion's book, Audio-Vision, provides an instructive framework to address the sounds 
of dripping water across the transition from Nozomi's (diegetic) plastic surface to 
Doona Bae's (non-diegetic) flesh body because sounds are often overlooked and 
reduced to what Chion critiques as an interpretation of sound as added value. For 
Chion, our perceptions about the "expressive and informative value with which a sound 
enriches a given image" becomes a misperception of meaning when we assume that 
sound "'naturally' comes from what is seen, and is already contained in the image 
itself." By extension, Chion explains, the perception of sound as added value renders it 
as redundant and stifles the possibility for auditory meaning to operate beyond 
interpretations of visual meaning.45  
Within the context of Air Doll, interpreting sound as added value becomes 
problematic because the sounds of water droplets hitting the surface of Nozomi's body 
change across the transition from prop to actor. As water droplets hit plastic we hear 
the resounding impact and reverberation of a "plop" but, after the air doll prop is 
replaced by an actor, the droplets hitting the surface of Doona Bae's skin become 
                                            
45 Michel Chion, Audio-Vision: Sound on Screen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 
5. 
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quieter sounds like faint drips from a leaky faucet. How, then, do we make sense of 
these differing sounds? Should we understand this transition to situate the story as a 
slightly more sexual incarnation of Disney's Pinocchio? These differences may seem 
obvious when the sound of water changes while dripping onto different materials like 
plastic and skin. The sounds we hear suggest that the plastic shell containing the air of 
her body has been replaced by skin but this interpretation falls short. Our ability to 
reconcile these auditory differences is obscured from a diegetic standpoint because 
the sound of water droplets hitting Bae's skin should not produce a different sound. 
Nozomi's body does not transform from plastic to flesh as if she were becoming a 
"real" girl and, because she remains an air doll across the transition from prop to actor, 
the different sound from water droplets hitting Bae's hand cannot produce added value 
within the context of the diegetic world.46  
Additional insight about the differences between sounds produced by these 
droplets is found in Chion's commentary about the audible properties of water. Chion 
writes about the prologue in the film Persona (Ingmar Bergman, 1966) to clarify how 
auditory perceptions produce meaning from the sound of dripping water and notes 
how "the sound of the smallest droplet imposes a real and irreversible time on what we 
see." In Persona, sound becomes meaningful for Chion because the resonant force of 
auditory reverberation launches the "small impact" of water droplets along a temporal 
trajectory.47 This is to say, as Chion explains: sound "quite often consists of a marking 
                                            
46 The impossibility of Nozomi's transition from plastic to flesh is made manifest in the scene 
when she punctures her hand, which is a scene I address in more depth later in this chapter. 
47 Chion, Audio-Vision: 19. 
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off of small phenomena oriented in time."48 The temporal trajectory Chion addresses is 
similar to the temporal gap created by the transition from a plastic prop to a human 
body and, across this transition, it constructs a path to explore the emergence of a 
temporal intersection between sound, story, and surfaces of visibility.  
The temporality of sound across the transition from plastic to flesh does offer 
insight to Nozomi's perceptions about the material properties of her body. In one 
sense, we might ask what temporal framework allows the transition from plastic to 
flesh to take place and, more importantly, the ideological implications of taking time for 
this transition. Sound lends dimensional texture to the surface of Nozomi's body 
because it reverberates into auditory perceptions about the plastic exterior and shape 
of her body before she is portrayed through the body of a human actor. This collision 
between sound and visible surface prompts Nozomi's plastic body to become 
surfaced before it is resurfaced in the visible form of a human body, which positions 
spectators to account for the differences between perceptions of visible surfaces 
before having the ability to determine whether visual or auditory perceptions more 
prominently structure the material form of her body. In this way, the collusion between 
sound and visible surface provides a temporal transition whereby spectators can 
engage with the sight and sound of Nozomi's plasticity before the visible traces of her 
plastic body transition to the realm of unseeable images.  
Simultaneous to this, we should remain attentive to the possibility for 
anthropocentrism to emerge as an ideological implication if the replacement of the 
                                            
48 Ibid., 20. 
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plastic prop is meant to create a sense of versimilitude for spectators watching the 
(animated) life of an air doll. Nozomi's character and story can demand anthropocentric 
perspectives about objects to be suspended but, if this film aims to refigure how 
spectators imag(in)e objects or things, this demand also requires spectators to 
contemplate ethical and ontological relationships between humans and things outside 
of a humanist framework. In other words, this film positions spectators to contemplate 
different ethical and ontological formulations for Things—what we might imagine as a 
form of "inclusive ethics"49 extended toward an object-inclusive ontology—which can 
be embraced by spectators as productive thought problems as easily as it can shift 
toward an acknowledgement of the film's fictional framework could lead spectators to 
overlook ontological or ethical questions about their relationship to objects and things. 
So, how do we begin to approach ethical inclusivity whereby it becomes 
possible to acknowledge forms of being beyond the human? One path begins with the 
work of Judith Butler who explains how, "on the level of discourse, certain lives are not 
considered lives at all, they cannot be humanized."50 Within an anthropocentric or 
humanist framework, Nozomi would be relegated to occupy a position Judith Butler 
                                            
49 I am quoting this phrase from David Gunkel's work on the machine, and I more thoroughly 
discuss his work in relation to glitch in the next chapter. I follow many of Gunkel's arguments 
and want to affirm that "inclusive ethics" recognize how differences always exist between 
bodies and address how distinct bodies treat each other to proclaim, as a fundamentally moral 
cause, that negative-difference is problematic. Further, these ethics valorize noise and 
recognize that all communication, no matter the source, is inherently noise(y). The outcome is a 
possibility to set aside (potentially recognizable) differences and foster communication or 
interconnections that allow all bodies to sustain noisy sensorial experiences. See Gunkel, 
Thinking Otherwise: 122. 
50 Butler, Undoing Gender: 25. 
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has called "non-narratable existence."51 But, immediately after hearing the sounds of 
water droplets, Nozomi thwarts the possibility to be haphazardly relegated into a mode 
of non-narratable existence when we hear her speak her first word: beau-ti-ful. One 
way to understand the significance of her one-word proclamation arises because she 
makes a declaration about beauty. Her utterance adds a level of complication to how 
we understand Nozomi's transition from object to thing because her proclamation 
seems to situate her as a subject in relation to another beautiful object.  
In his writings about the work of Immanuel Kant and Alfred North Whitehead, 
Steven Shaviro offers a pathway to locate a sense of being emerging from our affective 
experiences with these types of aesthetic judgements. As Shaviro explains, "in an 
aesthetic judgement, I am not asserting anything about what is, nor am I legislating as 
to what ought to be. Rather, I am being lured, allured, seduced, repulsed, incited, or 
dissuaded. And for Whitehead—if not explicitly for Kant—this is part of the process by 
which I become what I am."52 This type of aesthetic judgement refigures the 
relationship between subject and object because, as Shaviro explains:  
"A subject does not cognize the beauty of an object. Rather, the object 
lures the subject while remaining indifferent to it; and the subject feels the 
object, without knowing it or possessing it or even caring about it. The 
object touches me, but for my part I cannot grasp it or lay hold of it, or 
                                            
51 ——, Giving an Account: 135. 
52 Shaviro, Without Criteria: 3. 
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make it last. I cannot dispel its otherness, its alien splendor. If I could, I 
would no longer find it beautiful; I would, alas, merely find it useful."53 
Here, Shaviro provides a context to understand how aesthetic judgments give way to 
affective relations between subjects and objects. These aesthetic judgments function 
as malleable affective relations, which reveal oblique or opaque connections between 
subjects and objects rather than restructuring subject/object dialectics altogether. 
Some-thing lures Nozomi to (st)utter the word beautiful and the thing luring her has 
implications for our understanding about her perspective as a newly animated being. 
While Nozomi's aesthetic experiences can arise from being affected by her first 
encounter with the "alien splendor" of things, her fractured, first attempt to speak 
opens up toward multiple questions: is she referring to the beauty of water droplets 
hitting her newly animated hand or the experience of feeling the droplet touch the 
surface of her body for the first time? Or, perhaps most troubling, is she speaking 
about the beauty of the flesh that now covers the contours of her body as a signifier for 
a form of embodiment typical to human subjects? We must move further into the film 
to get a better sense about what Nozomi finds beautiful in this scene and, more 
specifically, where we locate answers to both of these questions (i.e. she can 
simultaneously be affected by her aesthetic relation to the sound, sight and feeling of a 
water droplet and her shift from a plastic to skin-based bodily surface) by tracing the 
commonalities between the properties of things she finds beautiful. 
                                            
53 Ibid., 4. 
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To this end, I address two broad topics to clarify how Nozomi utilizes her newly 
animated body and how her engagements with the world operate within a visual 
culture of things. I begin by addressing Nozomi's search for similitude. Nozomi aims to 
define her place within the world by making her similarities visible to other beings 
around her rather than remaining relegated to a position as an object she could not 
define or control. Nozomi is continually fascinated by the beauty of things she finds 
similar to herself and, more specifically, she also continually tries to demonstrate her 
similarity to other characters as her primary mode of relation and engagement. In this 
context, Nozomi's fascination with the visible properties of things reveals a surface 
orientation that will persist in her efforts to demonstrate why she is similar to other 
humans. I continue exploring Nozomi's surface orientation in the precise context of her 
body and, in light of her aesthetic relationships with surfaces, I explain how audible 
traces and resonances of plasticity foreground the problems she will face while relying 
upon surfaces to acquire information about modes of (visibly) being. 
4.4 How Objects Orientate Within a World of Subjects (Mimicry) 
When Nozomi leaves Hideo's home, she begins to see a range of people in the 
streets of the surrounding Tokyo neighborhood and, although the narrative does not 
specify how Nozomi acquired language almost immediately after she becomes 
animated, it seems fitting that many of the people she initially sees and mimics are 
children. As Nozomi walks down one street, looking around with wonder, and turns to 
watch a father give his daughter a purse holding the lunch she forgot to take with her 
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to school.54 The father directs his daughter to continue her trek to school ("Off you go," 
he says), she acknowledges him with the statement "I'm off!," and by the time these 
characters exit the frame we hear Nozomi softly repeat the child's statement. "I'm 
off…" becomes Nozomi's first moment of mimicry and, as indicated by the subtitles 
and the sound of her voice trailing off, an ellipsis leaves her statement open to reflect 
curiosity and uncertainty about the ways of the world around her. 
After following an elderly woman around town and learning to bow as a polite 
display of gratitude or thankfulness, we cut to Nozomi on a bridge where she trails 
behind a line of children holding hands and singing "Don't copy me, Mr. Echo, Mr. 
Copycat." As Nozomi watches, the child at the end of the line reaches out for Nozomi 
to join the line but, after linking hands, the child quickly lets go while shouting "Cold!" 
before rejoining the other children. Beyond the way the dialogue overtly comments 
upon Nozomi's mimicry, this child draws attention to Nozomi's difference because of 
the physical properties of her plastic surface. Comments about her cold body are 
reiterated multiple times after this moment, including when Hideo tells her that a cold 
body is her only flaw; but, unlike the opening scene when Hideo talks to Nozomi, 
spectators now see Nozomi's awareness of and reactions to other people around her. 
In response to comments like these, Nozomi begins to contemplate and, at times, 
conceal traits on the surface of her body she has learned to locate as signs of 
difference from the humans around her.  
                                            
54 It is also interesting to note what seems like a visible reversal between the objects Nozomi 
and this girl (Moe) carry. While the young girl carries her lunch in a bag shaped like a purse 
while Nozomi uses what looks like an apple lunch box as her purse. 
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Because objects are easily relegated to the fantasies humans project upon them 
without their consent, we might understand Nozomi's mimicry as an attempt to 
demonstrate why her subjectivity is not different from other human subjects. This 
engagement with difference can be described as part of an isomorphic dynamic. 
Following thinkers like Jacques Derrida or Luce Irigaray, an isomorphic dynamic 
operates within a system of logic that defines and structures difference—alterity, that 
is—by the properties that fail to align with default expectations about what constitutes 
a human being.55 While a tool might fail to function, revealing part of its thingness, this 
does not imply that a failing tool successfully signifies its Being like humans.56 At the 
same time, Nozomi understands and tries to enact a form of embodiment most 
prominently based on the information she acquires about her similarities and 
differences from the shape of the human form.  
Nozomi's aim to demonstrate her subjectivity based on the traits she perceives 
as indicators of human subjectivity appears to specifically demonstrate a search for 
similitude that I would call visible homomorphism, whereby we sense and see her 
desire to maintain a visible mode of subjectivity that passes as human within a system 
that maps the human onto the ontological system or structure for subjectivity and 
being. We witness Nozomi's fascination with surface similarities throughout the 
                                            
55 For more discussion about isomorphism, see Patricia MacCormack, "Queer Posthumanism: 
Cyborgs, Animals, Monsters, Perverts," in The Ashgate Research Companion to Queer Theory, 
ed. Michael O'Rourke and Noreen Giffney (Ashgate, 2009), especially 114-115. 
56 Patricia MacCormack addresses the distinctions between signification, the failure to signify, 
and significance in more depth in her essay on queer posthumanism. See ibid., 114; Jacques 
Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1997 [1976]; repr., Corrected); Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985). 
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duration of the film; this occurs, for example, during multiple encounters between 
Nozomi and a woman she sees wearing nylons with seams along the backside of her 
legs. Nozomi initially sees sameness on the surface of the woman's body by mistaking 
the seam that sutures the nylons together for the same seams on her body. Nozomi 
sees sameness on this woman's surface—a surface-sign for another being like 
herself—and, later in the film, Nozomi inspects the seam-lines on her body before 
determining how she (and this woman) can look more like humans if they were to "wipe 
off" the lines. 
 
Figure 4.4 Nozomi conceals her plastic seams 
Nozomi chooses to render a layer of cover to hide her lines, to use cosmetic 
concealer as a means to hide her seams she sees as a sign of difference (Figure 4.4). 
She has seemingly decided what constitutes the visible form of humans and 
determines that the ability to cover her non-human lines will stifle the possibility for her 
body to signify its plasticity. Nozomi's surface-orientation structures how she 
understands human forms of embodiment based on the homomorphic properties of 
human bodies she can see. Her surface-orientation allows her to imagine the 
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possibility to construct a visible form of embodiment similar to humans by covering her 
signs of visible difference. Futher, Nozomi is not necessarily mistaken to assume that 
she can register as human (or subject) by constructing this cover because, as Judith 
Butler explains, to declare our subjectivity or being by giving an account of oneself is 
also "a kind of showing of oneself." This is, she continues, 
"a showing for the purpose of testing whether the account seems right, 
whether it is understandable by the other, who 'receives' the account 
through one set of norms or another. I have a relation to myself, but I 
have it in the context of an address to an other. So the relation is 
disclosed, but it is also, to borrow from Foucault's work on confession, 
published, brought into the realm of appearance, constituted as a social 
manifestation."57 
Nozomi aims to "show" herself in a form more similar to the humans around her, and 
she "publishes" this intention by concealing the visibility of her seams. This act of 
visible mimicry also reveals the problematic position for an object becoming animated 
as a thing because the standards by which non-humans like Nozomi can offer an 
account of the "self" are not extended to objects or things and must, in at least some 
sense, be co-opted and enacted to become decipherable by other (human) beings.  
To give an account of herself, Nozomi considers how the surface-orientations of 
humans around her structure a normative requirement whereby any sign of her life as a 
plastic object has the potential to undermine her thingness and, perhaps more 
                                            
57 Butler, Giving an Account: 131, her emphasis. 
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significant for Nozomi, her efforts to be seen as (wholly) human, as a subject or being 
who need not be reduced to their parts. Yet, Nozomi's act of concealment maintains 
the possibility for failure, which will persist until she and we (as spectators) can 
determine the degree to which the use of concealer can eradicate her seams from the 
surface of her body and/or can undermine the presence or visibility of palpable, 
puncturable plastic held together by these seams.58 
4.5 Ec-Static Air; Or, The Unseeable Sounds of Becoming Beside Oneself 
Nozomi's inability to alter her plastic exterior seems to fuel her human-oriented 
engagements with the visible surface of her body, such as her attempt to render a 
cover for the seams on her body with cosmetic concealer. Her surface orientations are 
driven, at least in part, by a desire to become a subject like other humans rather than 
remaining relegated to her previous status as an inanimate object. Nozomi's orientation 
toward surfaces is another illustration of Bill Brown's distinction between Modernity's 
child, who looks beyond the surface of things, and Postmodernity's child, who, like 
Nozomi, remains satiated by surfaces.59  
This fixation on visible surfaces complicates Nozomi's ability to understand the 
matter contained by the surface of her plastic exterior. We gain a sense of this dynamic 
while watching Nozomi's reaction to the translucent shadow cast by her body, which 
                                            
58 This has some connection with my discussion about clothing in Chapter Two, although her 
concealer does not seem to provide the same possibility to queer her surface as clothing does 
to the human body. 
59 Brown, Sense of Things: 7-8. 
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she takes as a visible indication of her difference from humans with opaque shadows.60 
This reaction seems to reflect her fear about emptiness—perhaps fearing the heart she 
"was not supposed to have" was only ever a metaphorical heart—but, as I address 
below, her non-human interior facilitates our ability to better understand Nozomi's 
thingness and a visual culture of things. In one of the most fascinating moments in the 
film, Nozomi will experience her body failing to conform to what she desired to remain 
within its homomorphic, human shape. 
Nozomi and her co-worker Junichi (who she also finds attractive) put up 
Christmas decorations at the video rental shop where they work. Nozomi's aim to 
maintain a human shaped body is obliterated when she slips on a ladder and 
punctures her hand on the corner of a metal shelf. At this moment, a loud sound of an 
airstream overwhelms the soundtrack. The sound of air escaping Nozomi's body 
becomes a testament to her misplaced investment in the capabilities of cosmetic 
concealer to prevent the plastic held between her seams from being punctured. 
Further, the emphatic sound of air prompts Nozomi's thingness to return to the surface 
of our attention before it is possible to see her body beginning to deflate.  
The sound of air leaving Nozomi's body resonates with my earlier discussion 
about our audible perceptions of breathing or water dripping on her surface. Although 
the sound of air in this scene differs from the sound of breathing at the start of the film, 
similar visual framing is utilized to depict the connection between the sound that is 
heard and the source of the sound. To add a level of complexity to how I have 
                                            
60 This seems to be a different version of a haunting shadow than the one I addressed in 
Chapter Three, but it does remain similar to the shadows that draw attention to Jackson's non-
human, hyphenated forms of embodiment. 
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addressed the connection between sound and source in this scene, I want to explain 
why the sound of air functions both synchronously and acousmatically.  
Synchronous sound manifests in various ways but most commonly it denotes 
the moments when visual and audio events occur in unison. This occurs, for example, 
when the sound (event) of air escaping Nozomi's body joins the visual (event) sight of 
her hand being pierced by metal. Further, the audiovisual synchronicity in this scene 
becomes most apparent when the visible elements of the film are emphasized by the 
physical properties Chion notes as indicative of synchronous sound: when seeing the 
closeup shot of Nozomi puncturing her hand, the sound of air becomes "louder than 
the rest of the soundtrack" through the physicality of "visual fortissimo."61 The air 
leaving Nozomi's body is visibly indexed after she falls out of the frame and, similar to 
the jostling of the wind chime above Nozomi's head when she becomes animated at 
the start of the film, the camera lingers on the slightly frantic sway of Christmas 
ornaments hanging from the ceiling above her head. The synchronesis in this and the 
opening scene becomes important because sound is not visible, but the meaning of 
synchronicity gains significance because the sounds of air are acousmatic.  
For Chion, the acousmatic dimension of film is that which allows sound to 
"reveal itself in all of its dimensions" rather than being relegated to support visual 
perceptions within an occularcentric mode of film engagement.62 The ambiguity 
surrounding the source of air becomes a sign of its acousmatic properties that function 
closely to what Chion calls the acousmetre, the acousmatic character who has an 
                                            
61 Chion, Audio-Vision: 58-59. 
62 Ibid., 32. 
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oscillating relationship with the screen because it remains "neither inside nor outside 
the image." Chion goes on to clarify that the acousmetre is "not inside, because the 
image of the voice's source—the body, the mouth—is not included. Nor is it outside, 
since it is not clearly positioned offscreen in an imaginary 'wing,' like a master of 
ceremonies or a witness, and it is implicated in the action, constantly about to be part 
of it."63 Yet, various extra-diegetic factors make it difficult to map Chion's definition for 
the acousmetre onto the sound of air in Air Doll.  
The indexical source of air and breath often remain unseen from a spectatorial 
position, which complicates how the sounds of air or breath might be reduced to 
added value. By extension, the means of attributing the sound of air to Nozomi's body 
is not always coherent within the diegetic world. The sound of breathing at the start of 
the film, for example, is followed by the movement and sounds of a wind chime. 
Nozomi begins to breathe at the moment of becoming animate but this sound of air 
functions in contrast to the scene where she is punctured. While the sound of 
Nozomi's breath (leaving her body) prefaces how we see her becoming animated, the 
sound of air (also leaving her body) after being punctured shows us the potential for 
her to return to a state of inanimacy. Thus, we should question how Nozomi breathes 
in the opening scene if the act of breathing does not cause her body to at least partially 
deflate. 
                                            
63 Ibid., 125. 
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 Air remains avisually omnipresent throughout the film—air is everywhere64—and 
although sounds of air could emerge at any moment, it is unlikely for the sounds of air 
or breathing to function as acousmatic characters when they are rarely drawn to the 
attention of spectators without being attributed to Nozomi. These examples gesture at 
why the sound of air might be more accurately labeled as a paradoxical acousmetre, 
which utilizes some of the abilities of the acousmetre but, in the case of Air Doll, 
emerges in conjunction with changes to Nozomi's status as an in/animate being. The 
acousmatic properties of air reveal how affective qualities of sound "shimmer in the 
image"65 and, as a result, the sound of air reverberates through the frame before 
Nozomi becomes visible. This becomes apparent by the time her body enters the 
frame, after the reverberations of this sound have already affected her: we see her on 
the floor, legs and arms partially deflated (Figure 4.5 & 4.6). 
 
Figure 4.5 Nozomi's plasticity returns 
 
                                            
64 More discussion about the omnipresence of air will follow. 
65 Chion, Audio-Vision: 60. 
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Figure 4.6 Nozomi's plasticity returns 
The inability for Nozomi's plastic to retain the air that was previously sealed 
within her body is followed by a series of potential failures: the heart she found but 
"was not supposed to have" did not become visible and reveals the likelihood that it 
was a metaphor she utilized to signify a form for her subjectivity; her ability to function 
as an independent being becomes crippled because—while deflated—she cannot refill 
herself with the air her plastic body requires to remain full; and, by extension, it is 
possible to see her return to a partially inanimate state and Junichi's rush to assist her 
as an indication that she could not live an independent life as a thing. 
Nozomi demonstrates her desire to be seen as something other than an air doll 
when she avoids eye contact with Junichi, and this is emphasized further after she 
asks him to not look at her when he comes running to her aid. Junichi ignores her 
request and finds tape to patch the hole in her hand before he proceeds to blow her 
back up. We see Nozomi's plastic legs and arms begin to inflate when Junichi breathes 
air into her plug and, after a quick cut from her face to her legs, the plastic legs of a 
prop are replaced again by Bae's body. At this point in the film, it is not surprising for 
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Bae's body to return in its entirety when Nozomi's body becomes refilled with air but, 
as the camera pans from Nozomi's legs to her face, this shift also shows Nozomi's 
expressions change from a look of pain to pleasure. We can determine that Nozomi 
experiences pleasure while her body swells to its capacity with air but, from an extra-
diegetic standpoint, this form of pleasure reiterates how Nozomi experiences 
satisfaction while visible through Bae's body rather than when her plastic appendages 
are visible (Figure 4.7). Nozomi's pleasure also connects with fluctuations to the 
visibility of her thingness and, in this context, the sounds of air ripple into images—
images becoming ec-static. 
 
Figure 4.7 Bae's body returns 
4.6 The Being of Air, and Beings Becoming Ec-Static 
The sound of air operates in conjunction with fluctuations to Nozomi's status as 
an in/animate being and, when she is punctured and the air deflates from her body, 
these sounds draw attention to her thingness by situating the essence of her being-
animate literally around and beside her. Not only does this manifestation of leaking air 
position spectators to contemplate the malleable nature of Nozomi's body, but the 
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sound of air also re-surfaces Nozomi's body as if the air escaping her body was meant 
to function as a reminder for her to recognize her thingness. It remains unclear if 
Nozomi would return to her previous state as an inanimate object, were she left 
deflated on the floor of the video store. But, as an air doll, she understands the 
potential of becoming relegated to a position with particular use-value ("I am an air 
doll. A substitute for handling sexual desire.") and exchange-value ("I am an air doll. A 
late model, cheap one….") while the plastic form of her body remains in this state of 
visibility.  
At the moment Nozomi is forced to contemplate the change to the visible 
properties of her body, the transparent properties of air give way to an avisual form for 
becoming ec-static. "To be ec-static means, literally, to be outside oneself," Judith 
Butler explains, "and this can have several meanings": 
to be transported beyond oneself by a passion, but also to be beside 
oneself with rage or grief. […] I am speaking to those of us who are living 
in certain ways beside ourselves [….] In a sense, the predicament is to 
understand what kind of community is composed of those who are 
beside themselves.66 
Nozomi likely experiences this moment of being positioned beside herself (with grief or 
pain or terror) because of inappropriate orientations toward the properties of her body. 
Nozomi's experiences as an inanimate object remain present within the plasticity of her 
body. Shifting her attention to the surface of her plastic exterior did and could not 
                                            
66 Butler, Undoing Gender: 20. 
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protect her from being punctured and, as a result, Nozomi's aim to "wipe away" her 
seams merely displaced the visible form that would only ever bulge through the 
concealed cover if air was let loose from beneath.  
This moment of ec-stasis similarly affects how spectators understand the 
visibility of Nozomi's body and thingness. Nozomi's plasticity returns to the surface 
after being punctured and, at first glance, might illustrate the "countermovement" or 
"reversal" of tool-being, which occurs when a tools or thing fails to function as we have 
expected whereby "the excess of its being is suddenly revealed to us."67 At the same 
time, the air that is loosed from her body carries with it the excess of her being that 
cannot be rendered into a visible form. This is, in different terms, how Nozomi's 
moment of ec-stasis couples with the avisual properties of air to illuminate how visual 
cultures of things operate within thresholds beyond visible surfaces. While this moment 
of puncture ruptures the boundaries of Nozomi's body and the thingness she had 
hoped to contain, I want to briefly expand my discussion beyond Nozomi's audio-
visual presence as an in/animate thing to address the audio-visual properties of air in 
broader terms. What has lingered in my analysis to this point is an explicit discussion 
about the omnipresence of air, which remains present as an avisual threshold where 
the excess of thingness becomes ec-static as it is loosed from visible confinement. 
Kevin Ferguson addresses the presence and purpose of air in cinema by first 
clarifying how, more generally, it operates as "an intimate medium, breathing life into 
                                            
67 Here, Steven Shaviro summaries Graham Harman's discussion. See Harman, Tool-Being: 47; 
Shaviro, "The Universe of Things" 5. 
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our notions of embodiment and our relationships with others."68 Ferguson notes 
various types of scholarship about the intimate mediations of air and his discussion 
about Luce Irigaray's writings on air clarify how the avisual properties of air facilitate an 
excess of being that will not become visible in Air Doll.69 In The Forgetting of Air in 
Martin Heidegger, Irigaray reconsiders Heidegger's philosophical writings about Being 
to "take away from him [the] solid ground"—that is, his emphasis on the significance of 
Earth—and address the importance of air for our understanding about the presence 
and visibility of beings.70 Irigaray emphasizes how Heidegger's work becomes 
                                            
68 Kevin L. Ferguson, "Panting in the Dark: The Ambivalence of Air in Cinema," Camera 
Obscura 26, no. 2 (2011): 34. 
69 In addition to his discussion about Irigaray's work in The Forgetting of Air in Martin 
Heidegger, Ferguson addresses scholarship by Gilles Deleuze, on breath in the movement-
image, and Linda Williams, on the erotogenic function of breathing in pornographic film. See 
Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1986); Linda Williams, Hard Core: Power, Pleasure, and the 
'Frenzy of the Visible' (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). In addition to the 
scholarship he notes, I would include these works on air and breath in cinema: Connor, "Next-
to-Nothing"; ——, "Sound and the Pathos of Air" (paper presented at Two Thousand + SEVEN, 
Queen's University Belfast, April 21 2007 of Conference); ——, The Matter of Air: Science and 
Art of the Ethereal (London: Reaktion Books, 2010); ——, "On the Air," BBC Radio 3 Radio 
Broadcast, Retrieved June 13, 2004, http://www.stevenconnor.com/onair/; Davina Quinlivan, 
The Place of Breath in Cinema (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012). I would also 
include these works as examples of broader philosophical engagements with the topics of air 
and breath: Joanne Faulkner, "Amnesia at the Beginning of Time: Irigaray's Reading of 
Heidegger in the Forgetting of Air," Contempts 2(2001); Judith Butler, Frames of War. When Is 
Life Grievable? (Brooklyn: Verso, 2009); Luce Irigaray, "The Age of Breath," in Luce Irigaray: 
Key Writings (London: Continuum, 2004); Lenart Škof, "Ethics of Breath: Towards New Ethical 
Spaces of Intersubjectivity," Poligrafi 17(2012). 
70 See Luce Irigaray, The Forgetting of Air in Martin Heidegger, 1st ed., Constructs Series 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999), 2-5, 62.  
Irigaray also becomes significant in the context of my previous discussions about Heidegger, 
tools, and things. It also seems relevant to note that Graham Harman criticizes her work. I do 
not necessarily find his critique of her methodology problematic, but I find Irigaray's exploration 
of being beyond the visible to be relevant in the context of my analysis of Air Doll as opposed 
to what Harman defines as a primary aim of his work: "a military campaign driving back toward 
the surface of reality." See Harman, Tool-Being: 6, his emphasis. 
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indicative of and participates in the perpetual neglect and exclusion of air in Western 
culture.71  
While the avisual properties of air facilitate its exclusion from many philosophical 
accounts of Being, the avisual properties cannot be excluded from engagements with 
visual culture. In The Place of Breath in Cinema, Davina Quinlivan explains how breath 
facilitates this type of avisual connection between beings and, more broadly, enables 
us to "contemplate beyond the visible." For Quinlivan, Irigaray reveals how the "nature 
of breathing" facilitates the commingling of bodies through the threshold of air that 
"weaves a proximity, between."72 Breath reveals how it facilitates this type of 
connection in Air Doll, and is extended toward the capacity to animate objects by 
weaving air through a threshold between states of being. Recall the sounds of 
breathing—especially audible and emphatic when it is exhalation—across various 
scenes of Tokyo at the start of the film, heard before we return to Hideo's apartment to 
see Nozomi becoming animated. After cutting back to Hideo's apartment, we continue 
to hear acousmatic sounds of breathing that have yet to be indexically connected with 
Nozomi as the being who breathes. Across these opening sequences, then, breath 
operates within an avisual threshold, where air becomes a force of connection by 
refiguring how Nozomi's state as an inanimate object can connect with an animate 
state of being. 
Ferguson also relies upon Irigaray to foreground the "difficult visibility" of air and 
his acknowledgement about the marginalization of air in discussions about erotic life 
                                            
71 This is something Davina Quinlivan also notes in her book, Place of Breath in Cinema: 28. 
72 Irigaray, The Forgetting of Air: 62-64. 
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points to why we should remain attentive to Nozomi's experience while being refilled 
with Junichi's breath.73 Nozomi experiences pleasure that is distinct within this scene 
because it is the act of being filled by Junichi's breath that seems to differ from another 
scene where we watch her refill her body with a pump. This experience of being filled 
by another becomes an encounter that is both intimate and pleasurable for Nozomi, 
where the experience of becoming beside herself when air escapes from her body 
functions as a moment of ec-stasis before giving way to the feeling of ecstasy. Nozomi 
experiences ecstasy from the fullness of an air-filled body she perceives as a form of 
wholeness. More specific still, she knows this as a condition of her properties as a 
thing because her fullness becomes necessary to continue her participation in the 
"social life" of humans rather than the solitary life of things.  
This form of ec-stasis emerging from Junichi's breath will be repeated when he 
requests to deflate her body during an explict sexual encounter, but Nozomi's attempt 
to reciprocate fails when she tries to facilitate a similar experience of ecstasy for 
Junichi. Nozomi questions Junichi's intentions when he asks to let her air out for the 
second time, but after he tells her not to worry ("I'll breathe into you like before," he 
says) she agrees to reenact her previous moment of ec-static deflation before 
becoming inflated by Junichi again. Junichi's desire to deflate Nozomi positions both 
characters to experience an intimate exchange between bodies through the act of 
breathing. Becoming filled by Junichi's breath remains pleasurable for Nozomi and 
                                            
73 Ferguson elaborates on the sexual properties of air, which become apparent through the 
synonyms used to describe sexual behaviors (think "blow job") as much as the audibility of 
autonomic respiratory functions during intercourse. See Ferguson, "Panting in the Dark," 39-
40. 
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afterward, while Junichi sleeps on the bed, we see Nozomi search for his plug to fill 
him with her breath.  
After being unable to locate his plug, she finds a pair of scissors to put a hole 
into his body like the hole he patched on her hand; but, unlike her experience of 
becoming punctured, she realizes and nervously states: "I couldn't exhale my breath 
into Junichi." While Nozomi's ability to literally breathe remains questionable due to 
composition of her body, her aim to fill Junichi with air suggests how she equates the 
ability to experience pleasure with the ability to occupy the same type of body. In this 
case, she would seem to be aiming for Junichi to have a similar experience with the 
pleasure of becoming ec-static. At the same time, it remains uncertain what Junichi 
experiences as the final breaths respire from his body, when his final breaths become 
audible rather than visible manifestations for the temporal fluctuation as he becomes 
ec-static and commingles between life and death.74 
It remains unclear how Nozomi could mistake the properties of Junichi's human 
body as similar to the plasticity of her body. Her mistake is also not clarified by the 
narrative. Nozomi's actions become puzzling because of her continual orientation 
toward visible homomorphism. Nozomi initially saw difference along the surface of her 
                                            
74 This situates Junichi's experience with ec-stasis in a temporal framework that might operate 
within what Heidegger calls "ecstatic temporality" in his discussions about Dasein. Also there 
are ways in which Junichi's request situate him within a position similar to other ec-static 
experiences of sexual encounters, such as an odd reveral of what David Marriott describes as 
sex among bug chasers (people seeing to "catch" HIV/AIDS through sexual encounters). 
Marriott explains this as a performance "standing in for, as supplement or prosthesis, a 
teleology of sex as ecstatic transmission: variously, the destructive, rageful, ecstasy of a 
potentially fatal fuck." See Heidegger, Being and Time: 402; David Marriott, "No Second 
Chances," in Queer Times, Queer Becomings, ed. E. L. McCallum and Mikko Tuhkanen 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2011), 55.  
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body because the seams of her plastic were not visibly present on most of the human 
bodies she encountered, including Junichi. At the same time, Nozomi reveals her 
awareness about the properties of Junichi's body when she puts his body in a trash 
bag before placing it atop a pile of burnable trash. Nozomi "trashes" Junichi's body 
because she has learned from her creator about the fate of humans after death ("After 
all, once we die, we're 'burnable garbage'.") This contrasts what her creator explains 
as the fate of air dolls who, like herself, are not burnable garbage, which relegates 
them to landfills where they must reside with other nonburnable things (Figure 4.8). 
 
Figure 4.8 Burnable garbage 
Nozomi's decision to trash Junichi's body is followed by her decision to resign 
from a social life with humans by laying herself atop a pile of garbage (Figure 4.9). 
Nozomi's choice to be sent to a landfill not only becomes significant within the context 
of the narrative, but also reveals how she has come to understand and engage with the 
visual culture of things. In her final moments, the camera frames her position on top of 
a pile of trash, where she is surrounded by the things she collected during her 
experience with animacy. Nozomi did not arbitrarily collect these things—mostly glass 
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bottles in different colors—but chose them because of the properties she saw in 
herself. These things affected her because of their beauty, such as the sounds the 
bottles produced when air streamed across their necks. The visible translucence of the 
bottles also captivated Nozomi, affecting her with their beauty like the water droplets 
she felt after becoming animate, although she seemed resistant to the possibility of 
becoming affected by this property of her body.  
 
Figure 4.9 Non-burnable garbage 
By the end of Air Doll, Nozomi does lend clarity to how things engage with the 
visibility of things and beings around them, which might also include an education 
about the pitfalls of understanding visual culture based upon surfaces. At the same 
time, the final moments of the film transport spectators by way of Nozomi's respiration, 
carried with her air into her memories of a social life amongst humans. Nozomi's 
memories emerge similar to what Heather Love describes as "backward feeling," 
whereby Nozomi need not seek redemption for her experiences of history because her 
engagements with humans merely reiterate the ruined state things face within their 
social lives once humans become involved. 
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Yet, the things Nozomi finds beautiful should always surprise or escape us 
because the things with the capacity to lure and seduce other things live different 
social lives than humans. More importantly, Air Doll utilizes the audio and avisual 
properties of air to reveal a threshold where the possibility of becoming ec-static need 
not only function within a metaphorical form. Instead, Air Doll situates spectators to 
contemplate how easily things and non-humans become ec-static beyond the 
threshold of our ocular perceptions, whereby the ec-static behaviors of things and 
non-humans have the potential to produce noisy forms of embodiment humans cannot 
always reduce to their surfaces. 
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5.  SEEING THINGS: HOW THE DIGITAL IMAG(IN)ES ITSELF 
We've been living in a tiny prison of our own 
devising, one in which all that concerns us are 
the fleshy beings that are our kindred, or the 
stuffs with which we stuff ourselves. Culture, 
cuisine, experience, expression, politics, 
polemic: all existence is drawn through the 
sieve of humanity, the rich world of things 
discarded like chaff so thoroughly, so 
immediately, so efficiently that we don't even 
notice. —Ian Bogost1 
I have aimed to draw attention to how images and things can be seen queerly, 
how torquing our vision to see obliquely allows us to undermine normative 
engagements with visual culture whereby we encounter the movements and mediation 
of images beyond human interlocutors. In the preface, I discussed my desire to push 
metaphors about visual culture in new directions, specifically in the context of 
Mitchell's metaphorical statements about the desires and drives of images and their 
pictured companions. While I have focused on the position and potential plight of 
images rather than pictures, this chapter builds upon my discussion about a visual 
culture of things to interrogate Mitchell's use of this metaphor in rather explicit ways. 
If you recall, Mitchell argues that want what we fail to give pictures is "an idea of 
visuality adequate to their ontology."2 My position remains orientated along a different 
path than Mitchell not only because I have not sought to pursue the development of 
visuality as a standard by which our engagements with visual culture are measured, 
but also because the means by which we are able to understand the ontology of 
                                            
1 Bogost, Alien Phenomenology: 3. 
2 Mitchell, "What Do Pictures "Really" Want?," 82. 
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images or pictures should not emerge from an effort to master or control how they 
exist. Rather, and more explicitly, images and pictures deserve the possibility to be 
seen existing independent our pursuit of knowledge about or mastery over them. 
Dis/orientating toward the queerness of images provides a starting point. This 
dis/orientation requires us to experience the failure to fully grasp or understand visual 
culture, to reconcile with moments when we have mistaken or misunderstood images, 
and, ultimately, to acknowledge the possibility for an array of images we have yet to or 
might never, even obliquely, encounter. 
There are ways in which I began to explore these dynamics in the previous 
chapter while addressing how bodies and beings become imaged and pictured within 
a visual culture of things. This chapter expands this exploration toward non-human 
visual cultures within explicitly digital terrain to interrogate two questions: how do 
pictures and images of digital beings become visible and, by extension, can we 
encounter the digital producing images of itself? In an effort to answer these questions, 
I continue to stray from the aim to capture non-human things within pictures and 
images but also hope that their lives become visible, even obliquely at the periphery of 
my vision. I continue to foreground the importance of an ethical investment in the 
autonomy of non-human things beyond humanist and anthropocentric frameworks, 
which would otherwise deny any possibility for non-humans to show us how they 
picture and image themselves. At the same time, and similar to my previous inquiries 
about things, the potential to encounter moments of opacity remains because, like 
things, non-humans can also reveal their independent lives by restricting our access to 
understand the visual cultures they produce. Although, I have located at least one thing 
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to direct us toward new understanding about the queerness of images within non-
human visual culture.  
We can consider an array of media formats that lend to different aesthetics but, 
within and across all types of digital media, one common digital aesthetic form 
remains: the bastard child of digital aesthetics, more commonly known as the glitch. I 
address this bastard-status as a title that is not meant to detrimentally deride the 
significance of glitch images but, instead, as a title foregrounding how glitches 
proliferate within digital forms. Glitches are not the product of digitized copulation but 
they might be imagined as the unfortunate, illegitimate children of digital media. 
Glitches spawn from digital media as beautiful "mistakes;" they are the children who 
visibly disfigure the digital media from which they proliferate.  
As I contemplated how to better understand manifestations of glitch, I found 
Sean Cubitt's questions about the effect of cinema to be an enlightening frame of 
reference. Like Cubitt's curiosity about cinema, I want to know what glitch does and 
within whose reality glitch operates. More specifically, I want to understand what glitch 
does beyond its ability to affect and captivate me as a spectator; I want to understand 
why glitches become attached to concepts like error, malfunction, or irregularity, and, 
ultimately, to understand how glitches function beyond anthropocentric concerns. 
Similar to Cubitt, I would argue that if glitch does nothing, we would only need to ask 
what it fails to be. Glitch does something.3  
                                            
3 Cubitt frames his questions about cinema, stating: "I want to know what cinema does. If it 
causes no effect, however ornery or belated, cinema doesn't do anything, and there is left only 
the question of what it is or, more exactly, what it fails to be. Cinema does something, and 
what it does matters. Cinema's first effect is to exist. Yet like everything else it has trouble 
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In what follows, I elaborate upon the processes that culminate in the emergence 
of glitch, which situate queer aesthetics of failure as complications or challenges to our 
understanding of digitality and, more broadly, thingness. I address how glitch is 
defined within the context of glitch art to understand the types of conditions that result 
in the emergence of glitches and what their emergence reveals about our 
conceptualizations of (but also particular forms of engagement with) digital media. 
Digital glitch art, for example, often emerges in the form of pixelated pictures and, as I 
addressed in Chapter Two, a pixelated visual aesthetic has the potential to debase 
visual clarity while providing us with an array of alternative, virtual images. I address 
the relationship between glitches and the things that facilitate their emergence—the 
computer serves in this capacity later.  
To fully understand glitches, and the relationships between glitches and 
computers, we can begin by asking a series of questions: Why or how do glitches 
emerge and is their emergence a manifestation of malfunctioning hardware and 
software processes? If glitches are affected by hardware and software processes, do 
they operate beyond the context of digital malfunction? And, by extension, what might 
glitches reveal about the ontology of digital things, like computers and the pictures 
computers produce? 
                                                                                                                                             
existing, and the effects it produces—images and sounds, dimensions, durations, sensations, 
understandings, and thoughts—all share a quizzical and oblique relation to reality. Certainly 
you could measure physiological dilations and palpitations to ascertain the reality of a film's 
emotional clout. But there is something fictive, something uncanny, or something that, however 
marginally, fails the reality test in even the most engrossing films, and perhaps in them most of 
all. Studying special effects has led me to an odd little problem that has turned out, over the 
years we have spent together, to be fascinating and revealing companion: the problem of the 
object of cinema." See Cubitt, The Cinema Effect: 1. 
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I will reorientate our approach to the visibility of digitality and digital media by 
exploring the affective relationship between computers and glitches, and how 
computers are affected by or affect the visible form of glitches. Ultimately, I will argue 
that the beauty of glitched pictures does not emerge from our ability to dispense with 
glitches as memory "mistakes" but, rather, emerges from how we have mistaken these 
digital "failures." It is within this context that I turn toward my final arguments about 
glitch images, to the aesthetics of glitch images that reveal their thingness and the 
materiality of digital and computational memory. This constructs a pathway to explore 
how computers and their imaging processes operate beyond human-oriented 
experiences and expectations. Within this context, the visible manifestations of glitches 
within digital visual culture complicate aesthetic distinctions about types of media—
such as concepts like fidelity and indexicality—and reveal "failure" as a valuable 
aesthetic relation. I conclude by addressing how queer aesthetics of failure operates 
within digital visual culture; and, more specifically, I address why queer formulations for 
relations within digital aesthetics open up in multiple directions to rethink and refigure 
digital ontology. 
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5.1 Defining a "Glitch" 
glitch | gliCH | informal 
noun: a sudden, usually temporary malfunction 
or irregularity of equipment; an unexpected 
setback in a plan. verb [no obj.]: suffer a 
sudden malfunction or irregularity.4 
 
The visual glitch is an artifact resulting from an 
error. It is neither the cause, nor the error itself, 
it is simply the product of an error and more 
specifically its visual manifestation. It is a 
significant slip that marks a departure from our 
expected result. —Iman Moradi5 
Glitches take various forms within works of art, including hardware modifications 
by artists like Reed Ghazala (1970s– ) or Rob Lycett (2001– ) and more recent 
software-based manipulations by artists like Ant Scott (1980s– ) or Iman Moradi (2004– 
).6 In the glitch art collection Glitch: Designing Imperfection, Iman Moradi was joined by 
many artists who began to provide insights about how to, at least provisionally, 
conceptualize glitch within the framework of visual art and aesthetics.7 Moradi 
introduced Glitch by defining glitches as "unashamedly amorphous" because their 
processes of production result in particular visual styles. Glitches not only emerge as 
                                            
4 This definition is from the digital version of the New Oxford American Dictionary (American 
English). 
5 Iman Moradi et al., eds., Glitch: Designing Imperfection (London: Thames & Hudson Ltd, 
2009), 8. 
6 Hugh S. Manon and Daniel Temkin, "Notes on Glitch," Word Picture Journal 6, no. Winter 
(2011): ¶ 9-10. See also Moradi et al., Designing Imperfection.. 
7 One of the first symposia on glitch art took place in Oslo, Norway in 2002, and resulted in 
discussions and debates about how glitch is (too) broadly defined. Two years later, Iman 
Moradi echoed some of the sentiments emerging from this symposium and argued for, 
minimally, scholars and artists to extend their conceptualization of glitch to its use in visual art. 
See Iman Moradi's B.A. Thesis: Iman Moradi, "Gtlch Aesthetics" (The University of 
Huddersfield, 2004). 
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the result of an "error," from "mistranslations that are facilitated by a loss or breakdown 
in our communication signals" but also, he explains, become "fleeting artifacts" 
because of these malfunctioning processes. At the same time, Moradi explains, these 
are processes of malfunction and failure that lend to the similarly fragmented and 
linearly complex visual form of glitch art.8 
This general conceptualization is reiterated by other artists like Johnny Rogers, 
who explains how glitches emerge "outside of the user's intentions,"9 and Kim 
Cascone who, in the context of auditory glitch art, explains that the "effect of a glitch is 
to subvert the listener's expectations."10 Each of these artists draw attention to the 
processes that enable the production and manifestation of glitches within their work 
and, at the same time, they draw attention to how these processes typically result in 
unexpected or unanticipated visual imagery. The result of unanticipated visual imagery 
that emerges in a final work of glitch art becomes its primary distinction from other 
digital works of art with visual elements that are similar to or present in digital glitch art.  
"The Wave of the Future," for example, was curated in the early 1990s by The 
Computer Museum in Boston and The High Tech Times magazine (Figure 5.1).11 This 
artwork is an homage to the woodblock print by Katsushika Hokusai, "The Great Wave 
off Kanagawa" (circa 1830-1833), and transitions from the likeness of Hokusai's wave 
                                            
8 Moradi et al., Designing Imperfection, 8. 
9 Johnny Rogers, "Interviews," in Glitch: Designing Imperfection, ed. Iman Moradi, et al. 
(London: Thames & Hudson Ltd, 2009), 15. 
10 Kim Cascone, "Interviews," in Glitch: Designing Imperfection, ed. Iman Moradi, et al. 
(London: Thames & Hudson Ltd, 2009), 17. 
11 Marcus, "Wave of the Future Is Now the Past," Retrieved June 01, 2012, 
http://vorpal.us/2007/07/wave-of-the-future-is-now-the-past/.  
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to pixels before transitioning into a vibrant, vectored wireframe version of the waves 
(Figure 5.2). While "The Wave of the Future" retains elements like pixels, which are 
often present in digital glitch images, this artwork specifically distinguishes between 
digital aesthetics and the analog aesthetic of woodblock art. 
 
Figure 5.1 "Wave of the Future" 
 
 
Figure 5.2 "The Great Wave off Kanagawa" (Hokusai, circa 1830-1833) 
Within the plastic arts, we could also inspect the use of pointillism in the work of 
Georges Seurat, the French Post-Impressionist painter, whose use of pointillism could 
also be categorized within glitch aesthetics.12 In his paintings, Seurat uses contrary 
                                            
12 Iman Moradi has already drawn this comparison. See "Gtlch Aesthetics," 24. 
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colors of paint to produce an optical effect of blended paint color. This façade is 
produced because of how our eyes optically register contrary colors in close proximity: 
red, yellow, and blue paint pigments combine and produce an optical appearance of 
black on a canvas, much like red, blue, and green colors of light combine to produce 
the optical appearance of white on an LCD screen. Seurat's use of pointillism prompts 
an aesthetic experience similar to glitch art by drawing attention to processes of 
perception but, in this instance, the glitch arises within the spectator—as a condition of 
how color is optically registered—rather than arising from the painting. Seurat's 
paintings are visually similar to the work of some glitch artists but his purposeful 
placement of color does not result in the same type of unpredictability expected from 
the production of glitch art.  
Many discussions about glitch art, especially as they pertain to aesthetics, often 
center around the differences between "pure glitch" and "glitch alike" art. Moradi 
coined the term "glitch-alike" as an alternative category for artworks that are visually 
similar to glitch art. The glitch-alike is produced to look like an authentic glitch, but we 
might ask where the "realness"—to use Moradi's terminology again—of a "pure glitch" 
is rooted and how a glitch directs us toward a different understanding of media. If real 
glitches emerge from media manipulation with unpredictable results, glitch-alikes are 
created through media manipulations that provide a result an artist can anticipate. In 
this instance, both "The Wave of the Future" and paintings by Seurat qualify as glitch-
alike because they are results of media manipulation with anticipatable outcomes but, 
at the same time, these works remain excluded from the term "glitch-alike" because 
they are not produced to look like glitch art. 
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Reed Ghazala's art does illustrate how Moradi attempts to distinguish between pure 
glitch and glitch-alike works of art. Ghazala provides an analogical form for glitch art 
through the manipulation of camera hardware in his earlier works, which reconfigure 
the form of snapshot photography by manipulating the film's exposure to alter how 
light is photochemically registered on celluloid. Ghazala explains how the photographs 
in his "35 MM" collection were created in-camera by manipulating the hardware of his 
manual Nikkomat FTN over durations of time and provided unexpected photographic 
results.13 Ghazala expands the form of analogical manipulations in his "Landfall" series 
through photochemical manipulation he calls dye migration art. Ghazala foregoes the 
use of any camera hardware in the "Landfall" series by manipulating the photochemical 
properties of instant film with his fingers while exposing the film to flashes of light.14 
Ghazala's photographs provide a form of glitch but this form remains distinct 
from digital glitch art. While these photographs illustrate how the manipulation of 
hardware provide unexpected visual results, they also reveal how difficult it can be to 
determine the processes of manipulation culminating in a work of glitch art. At the 
same time, these photographs stage a question about broader definitions of glitch: If 
all (overt) media manipulation does not result in a work of glitch art, do all glitches 
emerge from the (overt) manipulation of media? 
This question gestures at why Moradi's use of the term "glitch-alike" remains an 
imprecise category to distinguish between types of glitches. This imprecision arises 
                                            
13 Reed Ghazala, "35mm," Retrieved January 15, 2013, http://www.anti-
theory.com/visualart/photographics/35mm/.  
14 ——, "Dye Migration," Retrieved January 15, 2013, http://www.anti-
theory.com/visualart/photographics/dyemigration. 
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because the differences between authentic and mimetic forms of glitches are difficult 
to detect, but also, as I address in greater depth below, because these categories do 
not account for glitches emerging beyond artistic modes of production. In addition to 
hardware manipulation used in glitch art created by artists like Ghazala, Hugh Manon 
and Daniel Temkin address how glitch can take its visible form through the 
manipulation of software or data. These authors also recognize glitch art as a type of 
"process art" because the image becomes less important for our understanding of the 
artwork than the processes enabling the visual form of the final product. The problem 
with only defining glitch by the processes that result in the final aesthetic form arises 
when the final artifact can appear the same as any work produced to look like glitch 
art. Glitches rarely proclaim how they were produced, let alone distinguish between 
analog or digital artistic manipulations of hardware or software.15  
I dispense with Moradi's categories toward a more nuanced definition of glitch 
aesthetics, aiming to specifically provide a definition for glitch art aesthetics that are 
not centered on the desire for authenticity. Not only is it difficult to determine whether a 
glitch is pure or authentic, but these terms are based solely on a final work of glitch art 
and the assumption that artistic forms of manipulation and production are the only 
standards by which glitch is defined. I refigure this assumption later by addressing how 
glitch aesthetics apply to glitches that are not even artistically produced and, more 
specifically, that this aesthetic form refigures several assumptions about digital things 
and digital visual culture.  
                                            
15 Manon and Temkin, "Notes on Glitch," 3; Hugh S. Manon, "Rude Aesthetics in the Digital 
Mainstream" (paper presented at World Picture Conference, Oklahoma State University, 
October 24-25 2008 of Conference), ¶ 9-10. 
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Gltich aesthetics have been defined as "lo-fi," which, in conjunction with the 
broader category of "rude aesthetics," has the potential to undermine an emphasis on 
realism as a necessary categorized distinction to define glitch. Low fidelity art takes its 
visual form by accounting for and then deliberately degrading "state-of-the-art" 
technologies that function as standards for realism within an historical moment. Hugh 
Manon explains how fidelity becomes an important factor to consider within the 
broader category he calls rude aesthetics because, "unlike 'mimesis' or 'verisimilitude,' 
fidelity implies a mediation through the Other as locus of judgment—a hypothetical, 
never-verifiable third part, which permits us to assess the effectiveness of our own 
lies." Manon explains how concepts like low and high fidelity challenge aesthetic 
notions like realism because the tropes of fidelity (like accuracy, faithfulness, 
exactness, and/or loyalty) can only be understood as an enactment of "truth" in 
accordance with biased expectations and standards (of truth, of verisimilitude, of 
quality, etc.).16  
Manon and Temkin draw attention to the persistence of a particular "latent 
desire for the noise of old" emerging within lo-fi art as a response to cultural penchants 
for fidelity and perfection. To this, Manon and Temkin add: 
We could say that lo-fi art is a perverse recursion into archaic, noisy and 
unsupported modes of production, whereas glitch embodies the 
inappropriate return of laborious and messy analog diddling in the 
                                            
16 ——, "Rude Aesthetics in the Digital Mainstream," 2-3. 
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context of the digital era's slick, pixel polishing, drag-and-drop 
perfectionism.17 
Categorizing glitch art based on Moradi's division between pure glitch and glitch-alike, 
as opposed to lo-fi art, reveals an underlying impulse or desire for authenticity to 
remain a determinable factor within works of glitch art. Manon and Temkin draw 
attention to fidelity as a malleable standard of aesthetic distinction, whereby 
truthfulness or "realness" become arbitrary standards of an artistic form. In contrast, as 
Manon suggests, lo-fi aesthetics illustrate how we need not necessarily challenge 
concepts like truth or realism, but, instead, enable the possibility for these concepts to 
"slip."18  
If digital reproductions of lo-fi, analog noise appear the same as their analog 
ancestry, it begs the question as to why the desire for the "noise of old" persists as 
Manon and Temkin suggest. On the one hand, Manon and Temkin note, digital glitch 
images function like other media that undermine distinctions between analog and 
digital formats because digital imagery often "greets the beholder in the guise of 
analog."19 On the other hand, there are fundamental differences between digital and 
analog media that become evident through the ways in which the different 
technologies fail. Digital glitches begin to undermine any possibility for disguise as 
analog artifacts because, as Manon and Temkin explain: 
                                            
17 Manon and Temkin, "Notes on Glitch," ¶ 46. This argument also resonates with what R.L. 
Rutsky writes about a cultural concern about and investment in "stylishness." See R. L. Rutsky, 
High Technē: Art and Technology from the Machine Aesthetic to the Posthuman (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 4. 
18 Manon, "Rude Aesthetics in the Digital Mainstream." 
19 Manon and Temkin, "Notes on Glitch," ¶ 1. 
 216 
Unlike its predecessors, when digital technology fails, it tends to fail 
catastrophically. It takes nothing—a fleck of dust, minor condensation—
to flummox the digital. Comparatively, to effectuate an analog media 
catastrophe one needs to bring out the heavy artillery: fire, scissors, 
sandpaper, a large magnet. When excessively damaged, digital moving 
images do not bleed; they disintegrate to the point of unreadability. They 
do not skip, but instead freeze. When they distort, they do not gain 
pleasing overtones; instead, having reached a certain amplitude, they 
"clip," and when they do one literally sees or hears the orthogonal relation 
between the analog source and its digital reproduction.20 
Pixelation, for example, is common in digital glitch art as a visible sign for 
(catastrophically) failing digital technology, but every instance of visible pixelation does 
not qualify as a work of glitch art. Rather, I find it more valuable to foreground the 
failures of digital technology, which result in an array of irregular, unusual, and 
abnormal aesthetic forms and reiterate the possibility to engage with the queerness of 
(digital) failure.  
I address the aesthetic form of glitches that emerge unintentionally by turning 
my discussion to aesthetic forms of failure. Although unintentional glitches are visually 
similar to those created as glitch art, unintentional glitches become primary illustrations 
for what we might define as visual artifacts operating within an aesthetics of failure, 
which is a broader category to encompass lo-fi aesthetics—the aesthetic form of 
                                            
20 Ibid., ¶ 28. 
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things that fail to uphold standardized, contemporary technological styles—and rude 
aesthetics—the aesthetic form of things failing to "be" or function as they are 
expected. 
5.2 Aesthetics of Failure 
5.2.1 Whose Malfunction? 
I continue to be touched by the beauty of failure every time I see a glitch, and I 
have been affected by glitches and digital failures in a number of ways: I have seen my 
screen flicker, pixelate, and lose sound during a storm because I subscribe to satellite 
TV (Figure 5.3); while using my Playstation 3, I occasionally experience a lag during 
gameplay, which will then begin to stutter, pause, and finally crash my system; and, my 
attempt to recover digital photographs that were accidentally deleted from a hard-drive 
resulted in recovered files that could not be rendered into the pictures they once were.  
 
Figure 5.3 Satellite TV glitch 
My reflection on Sean Cubbit's questions about the effect of cinema at the start 
of this chapter becomes useful within this context. I argue that glitch does something 
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but, like cinema, affirm that "it has trouble existing, and the effects it produces—
images and sounds, dimensions, durations, sensations, understandings, and 
thoughts—all share a quizzical and oblique relation to reality."21 We can better 
understand how glitches position themselves within an oblique relation to reality—or, 
more specifically, within an oblique relation to human reality—by addressing specific 
manifestations of unanticipated glitches, which complicate human experiences with 
digital technologies and lend to misperceptions about their irrelevance within our 
understanding about digital visual culture. 
 When I write anything "important" on an electronic device, I have a rather 
standard habit: type, save; type, save; pause to think, save; finish writing, save and 
then save a duplicate, external copy; and, finally, backup both copies. This is a tedious 
process but remains a process with particular purpose after a few bad incidents in 
college when floppy discs were still the common form for external data storage. It was 
the floppy disc's magnetic data storage that proved to be fickle, falling victim to 
demagnetization on more than one occasion and seemingly unable to retain data with 
so much as a sneeze while being held in my hand. I learned to never trust a floppy disc 
as my only storage device because of the potential for its memory to malfunction but, 
even as I shifted to different standards for data storage, my experiences with data loss 
frequently remain the same. My experience with the "failures" and "malfunctions" of 
data storage have ranged from bitrot and DVD-R expiration to scratches resulting in 
                                            
21 Cubitt, The Cinema Effect: 1. 
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un-readable CDs and hard-drives, and with each experience it becomes easier to 
direct my frustrations at what appeared to be a delinquent digital device.  
I continually asked "What is the matter with computer memory?" because these 
glitches or malfunctions disrupted my expectations for smooth operation. This problem 
arose because of how and what I could not see. After all, as Vivian Sobchack explains, 
What is the computer but a fathomless "memory box"—one that collects 
reserves, and allows for the conscious retrieval and visible recollection of 
memories, all "cached" in an enormous unseen network of past images, 
sounds, and texts.22 
My inability to see the processes that enable the movement and storage of digital 
memory resulted in how I correlated the purpose of digital devices with the 
expectations I had of them, how I understood myself in relation to their difference from 
me as objects. Sobchack clarifies why our experience with electronic objects can differ 
from other media, such as cinema: whereas cinema provides an "objective and visible 
performance ... of lived body experience," the materiality and forms of engagement 
with electronic media become "so diffused" as to appear that they "belong to no-
body."23 Because "electronic presence has neither a point of view nor a visual situation, 
such as we experience, respectively, with the photograph and cinema," Sobchack 
explains, electronic space transforms "aesthetic characteristics and sensibility," which 
                                            
22 Sobchack, "Nostalgia for a Digital Object: Regrets on the Quickening of Quicktime".  
23 There are ways that this distinction also seems to become slipperier when cinema is 
increasingly experienced with and through electronic objects. See ——, Carnal Thoughts: 152. 
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also marks a "significant transformation of ethical investments."24 I recognize 
Sobchack's ethical investment in embodied experience and, rather than dismissing the 
significance and importance of her analysis about human-oriented phenomenological 
experiences, I explore the transformation of ethical investments through a parallel but 
different form of aesthetic experience. 
Machines are plagued by their formulation within humanist frameworks and 
remain riddled by the binary logics that structure difference within human discourse; 
and, the imagined differences between humans and machines are merely one example 
of the binary logics that preoccupy Western thought, which, as David Gunkel notes, are 
"not without ethical complications and consequences."25 In his book Thinking 
Otherwise, Gunkel elaborates upon the capacity for machines to function as moral 
agents—as "legitimate subject[s] of or for moral reasoning"—and possibly as agents 
deserving moral consideration.26 To fully understand the significance and impact of 
glitches within visual culture requires that we understand how they emerge from or 
relate to electronic and digital objects. Further, this understanding reveals how glitches 
emerge from unseen, rhythmic processes operating outside of our human perceptions. 
Thus, instead of folding floppy discs in half from the frustration of their failure or 
instead of cracking a corrupt CD in two, I want to reframe my question about problems 
with computer memory into a different query: what is the matter of computer memory? 
I want to ascertain the matter of computer memory much like others address human 
                                            
24 Ibid., 158-159. 
25 Gunkel, Thinking Otherwise: 120. 
26 Ibid., 121-123. 
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memory. To this end, I explore how the matter of computer memory reveals glitches as 
"visual situation[s]" that are as captivating as photography and cinema and, more 
importantly, are manifestations of a digital "point of view." Sobchack rightfully 
articulates how within "this historical moment in our particular society and culture, we 
can see all around us that the lived body is in crisis," and I redirect my engagement 
with this crisis by shifting the center of ethical concern away from human bodies and 
experiences toward digital glitches, which confront this crisis emerging for those who 
cannot be pictured or imaged because they are not considered beings at all.27 
5.2.2 Memory (and) Malfunction 
I begin my inquiry about computer memory by addressing what constitutes the 
phenomenological experience of human memory, which is meant to clarify the 
experiences of humans that often remain central foci within explorations about the 
crisis of lived bodies. From here, I shift to address the matter and affective movements 
of computer memory that would be excluded from equal consideration within 
anthropocentric frameworks. 
 Henri Bergson provides initial insight for us to understand how memory 
functions as a vehicle to transport sensorial experiences within and between bodies. 
"Whenever we are trying to recover a recollection," Bergson explains, "we become 
conscious of an act sui generis by which we detach ourselves from the present in order 
                                            
27 Sobchack, Carnal Thoughts: 161. 
 222 
to replace ourselves, first in the past in general, then in a certain region of the past."28 
This detachment and movement into the past is why Bergson suggests that "questions 
relating to subject and object, to their distinction and their union, should be put in 
terms of time rather than space."29 Brian Massumi elaborates on Bergson's writings 
about memory and specifies how the movement of memories become active, affective 
processes for bodies engaging with and making sense of sensorial perceptions. 
Massumi reiterates how memories become a fickle or volatile form of storage for our 
sense perceptions because they are easily stimulated or can become virtually altered 
before being stored in cognition or being recalled in the form of a recollection.30  
Steven Connor clarifies these as movements that are meant to allow humans to 
"organize, articulate, [and] make sense of our sensory perception" as "forms of self-
relation" for "uncollected works-in-progress."31 These forms of relation evoke the fate 
of memory as susceptible to alterations, oscillations, and interchanges across 
durations of time. The potential for particular futures may never enter into present 
experiences; our subjective experiences within the present immediately enter into the 
past, into memories of a once-was present; and, within our present experiences, our 
recollections of the past can never necessarily or accurately reflect our experiences 
and perceptions from another time. In other words, as each infinitesimal moment within 
                                            
28 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and William Scott Palmer, 
5th ed. (New York: Cosimo, Inc., 2007), 171, his emphasis. 
29 Ibid., 77. 
30 Massumi, Parables: 193-200. 
31 See Steven Connor, "Intersensoriality" (paper presented at Thames Valley University 
conference "The Senses," Thames Valley University, February 6 2004 of Conference)., 
especially the sections “Well-Being” and “Complexion” 
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the present folds into the past or each present becomes a past that continues its 
propulsion toward potential futures, memory becomes infinitely scalable whereby any 
subject position is already giving way to subject positions that are perpetually 
becoming something else.  
Laura Marks provides a point of departure into computational memory by 
detailing the active, affective processes that organize and mediate memory "along 
traceable pathways." She explains how memory has little to do with "will or self-
consciousness," but, instead, operates as an interconnected form of communication. 
Marks's analysis is an affair with infinitesimal proportion and she provides a different 
scale of perception to clarify how subatomic electron particles that are easily 
dismissed as an intangible form of sensorial/memory experiences.32 Through her 
analysis on digital photography, Marks explores how electrons move and exchange 
information through digital and computational memory. Electrons become lively 
vehicles that "communicate" by being "interconnected" within paths that are 
indiscernible to human experiences with or perceptions of memory. "Electrons 
remember," Marks explains, by enfolding information that is transported, 
communicated, and connected with a material form of storage. The movement of this 
                                            
32 It is possible to correlate this experience to human forms for the transportation of memory. 
As John E. Dowling explains, the brain is composed of neuron cells that process and carry 
information. Neuron cells, like all matter, are composed of atoms. "Atoms ordinarily have equal 
numbers of electrons and protons and are, therefore, electrically neutral. But atoms can gain or 
lose electrons and become charged, either negatively or positively. They can have extra 
electrons or fewer electrons." When electrons charge atoms (becoming ions), they are able to 
move in-between cells. Although, I will not elaborate on arguments about human uses of 
electrons as vehicles for sense perceptions to be stored within our brains as cognitive storage 
systems. See John E. Dowling, Creating Mind: How the Brain Works. (New York: W.W. Norton 
& Company, 1998), 20-22. 
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information becomes a "raw" form of sensation within memory that is felt—as a pulse 
or surge, perhaps—as each electron carries information to be enfolded within a storage 
before it can be unfolded and recollected at another time.33 A primary difference 
between human and computer memory, as Laura Marks explains, arises from the 
computer's reliance on binary code as "present" or "absent" electron charges that 
"cannot tolerate intermediate states between 0 and 1" as they enfold information to be 
transported, communicated, and stored.34  
What is written here was not typed in binary code. Rather, it is has been typed 
within several word-processing graphical interfaces, on several different machines, 
which all allow me to produce text that I can read in English on any computer running 
the same software. As I type this paper on a keyboard, electrical currents pulse a 
series of electrons into RAM. Beneath a graphical interface, computers mediate 
individual bits as pulsations of electrical current. These pulsations (absence, pulse, 
pulse, etc.) enfold the absence and presence of electrons as bits that accumulate in 
memory before unfolding in the form of text or image in a GUI (graphical user-
interface). 
                                            
33 Marks, Touch: 161-162. 
34 See ibid., 172. Ted Friedman offers additional insights about how analog, digital, and binary 
have functioned terminologically and historically within the context of computations. See Ted 
Friedman, Electric Dreams: Computers in American Culture (New York: New York University 
Press, 2005), especially Chapter 2, “Ideologies of Information Processing, From Analog to 
Digital.”. Also note that 0 and 1 are the human representations for absent and present 
electrons as "bits" of information. The base unit of information that is processed by most 
computers is a byte (which contains eight bits). Contemporary computers still process bits and 
bytes, but humans typically refer to computer information that is stored in greater quantities: 
one megabyte, for example, contains 8 million bits; or as Wikipedia analogizes, one megabyte 
contains the amount of information in a short novel. Available at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Megabyte 
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When I "recode" or translate a sentence into binary, numerical digits humans 
understand, my computer encounters an array of electronic pulsations for each 
keystroke that is not made visible within the GUI. For example, typing the statement 
"binary-code processes in the background" results in this string of binary code: 
01100010 01101001 01101110 01100001 01110010 01111001 00101101 
01100011 01101111 01100100 01100101 00100000 01110000 01110010 
01101111 01100011 01100101 01110011 01110011 01100101 01110011 
00100000 01101001 01101110 00100000 01110100 01101000 01100101 
00100000 01100010 01100001 01100011 01101011 01100111 01110010 
01101111 01110101 01101110 01100100 
Because human users need not utilize binary code within a GUI, it becomes easy to 
dismiss unseen computational processes and communication.35 Human users 
communicate or "compute" comfortably without the need to engage with the range of 
information enfolded into computer memory before it unfolds into the visible GUI, 
which, by extension, can prompt the fantasy and façade of computers as objects, as 
utilities that communicate for but not with or beyond our human-oriented needs or 
expectations. 
Consider, as an example, how Microsoft Word uses computer memory to 
temporarily save word-processing input from users. If or when Word "crashes," there is 
typically the possibility for a user to return to a document in a recovered, that is, 
temporarily saved, state. Opening Word after a glitch of any sort to find a "recovered" 
document commonly results in recovered data that differs from what a user hopes to 
                                            
35 Users easily interface with computers without binary digits (bits), as Bill Daley explains, 
because it requires 8 bits of binary code to produce one letter or number and has become so 
"tedious to translate" that computer-programmers have developed other systems for character 
codes. See Bill Daley, Computers Are Your Future, Brief ed. (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, 2005). 
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find as a duplication of information that was typed prior to the software crash; and this 
can result, at least for myself on a few occasions, in a rough slam of a hand on the 
desk or monitor and an array of profanities spouted toward the computer screen. What 
are the errors, malfunctions, or irregularities that facilitate the emergence or 
proliferation of an unanticipated glitches such as this? Or, in more precise terms, what 
are the conditions that lend to the emergence and proliferation of glitches?  
Several factors can affect how Microsoft Word operates, crashes, and then 
recovers an unsaved document. Word could crash or quit for an array of reasons: a 
battery power-source could run out; the electrical current carrying information could 
fluctuate, interrupting the pulses of data in transit, and alter the strings of code being 
stored; a virus could contaminate the code that Word requires to engage with other 
computer processes; etc. Because computers communicate by collecting and 
returning information from permanent storage, an interruption to the flows of machine 
memory can result in the recovered state of a Word document that lacks information. 
While the computer and its software may not return to a saved state that the user 
desires, the computer and its software cannot and should not be expected to 
reproduce human memories of a previous state. 
Although the unexpected software crash may appear to indicate the failure of 
computational processing, there are more factors to consider. First, hardware and 
software activate memory transmissions (such as keystrokes that transmit new strings 
of information), which transform into information that is communicated, exchanged, 
accessed, and stored. The logic of these operations are easily interrupted by outside 
stimuli or noise, including interruptions like viral contamination. Second, while 
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computer crashes or memory malfunctions can emerge from a series of unseeable 
background processes, they can also have just as much to do with how human users 
interact with, neglect, interrupt, or disregard their information-processing machines 
and the requirements that are necessary for computers to mediate information. Several 
things can be asked: Did the user supply the machine with enough information storage 
(the hard-drive); or, a more likely factor, enough dynamic random access memory 
(DRAM)? DRAM is the temporary residence of cellular computer memories, where 
electrons mediate information before it is permanently stored on a hard-drive. Does the 
user run too much software simultaneously? Software process overloads can impede 
the central processing unit (CPU), which maintains the order of electron movement in 
the computer.36 Or, does the user choose to run, but simultaneously disregard, 
programs that do not adequately exchange information—exchanges that intermix 
processes that disrupt the transitions between memory types altogether.37  
Finally, I explore next, a third option arises when we contemplate the possibility 
that computational processes did not fail in the first place.  
                                            
36 The CPU must refresh the electrical activities within the DRAM memory cells (volatile spaces 
that must refresh to actively mediate information), move the dynamic RAM to static RAM or 
cache (spaces that hold information in static positions, only volatile if the machine loses of 
power), or direct all of these random-access memories into permanent storage on the hard-
drive. 
37 In fact, when I initially started writing on this topic, I perpetually crashed Microsoft Word by 
choosing to use a newer version of the software that was incompatible with my copy of 
Endnote citation software. I frequently forgot that placing a citation in a footnote would cause 
Word to crash and found myself, just as frequently, screaming at my laptop for losing the prose 
I had so carefully written just moments before. 
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5.2.3 Digital Noise and Non-Human Being(s) 
As Manon and Temkin explain, "whether its cause is intentional or accidental, a 
glitch flamboyantly undoes the communications platforms that we, as subjects of 
digital culture, both rely on and take for granted."38 These authors are correct to make 
this assertion, which is similar to earlier arguments I note from Laura Marks and Iman 
Moradi, but I want to more fully interrogate this form of undoing when it emerges from 
unintentional or unexpected glitches. The unexpected, visible manifestation of glitches 
function as signs for digital objects failing to conform to human expectations and, at 
the same time, glitches have the potential to reveal the failure of human 
communication as a standard by which non-human beings make their presence known 
or visible.  
Much of the scholarship on communication engages with and frequently 
perpetuates a theory of interaction developed by Claude E. Shannon and Warren 
Weaver, who provide a model for the information mediated between two humans.39 
When this communication theory is applied to the machine (often in the context of 
literature about computer-mediated-communication), David Gunkel explains, the 
communication model continues to reply on an "unquestioned assumption" about 
computers and information technologies: "the other with whom [we] interact ... is 
                                            
38 Manon and Temkin, "Notes on Glitch," ¶ 1. 
39 See Claud E. Shannon and Warren Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of Communication 
(Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1963). 
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always [assumed to be] another human being."40 This assumption structures a human-
oriented sender/receiver model of communication, which reduces machines to 
"channels" or "mediums" where humans exchange information. More significantly, 
within the context of my argument here, this assumption does not provide the 
possibility to understand how computers communicate and experience communication 
independently from humans. 
In Shannon and Weaver's model of communication, "noise" becomes the 
contaminating force within human communication because it interrupts the flow of 
messages that are sent and received between humans. Gunkel argues for the 
reconfiguration of noise within this model by foregrounding how the computer "actively 
participates in communicative exchanges as a kind of additional agent and/or 
(inter)active co-conspirator," to which he adds:  
"[T]he computer participates in and contaminates the process [of human 
communication]. It acts on the messages, significantly alters them, and 
delivers information that was not necessarily selected, composed, or 
even controlled by human participants. These various occurrences 
                                            
40 See Gunkel, Thinking Otherwise: 9. Gunkel also notes several examples of scholarship that 
rely on the Shannon and Weaver communication model. For scholarship that frames the 
machine as a mediator in human communication, see: George Gerbner, "Toward a General 
Model of Communication," Audio Visual Communication Review 4, no. 3 (1956); Roman 
Jakobson, "Closing Statement: Linguistics and Poetics," in Style and Language, ed. Thomas A. 
Sebeok (Cabridge, MA: MIT Press, 1960); B.H. Wesley and M.S. MacLean, "A Conceptual 
Model for Communication Research," Journalism Quarterly 34(1957). For Scholarship that 
frames the machine as an extension of human communication, see: Martin Heidegger, The 
Question Concerning Technology, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper Tochbooks, 1977); 
Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff 
Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1984); 
Marshall McLuhan, The Extensions of Man (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995). 
 230 
cannot be reduced to a form of unintentional noise introduced by the 
exigencies of the channel, which is precisely how [traditional 
communication] models have dispensed with and accounted for this kind 
of machinic contribution."41 
Gunkel's argument is illustrated by recalling telephonic static carried over phone lines 
by dial-up modems. Picking up my telephone, the noise I heard—to my ears, sounding 
like an array of blips and bleeps—was not heard as "noise" by my computer. Rather, 
the sounds I could hear were an intentional, algorithmic system used to disseminate 
information from my computer to be received by my internet service provider while 
connected to the Web. In other words, this modem-based communication channel is 
only filled with noise by human-oriented standards of communication because it is 
unlikely that most humans would be able to translate these sounds into bits and bytes 
before, again, translating this data into the graphical pages appearing on a Web 
browser. 
Gunkel's arguments about computer communication lend interesting 
perspective to how I have addressed manifestations of unexpected glitches thus far. 
Unexpected glitches reveal how our human perceptions of error or contamination 
function as one form of failure that is, at the same time, more than failure. Glitches 
become visibly queer manifestations of calculated and intentional digital behavior by 
"properly" decoding "improper" data or processes.42 The failure glitches reveal is a 
failure to be properly presentable to humans within a human point-of-view. Computer 
                                            
41 Gunkel, Thinking Otherwise: 138. 
42 Manon and Temkin, "Notes on Glitch," ¶ 1. 
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glitches become visible manifestations of the digital failing at impropriety; or, in short, 
glitches become queer signs for the failures of computers to not not follow their 
standard operating procedures, which is a failure to succeed at being like humans. Or, 
in other words, what appears as technological failure to humans is not necessarily 
anything but the failure to communicate with humans as humans communicate and, 
more broadly, the failure to be human. 
Judith Halberstam provides a path to expand on our understanding of these 
forms of failure as modes of "unbeing" and "unbecoming," which she addresses in her 
analysis on queer aesthetics of failure.43 I agree with Halberstam's assertion that these 
modes of failure produce different relations to knowledge, but I remain most concerned 
with how failure functions as a form of "unbecoming" that reveals different 
understandings of ontology. Rather than aiming to conceptualize modes of "unbeing," I 
want to address how glitches function as forms of digital failure that refigure 
problematic notions of Being constructed within Western and Continental Philosophy. 
When failure is understood as a form of unbecoming it also functions as a becoming (in 
the Deleuzian sense), which structures a different ontological mode to understand the 
malleability of Being.  
Unintentional and unexpected glitches become the visible manifestation of 
digital, non-human Beings, which fail to be presentable for humans by failing to 
conform to anthropocentric and humanist forms of existence. In short, glitches function 
as performative utterances for the failure of digital objects to constitute their being 
                                            
43 Halberstam, Queer Art of Failure: 3, 23. 
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through the human. Glitches force us to consider why we should think otherwise about 
ontology by lending visible form to digital objects as unbecoming objects—that is, ill-
suited as objects while also turning into or becoming beings beyond subject-object 
dialectics—and this becomes the context where glitches visibly indicate their desire to 
perpetuate queer relationships to failure. 
5.3 The Digital Imag(in)es Itself 
Beyond my discussion about the distinctions between objects and things in the 
previous chapter, there is a different category to address within the context of digital 
non-humans. Electronic objects, shortened to e-jects, stage a crisis in the object; and 
function, Michael Angelo Tata explains, as signs for "innervation," "undirected 
emotion." The e-ject is, in the broadest sense, a term that culminates several 
meanings: its slightly Derridian vowel-switch draws attention to the similarities to and 
differences from objects and its hyphenation becomes a play-on-words to reject its 
status as an object—pure "throw" (-ject) without direction "toward" (ob-). The e-ject's 
resistance to objectness is meant to throw our understanding and becomes, in the 
context of glitches, a patina of abjection by making the hidden processes of electron 
transfer visible—a revelation of the processes that we require to understand the 
rhythmic and ecstatic engagements of electronic objects. The visibility of hidden 
information also emphasizes our lack of understanding and control, which reiterates 
the e-ject's ephemerality, as Tata argues, which takes Lacan's objet petit a to an 
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extreme by breaking apart the possibility of wholeness or universalism toward a 
"smashed mess" of particularities.44 
As e-jects, glitches reveal a mode of Being that is simply non-human. As e-jects, 
they carry our conceptualizations of objects and stretch them through abjection to 
produce a form of thingness that results in what Tata describes as: 
a type of notoriety—and motoriety, given the nimbleness and fluidity of 
this radical popularity—that can only be described as the fame of fame 
(fame revealed not as quality, but as quantity): that is, the type of 
telepoetic popularity produced when being and its attributes become less 
the potential for knowledge or contemplation or comprehension or 
mastery and more the sheer fact of being-seen, being-heard, being-
talked-about, being-circulated, being-encountered, being-electrified, and, 
of course, being—or perhaps not being—ephemeral.45 
These properties in Tata's description of e-jects are similar to many descriptions of 
glitches, and because glitches proliferate from other electronic objects I explore the 
visibility of glitches as a manifestation of non-human visual culture. While human ears 
may hear a noise, computers communicate. Although silicon may construct the 
substance of computer memory, this does not negate how computers can and do 
affectively experience memories. Glitches confront us, have the potential to queer us 
                                            
44 Michael Angelo Tata, "Is There an E-Ject? Rumor, Rumination" (paper presented at the 
Digital Arts and Culture Conference, 2009). 
45 Ibid. 
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and, more specifically, queer our understanding of (digital) visual culture by refiguring 
how we understand the visible forms of (digital) failure.  
Whether we consider instances when televisions or computers glitch, or 
consider instances when digital cameras and photographs glitch, I remain perplexed 
and have a sense of wonder about the possibility for an ontological account that would 
allow me to understand if or how the digital imag(in)es itself. To provide an argument 
about how the digital imag(in)es itself requires that we fully account for the conditions 
whereby digital objects, things, or e-jects can become positioned ontologically on their 
own terms. To this end, I want to raise some questions about a glitched digital 
photograph as an attempt to explore how this photograph functions as an instance 
when the digital imag(in)es itself. 
5.3.1 Does Ethical Consideration Allow Us To See the Digital Imag(in)ing Itself? 
This glitched picture is the visible result from my attempt to access a 
photograph from the memory card of a digital camera through software on my 
computer (Figure 5.4). I am initially inclined to argue that this photograph is the result of 
my computer aiming to access and process the memory of my digital camera SD card 
and the data it encountered was not compatible with the software I used or was 
otherwise inaccessible. The camera utilizes its hardware to capture and store light that 
is, in turn, transcoded by software into bits of data that can be recollected and made 
visible by software on a computer. Similar to my previous discussion about computer 
communication, these movements of data and memory function as forms of 
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communication between digital devices as much as they often appear to function as a 
visible form for memory miscommunications. 
 
Figure 5.4 Glitched digital photograph 
David Gunkel, as I previously explain, argues that these forms of memory 
exchange illustrate information processing machines engaging in ethical forms of 
communication. Gunkel argues that our understanding about the ethical behavior of 
machines can be determined based on how ethics have been defined as "systematic 
rules of behavior that can be encoded, like an algorithm, and implemented by different 
moral agents."46 It seems ironic that machines like computers have not challenged bio-
centric prejudice before the animal because, Gunkel explains, "unlike the animal, the 
machine, especially the information processing machine that comprises so much of 
                                            
46 Gunkel, Thinking Otherwise: 128. 
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contemporary technology, appears to possess something like intelligence, reason."47 
While machines would not think or communicate like humans or animals, Gunkel 
argues that for the need to examine how "machine intelligence may take place and be 
organized completely otherwise."48 
Emmanuel Levinas provides additional insight about the intersection between 
communication, ethics, and Being within a framework for ethical engagements with 
Otherness. Levinas argues that the center for ethical and affective relations can be 
located in the "face" as a surface for linguistic and communicative processes. Within 
his account, beings can interact by "facing" other beings, which allows us to create 
and engage in ethical, affective relations. Facing "the Other," he explains, "is to 
welcome his expression," to welcome an "ethical relation" where "at each instant he 
overflows;" and it is information and exchange we "receive from the Other" as an inter-
face "beyond the capacity of the I" where we began.49 To imagine the face of a 
computer or a digital camera requires that we expand our understanding of ethics, 
                                            
47 Ibid., 126. One could also extend this critique of to zoocentrism in animal studies as Steven 
Shaviro has suggested: "I'm not being facetious when I criticize the zoocentrism of 'animal 
studies.' What about plants, fungi, protists, bacteria, etc?" This post on Twitter has also been 
quoted in Bogost's work. See Bogost, Alien Phenomenology: 8; Steven Shaviro, "Zoocentrism 
of of 'Animal Studies'," Twitter, Retrieved September 16, 2009, 
https://twitter.com/shaviro/status/4038354360. 
48 Gunkel, Thinking Otherwise: 149. 
49 Levinas, Totality and Infinity: 50-51. Further, my argument is not to be confused with works 
by scholars who employ Levinas to discuss inter-facing between humans and perpetuate the 
objectification of the machine. While there may be facings between humans in cyberspace, as 
argued by Zembylas and Vrasidas, the computer must not be excluded from the 
communication network. See Michalinos Zembylas and Charalambos Vrasidas, "Levinas and 
the "Inter-Face": The Ethical Challenge of Online Education," Educational Theory 55, no. 1 
(2005): 61-78. 
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which becomes a possibility by foregrounding how humans inter-face with machines 
through computer interfaces.50  
To locate a face within an interface where we can see the glitched digital 
photograph (in this case, perhaps an operating system made visible on a computer 
monitor) requires us to not only recognize but also acknowledge how computers 
independently and diligently mediate non-human information behind the complexion of 
an interface. To acknowledge this would be an about-face from anthropocentric and 
humanist ethical engagements, an about-face that would account for the complexities 
of digital communication and intelligence that becomes visible in the form of a glitch. In 
this way, the computer reveals its ability produce a visible form for how it mediates and 
communicates digital information but this does not fully account for how the digital 
imag(in)es its non-human existence. 
5.3.2 Does Ontological Reconfiguration Allow Us To See the Digital Imag(in)ing Itself? 
Lingering beneath much of what I have written to this point in the chapter are 
conversations taking place about object-oriented ontology. I find Levi Bryant's notion 
of Flat Ontology to be an insightful pathway toward an initial understanding about the 
metaphysical manifestations of all beings. Bryant conceptualizes flat ontology as path 
toward a democracy of objects, which is an aim to flatten ontological divisiveness by 
affirming how all objects maintain the same ontological status. Bryant makes these 
                                            
50 The distinction between "inter-face" and "interface" is meant to differentiate between 
programmed interfaces (like GUIs) and how we can engage or interrelate with the Other by 
inter-facing. 
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arguments most broadly by suggesting that "all things equally exist, yet they do not 
exist equally."51  
Ian Bogost extends Bryant's arguments to suggest "tiny ontology" as another 
approach toward understanding the existence of things. Bogost also notes Bruno 
Latour as an influence for his notion of ontology but, in light of additional theoretical 
influences (and objections), Bogost proposes the "unit" (as opposed to Bryant's 
"object" or Latour's "actor") as a more malleable category to understand the presence 
of things and beings.52 Bogost writes about the "unit" in his earlier book, Unit 
Operations;53 but, within the context of a unit-oriented ontology, he uses it as an 
"ambivalent" term to define beings because units can simultaneously function as 
singularities or unitary entities as well as units within a system or collection of other 
units. Within this context, then, is it possible to understand the computer as a non-
human being because it is a singularity like all other singularities? Or, by extension, 
does it suggest that the glitch also functions as a non-human being rather than the 
bastard child of digital media? 
                                            
51 Although Ian Bogost provided this as a summary of Bryant's work, Bryant affirms this as a 
good way to define a democracy of objects. See Bogost, Alien Phenomenology: 10; Bryant, 
The Democracy of Objects: 11. 
52 For example, Bogost remains critical Latour's Actor-Network-Theory when it functions as "an 
overly normalized structure, one driven by order and predefinition." Bogost contends that 
actor-network theory might consider a redirection toward "Latour's later notion of the 
imbroglio, a confusion in which 'it's never clear who and what is acting'." See Bogost, Alien 
Phenomenology: 17-23; Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-
Network-Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
53 Ian Bogost, Unit Operations: An Approach to Videogame Criticism (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2006). 
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5.3.3 The Digital Glitch Imag(in)es its Queerness as a "Strange Stranger" 
I find Bogost's conceptualization of the "unit" to be informative in light of 
Shaviro's central concern about aesthetics. Bogost's unit remains, by and large, 
ambivalent, and resonates with Shaviro's discussion about our inability to fully grasp 
affective, aesthetic relations. The ambivalence of the unit becomes apparent for 
Bogost by stating that "units operate … acting and reacting to properties and states 
while still keeping something secret."54 Within this context, Bogost and Shaviro both 
seem to affirm how the aim to define objects, units, or things will always result in 
opacities where full understanding remains indescribably out of reach. 
Not only is this uncertainty or ambivalence refreshing, but it also reveals our 
rather queer relation to non-human beings. While queerness is not explicitly what 
Bogost or Shaviro address, queerness comes to the fore through their uses of the 
word "alien" (or alienation) to describe encounters with objects and things.55 This is 
perhaps more explicit in Levi Bryant's writing about "Phallosophy," where he suggests 
that the withdrawal of objects becomes "so abyssal that it moves beyond any 
epistemological limitation" and creates what Timothy Morton has called a "strange 
stranger."56 In response to the emergence of this "strange stranger" Bryant asks: "does 
this deserves [sic] the title of a queer ontology, in addition to the title of feminist 
                                            
54 ——, Alien Phenomenology: 25. 
55 It is also important to note how they use the term "alienation" within differing philosophical 
contexts. Alienation is Whiteheadian for Shaviro and Husserlian for Bogost.  
56 Levi Bryant, "Phallosophy," Retrieved March 15, 2011, 
http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2011/03/15/phallosophy/; Timothy Morton, "Queer 
Objects," Retrieved March 15, 2011, 
http://ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com/2011/03/queer-objects.html. 
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ontology?"57 Within the context of digital media and aesthetics, the glitched picture 
reveals at least one answer: the digital image(in)es itself for us within a the familiar form 
of the glitch and does so to reveal itself as a queer, strange stranger.  
In short, unintentional and unexpected glitches become the visible manifestation 
of digital, non-human Beings failing to be for humans by failing to conform to 
anthropocentric and humanist forms of visible existence. Glitches become 
performative utterances for the failure of digital objects to constitute their being 
through the human. Glitches force us to consider why we should think otherwise about 
ontology by lending visible form to digital objects as unbecoming objects—that is, ill-
suited as objects while also turning into or becoming beings beyond subject-object 
dialectics—and this becomes the context where glitches visibly indicate their desire to 
perpetuate queer relationships to failure. Glitches confront us, have the potential to 
queer us by avoiding our full understanding and, more specifically, queer our 
understanding of visual culture by refiguring the impact of visible failure. Whether we 
consider instances when televisions or computers glitch, or instances when digital 
cameras and photographs glitch, each of these moments of failure should facilitate a 
sense of wonder because we have become privy to the pleasure of seeing this strange 
stranger while the digital images and imagines itself. 
                                            
57 In response to this question he discusses the strangeness of queerness as emerging from 
the uncanny and a penchant for masquerade, which reveal the capacity to disclose "the 
relation that is a non-relation to the strange stranger." See Bryant, "Phallosophy". 
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CODA: HAVING SEEN OBLIQUELY 
If at first you don't succeed, failure may be 
your style. —Quentin Crisp1 
Each of the previous chapters has moved toward an answer for my initial 
question, that is, what circumstances might reveal the queerness of images. I 
addressed why images function strangely within visual culture before I began to 
interrogate how we can see the queerness of images. I began my discussion about the 
strangeness of images by addressing how fantasies are projected upon will-be-born 
children in fetal photographs. Then, I turned to figures of queer children to reflect upon 
these projections. These children illustrated sideways approaches to visual culture and 
provided insight about how we could approach the strangeness of images by torquing 
our vision to see obliquely. This oblique approach to visual culture led me to explain 
how we could initially locate these images lingering beyond seeable surfaces (like 
pictures and photographs), where the avisual properties of images allow them to move 
within thresholds between bodies and things. I ended Chapter One by suggesting that 
not only we had begun to see the queerness of images but that the process of seeing 
obliquely would result in greater understanding about "aesthetics of failure" and why 
aesthetic forms of failure are worthy of our sight. But, before I return to this point, I 
want to briefly walk through the ways we have seen obliquely and the places where 
these queer forms of sight have taken us. 
I continued to explore the queerness of images beyond fetal photographs by 
suggesting various ways we could torque our vision to see obliquely, beyond surfaces 
                                            
1 Quentin Crisp, The Naked Civil Servant (New York: Plume, 1986), 196. 
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of visibility. This included refiguring how staring can function within looking relations to 
facilitate a sense of wonder; extending this sense of wonder to fascination by 
increasing our attention to visual details; shifting our fascination within ocularcentric 
paradigms toward the audible, avisual properties of visual culture; and looking to the 
peripheries of our vision where the noisiness of visual culture provides a new insight 
about visual failure.  
Each of these methods aimed to torque our vision to see obliquely while also 
providing new insights about where we could encounter the queerness of images. In 
Chapter Two, I torqued our attention from the oblique sight of avisual images toward 
the possibility to experience these movements with a sense of wonder. I considered 
how it would be possible to decrease our distance from the image by finding ways to 
refigure our participation in looking relations and, in this case, it was the pixel—or, 
more accurately, a pixelated point-of-view—that provided clarification. Processes of 
pixelization drew our attention to the shame that sticks to uncertainties about images 
of "lacking" bodies but also revealed how a much broader range of images accumulate 
and proliferate within virtuality. Despite the failure to fully master the many forms 
images might take, a pixelated point-of-view revealed why baroque looking relations 
and acts of staring facilitate our ability to embrace these failures as an alternative 
relationship to visual culture.  
While I continued to explore how a sense of wonder and fascination operate in 
Chapter Three, I also addressed why our ability to fully understand images and visual 
culture did not improve once we shifted our focus from bodies that "lack" toward more 
intimate engagements with details on the surfaces of bodies. Rather, turning to precise 
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details within the context of Michael Jackson's malleable forms of embodiment 
revealed how our proximity to the details of pictures also cut away from the confines of 
visible certainty. More specifically, the proximity to these details cut toward 
disorienting experiences with visual culture. From this point, I pushed the discussion 
about Jackson's hyphenated forms of post-human embodiment into the final two 
chapters of my dissertation, where I addressed the persistence of uncertainty and 
disorientation arising from images circulating around non-human bodies and beings. In 
Chapter Four, I addressed how a visual culture of things emerges when we look 
beyond the visible surfaces of objects. Further, this chapter explicitly engaged with the 
sonic properties of visual culture to explore how the avisual properties of air facilitate 
the possibility to see the processes of becoming ec-static, or a mode of being that 
occupies spaces beside and beyond the body, similar to the threshold where images 
reside.  
Finally, in Chapter Five, I extended my discussion about sound toward noisy 
forms of being that reside at the peripheries of our vision. My discussion about the 
audio/visual properties of plasticity and thingness in Chapter Four allowed me to 
explore how we see beyond the surfaces of (everyday) objects to see a visual culture of 
things. In contrast, in Chapter Five I addressed everyday experiences with digital failure 
through glitch images. Digital glitches reveal ephemeral or indiscernible forms for 
images being produced by non-human beings and also function as visible 
manifestations for our strange encounters with the strangeness of non-humans and 
images. Yet, our experiences with digital glitches reveal more about the queerness of 
images and about how we can understand aesthetics of failure. At the end of Chapter 
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Five I argued that each experience with failure should facilitate a sense of wonder 
because it has become a moment when the digital imag(in)es itself, a moment where 
we encounter and see the strange stranger who often remains within the peripheries of 
our vision.  
To conclude my reflection on the queerness of images I want to take these 
arguments about digital images a bit further. I want to suggest that all of the images I 
have addressed have been "strange strangers," and I alluded to this much earlier in my 
dissertation when I made reference to Nancy's point about the aporetic properties of 
images, which position images as familiar and untenable or unreachable. Further, I 
want to suggest that the strangeness of images emerges because images move 
beyond the surfaces of visibility, beyond the surfaces that often remain the central 
focus within studies of visual culture. Finally, I want to affirm that the failure of images 
to become visible is merely one way in which images function like digital glitches: in 
this case, images fail to be properly presentable to humans from an anthropocentric, 
human point-of-view.  
These are the strange properties of images that point to their queerness. This 
penchant for strangeness and failure is what queer children have in common with 
images, and indicates why these children provided such valuable insight about how 
and where we could begin to locate the queerness of images. Images, like these 
children, flamboyantly affirm failure as their style. This similarity (or proximity) also 
reveals why images are ideal candidates to enable our study of oblique and queer 
approaches to visual culture as well as aesthetics of failure. These are queer aesthetics 
mobilizing beyond our control, where images are becoming intelligible only because 
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they are messy, disrupt, shock, and annihilate our understanding of visual culture.2 
Only after these modes of seeing are unfolded, showing us the many strange 
movements that often remain hidden, can we finally understand and experience 
beautifully oblique and ec-static forms of failure. 
                                            
2 Halberstam, Queer Art of Failure: 110. 
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